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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an attempt to fill the theoretical and empirical gap that exists in current 
small arms literature, which has failed to examine and identify the different aspects that 
are involved with small arms transfers in Southeast insurgencies. Small arms not only 
play a significant role in all internal conflicts throughout the world, but they are of 
particular concern right through Asia, where civil wars have tended to last longer than 
those in any other region. This study uses a comprehensive dataset that defines active 
armed conflict in Southeast Asia during 2002. This has allowed for the detailed analysis 
of three countries within Southeast Asia, where government forces have been involved in 
active armed conflict with insurgent groups. Important aspects of this thesis include; the 
analysis of external and internal sources insurgent groups are able to secure both 
financially and militarily; the most important sources of supply for insurgent groups 
obtaining small arms; and how the supply, use and accumulation of these small arms by 
insurgent groups have affected internal conflict. This study suggests that internal sources, 
rather than external sources, are more important for insurgent groups in securing forms of 
finances and weaponry. The most important sources of supply for obtaining small arms 
would also tend to come from internal sources. Furthermore, it is likely that variables of 
intra-state conflicts, such as duration and intensity, have been highly affected by small 
arms usage. This thesis concludes by suggesting that the study of how insurgent groups 
obtain different forms of finances and resources is equally as important as the analysis of 
how insurgent groups obtain small arms.  
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Chapter 1
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE SMALL ARMS PLAY WITHIN 
INTRA-STATE CONFLICT
1.1 Introduction: The Effects of Small Arms Use in Intra-State Conflicts
Small arms in the 21st century pose a major problem for countries that are easily 
susceptible to internal conflict. Small arms give non-state actors the ability to initiate and 
carry out continuing armed violence, through the use of these particular weapons. Access 
to small arms by insurgent groups is a key variable in the conflict cycle of an internal 
conflict. It is this access of supply that allows non-state actors the ability to continue 
fighting in internal conflict. While demand for small arms in internal conflict usually 
exceeds supply, it is this supply of weaponry that is crucial for insurgent groups to 
effectively wage civil war against a sovereign government. Without any form of small 
arms supply non-state actors remain powerless in their goal to defeat government forces.
Small arms establish a threat to state survival in weak or failing states, as highlighted by 
Klare (2004) who states, “it means that antigovernment formations can readily assemble 
sufficient weaponry to mount a revolution or insurgency” (ibid:123). Small arms have 
many distinctive features according to Klare (2004) that make them attractive to ethnic 
militias, insurgent forces, criminal bands and other paramilitary forces. They are light
weight allowing a solider to move on foot more easily, they are small meaning they are 
easy to hide and conceal, and they are readily affordable and available (ibid:123). It is 
these characteristics alone that allow small arms to be a decisive factor within internal 
conflicts. As Klare (2004) states, “for all these reasons – ease of operation, lightness, 
affordability, concealability  global availability – small arms and light weapons constitute 
the principal instrument of violence in all of the internal conflicts of the post Cold War 
era” (ibid:125).
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 Small arms are responsible for as “much as 90% of the casualties in current regional 
conflicts and civil wars” (Erwin, 1998 cited in Sislin and Pearson, 2001:17). According to 
the Small Arms Survey (2003), “small arms misuse is one of the leading causes of fatal 
and non-fatal injury. An estimated 300,000 people are killed as a result of small arm 
misuse each year in conflict” (ibid:132). Furthermore, “light weapons were the only arms 
used in 46 of 49 conflicts since 1990 (Klare,1999:21). The percentage of civilians killed 
in conflicts due to small arm use is estimated by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross to be more than 35% (Red Cross, June 1999 cited in Cakier, 2002:263). Arms that 
are transferred through black-market and covert governmental channels that find there 
way into the hands of non-state actors play a disproportionate role in fuelling ethnic and 
internal conflicts (Klare, 1999:22). Generally weapons transfers will consist of small 
arms and light weapons, because of their ability to be recycled from previous conflicts 
and their ease of availability. 
The supply of small arms to insurgent groups has a direct effect on the life cycle of 
internal conflict in a region. As Fearon (2002) states “civil wars tend to last a long time 
when neither side can disarm the other, causing a military stalemate” (ibid:2). It is 
virtually impossible to stop the flow of arms supply to insurgent groups because of the 
many borders states are forced to defend. This is in addition to many of the states lacking 
the financial resources to monitor their borders to incoming ships, making arms 
smuggling extremely difficult to defend against. Furthermore, governments in various 
states are virtually powerless to stop raids and ambushes from occurring on military and 
police targets within regions that are prone to insurgent rebellions. These factors can 
result in military stalemates between governments and insurgent forces in many weak 
states. Governments in many underdeveloped countries cannot stop the supply of small 
arms to insurgent forces, while on the other hand; insurgent forces are not equipped with
enough heavy weaponry to defeat governments through military means.
 Small Arm use in civil wars can also be a direct result of a failed state. This is 
highlighted by Rotberg (2004) who states, “in most failed states government troops battle 
armed revolts led by one or more rivals” (ibid:5). This is the case in most underdeveloped
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countries, where governments face armed conflict from more than one non-state group, 
who may even be from the same ethnic background. As Rotberg (2004) points out, “the 
civil wars that characterise failed states usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity” (ibid:30). In general these are the 
main causes that directly effect conflict in many underdeveloped and third world 
countries and cause states to collapse in different continents throughout the world. To 
prevent states collapsing, “it is essential to realise action above and beyond controlling 
illicit weapons, by tackling widespread civilian demand, security personnel’s misuse of 
weapons and the transfer of weapons to non-state armed groups” (Pattugalan, 2003:15). 
Arms transfers can also occur in an internal or civil conflict, when an insurgent group 
needs external supplies and aid, one form of which is arms. Analysing arms transfers to
non-state actors, needs to take into account who supplies, how much and with what 
impact. Arms transfers are common in internal conflicts in regions such as Southeast 
Asia, as they are seen as a way of influencing government decision making through the 
use or threat of use of violence. Light arms and primitive implements generally are more 
readily at hand and subject to less government control than heavy weapons (Sislin and 
Pearson, 2001:38). Hence they are generally the weapons of choice by non-state actors in 
intra-state conflict.
1.2 The Problems Associated with Small Arms Transfers to Insurgent Groups in 
Southeast Asia 
The transfer of small arms and light weapons to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia has 
become a contentious issue for governments and their leaders in the region. Not only is 
Southeast Asia home to a magnitude of weak states, but the borders of many countries in 
the region are susceptible to arms smuggling and trafficking. Furthermore, ethnic 
divisions and cultural differences plague the region causing greater instability and
making it prone to internal conflict. Arms transfers to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia
have continued to impact and influence the outcome of many civil wars in the region. 
Insurgent groups in the Philippines and Indonesia such as the New Peoples Army (NPA); 
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the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Gerakan Aceh Movement (GAM) 
have been military engaged against their respective governments for a number of decades 
and as a result has progressed the onset of civil war, as well as increasing the duration
and longevity of violent conflict in Southeast Asia.
This thesis will be looking at the problems associated with small arms use by insurgent 
groups within internal conflict in Southeast Asia. Currently very little literature is 
available on small arms transfers to non-state actors in Southeast Asia within the context 
of internal conflicts or civil wars in the region. One of the main factors for using 
Southeast Asia as a case study is that the area of small arms in internal conflict in the 
region has largely been understudied and neglected. Furthermore, Fearon (2002) has 
found that “civil wars in Asia have lasted longer on average than those in any other 
region” (ibid:11). Accordingly the rate of outbreak in Asia for civil wars was the highest 
than any other region, at three per hundred country-years (Fearon and Latin, 2003:77). 
This is reflected in the increased average duration of civil wars worldwide which has 
increased from two years in 1947 to about 15 years in 1999 (Fearon and Latin, 2003:78).
The increase in duration of civil wars in Southeast Asia can be indirectly attributed to the 
increase in small arm proliferation the region has faced over the last few decades. This 
has resulted in the increasing misuse of small arms and weapons especially by non-state 
actors and fuelled the fire for many of the internal conflicts.
 Capie (2002) has been the first scholar to initiate the first comprehensive study of small 
arms production and transfers both licit and illicit in Southeast Asia. Capie’s (2002) study 
concludes that Southeast Asia has a serious problem with the leakage of illegally owned 
weapons and with the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (ibid:iii). Further 
to this Bedeski et al (1998) comments that there is potential for an explosive mix in 
Southeast Asia due to the economic shocks of recent years combined with the growing 
market in small arms (ibid:i). Previous studies by Chalk (1997) have highlighted the 
susceptibility of insurgent groups forming in Southeast Asian and initiating internal 
conflict, because of the number of post-independent states structures throughout 
Southeast Asia that contain significant sectors of population who do not identify either 
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with their ruling groups or territorial boundaries, such as Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Burma (ibid:17). It is these three countries that form the case studies in this thesis.      
There are numerous sources of external and internal supply of small arms available to 
insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. For many insurgent groups in the region small arms 
are seen as a means of influencing or changing government decision making by the use of 
armed violence. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of armed conflict has changed 
from being predominately inter-state to an intra-state based conflict. As Kramer (2001)
comments, “very few resources have been committed to analyzing the small arms 
situation in Southeast Asia, largely because small arms have only recently been viewed as 
an issue of national security” (ibid:2). Furthermore each country in Southeast Asia is 
affected by small arms in a different way and to a different degree (Kramer, 2001:2). This 
makes it hard for the different states to formulate one policy that can be put in place 
throughout all the countries in Southeast Asia. However more recently governments in 
Southeast Asia have become increasingly worried about the growing illicit trade in small 
arms. Inadequate laws, regulations, policing of borders and corruption are a number of 
factors contributing to the ineffective control of stopping weapon flows to insurgent 
groups.
Arms that are supplied to insurgent forces can result in lengthy wars of attrition, as seen 
in previous civil wars, where arms supply has been a major determinant of outcomes in 
civil wars (Harkavy and Neuman, 1985, cited in Brzoska and Pearson, 1994:8). However 
on the other hand Brzoska and Pearson (1994) state that, “denial of arms supplies either 
freezes or erases force advantage, leading one or both sides to face higher costs and 
greater losses, thus presumably hastening the search for negotiated settlements” (ibid:9). 
This highlights the vital role small arms play in the onset and duration of a civil war in 
Southeast Asia. The problems associated with small arms supply to insurgent groups in 
Southeast Asia are numerous. Generally any weapons acquired by insurgent groups in the 
region are used to further their own goals and ambitions. While armed violence is only 
one way of achieving these goals, it generally is the rule rather than the exception.
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Tracing arms transfers to insurgent groups is one way to combat and prevent arms supply 
to non-state actors. However as Bedeski et al, (1998) points out, “there is no 
comprehensive database of small arms and acquisitions and inventories available that is 
comparable to the one on large conventional weapons manufactured by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)” (ibid:16). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that a database cannot be created. As Klare (1999) states, “while much 
data has been collected on the topic, no uniform set of statistics has yet been discovered” 
(ibid:11). Small arms data to insurgent groups is not as detailed as major conventional 
weapons data-sets in the sense of allowing for major military goods transferred and the 
political and financial conditions of their transfer (Brozoska and Pearson, 1994:17). 
However, like the data on conventional weapons, the perception of timing is also 
important in analyzing the affect of arms transfers in internal conflict. This is highlighted 
by Brozoska and Pearson (1994) who state, “timing and the perception of time is of 
utmost importance, not only because weapons arriving at the wrong time might be 
useless, but also because the timing of weapons deals affects political and military 
decision-making calculus even before the arms are delivered” (ibid:17). Insurgent groups 
are highly dependent on the timing of weapons supply in internal conflict. Without a 
constant source of supply of weapons, insurgent groups are powerless to force 
governments to the negotiation table or bringing their objectives into the attention of the 
public eye. However, surprisingly little has been written about the effect arms transfers 
have on the conflict cycles of internal conflict in Southeast Asia.
Tracing arms transfers to insurgent groups highlights the external and internal flows of
logistical support insurgent groups are able to obtain. External and internal support 
includes financial as well as military aid. As Sislin and Pearson (2001) point out “we 
need to know much more about which suppliers, close at hand or at a distance, are crucial 
for the fuelling of war” (ibid:20). Currently there is little literature on the transfer and 
supply of small arms to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. Furthermore there is even 
less literature on the effect small arms transfers to insurgent groups have on internal 
conflict in the region. Hence many unanswered questions exist in regards to arms 
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transfers to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. A large reason for this is that many of the 
reports dealing with this subject come from a relatively small set of overseas 
correspondents and official statements by the local press and government (Sislin and 
Pearson, 2001:33). As Weezeman (2003) points out:
“Suppliers and recipients usually keep such transfers secret. The information on arms transfers 
to non-state actors that is reported in the public domain is difficult or impossible to verify, It 
may come from possibly biased and unreliable sources such as security organisations fighting 
the rebel groups on which they report” (ibid:17).
However as previously mentioned, the collection of data on small arms transfers in 
general has increased over the years. Projects like the Institute of International Studies, 
now exist which publishes an annual Small Arms Survey that primarily concentrates on 
the effects small arms have on the world’s poorest countries. However Weezman (2003) 
comments that “the usefulness of this data is very limited, as there is no indication of who 
received which weapons and how they were received” (ibid:18). Nevertheless, projects 
like these acknowledge the harm small arms have on internal conflict in underdeveloped
countries, with small arms being implicated in more than 300,000 deaths each year, 
primarily in the worlds poorest countries (Small Arms Survey, 2003:iii).
Weezman (2003) also comments that the availability of data on transfers of small arms 
and other types of under-reported arms transfers has increased for two reasons. First 
increased interest in the issue of small arms has led to a significant increase in the 
resources for research into the issue (ibid:17). As previously mentioned this has led to 
data gathering efforts by organisations such as the Small Arms Survey, as well as the 
Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT). NISAT lists many new reports 
related directly to arms transfers to insurgent forces in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, 
NISAT collects the reported data on arms sources for insurgent groups in each of the 
conflicts within Southeast Asia. Second, more news resources are now easily accessible 
via the internet, and Weezeman (2003) finds that “for research on small arms it is 
necessary to scan a large number of news sources, including regional, national and 
subnational sources” (ibid:17).
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This thesis is an attempt to fill these gaps in current research. Previously no study 
analysing the dynamics of arms transfers to non-state actors, such as insurgent groups has 
transpired. However, more recently articles have been published with initial steps looking 
at the analysis of arms transfers to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. As Bedeski et al 
(1998) highlights:
“To complicate matters, the task of obtaining data on legal trade in weapons (including small 
arms) is rather challenging because such data is often considered sensitive material by many 
East Asian governments. However this author believes that the collection and analysis of 
comprehensive data is conceivable with future research (ibid:6)”.
Small arms are an important research area in Southeast Asia as highlighted by Pattugalan 
(2003) who states, “ASEAN has increased its awareness of arms smuggling and the 
human costs because of increased attention to terrorism and its links to illicit arms 
transfers. The focus on arms smuggling has however left out analysis and action on 
curbing demand and ending misuse” (ibid:15). It is this future research and the analysis
of problems associated with small arms transfers to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia, 
that form the key methodology of this thesis.  
1.3 Conceptual Clarifications  
(i) Small Arms
Small Arms have been defined by the July 2003 United Nations (UN) Generally 
Assembly Document as generally “considered to be weapons manufactured to military 
specifications that are designed for personal use as opposed to those requiring several 
people or crew to operate and maintain. It includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, 
rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns” (ibid:14).
Small arms differ from heavy weapons in that they can be carried by an individual or a 
small group of people, are relatively cheap to buy and require little or minimum technical 
knowledge. Heavy weapons on the other hand, which include tanks, aircraft fighters and 
surface to air missiles are expensive and require technical knowledge to operate. They are 
also hard in finding sources of supply, with only a few countries specializing in their 
production. For most insurgent groups, heavy weapons are virtually unobtainable. 
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Sislin and Pearson (2001) define two basic types of armament which might be employed 
by ethnic groups and states militarily. First there is ‘major conventional weapons’ as
analysed and produced by SIPRI which tracks items such as, aircraft, armoured vehicles, 
artillery and warships. Furthermore a definition of heavy weapons has been generated by
the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which divides heavy weapons into categories just 
mentioned (ibid:28). In contrast to major convention weapons, small arms are described 
by Sislin and Pearson (2001) as weapons that are excluded from the existing SIPRI data 
sets or the UN register, which focus only on major weapons (ibid:29). Furthermore, small 
arms can be carried by an individual soldier or in a light vehicle, which can be defined as 
the portability definition of light arms (Pearson, 1994:29). Klare (2004) comments that, 
“small arms occupy a middle ground between non-military firearms (hunting guns, 
sporting guns, handguns) and the major weapons used by modern military forces (tanks, 
artillery pieces, helicopters, combat planes etc)” (ibid:121). Klare (2004) justifies these 
distinctions by finding that non-military small arms are not sufficiently lethal and rugged 
to be employed in substantial military operations and major weapons require training and 
maintenance to use (ibid:122). Small arms have none of these liabilities and as Klare 
(2004) states, “it is not surprising that such munitions have become the weapons of 
choice for irregular forces in internal conflict situations” (ibid:122).
 However, while a line can be drawn to distinguish small arms from heavy weapons, 
there is still no universally accepted definition of small arms (Small Arms Survey, 
2003:60). Generally small arms used by insurgent groups in Southeast Asia to date, have 
been weapons that are carried by an individual solider. The terrain in many of the 
countries forces insurgent rebels to carry only the bare necessities. For a typical insurgent 
solider in Southeast Asia, their equipment will consist of a semi-automatic weapon, with 
a few rounds of ammunition which are used sparingly, along with knives, home made 
bombs or military issued grenades. A number of factors dictate this, including the ability 
for the rebel soldier to fight in the forest without being bogged down by gear.
Furthermore, financial constraints also force soldiers to carry the bear minimum of 
weaponry, for fear of losing it or it being captured, or simply because there is not enough 
weapons and ammunition available to a large group of soldiers. While no universal 
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definition of small arms has been formulated, general characteristics do exist, that draw a 
distinct line between small and heavy weapons. 
(ii) Arms transfers
Arms transfers are defined by Pearson (1994) as the “shipment of arms or related goods 
and services by sale, loan or gift from another country to another; such shipment may be 
by one country to another, by a government to specific individuals or forces (e.g. rebels), 
abroad, or by a manufacturer to either a foreign government or forces” (ibid:7). This 
study is concerned with the way in which insurgent groups in the region of Southeast 
Asia acquire arms, through transfers. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent 
ending of the Cold War, arms transfers from governments to insurgent forces have 
become more the exception than the rule. Instead insurgent groups are now more likely to 
acquire their arms from the black market, leakages in government stockpiles and 
battlefield acquisition such as raids and ambushes on government forces and weapons 
depots. Neighbouring countries who supply weapons to insurgent groups in other 
countries, risk the prospect of causing instability in their own country, which could have 
a domino effect in the rest of the region. Due to the economies of Southeast Asia 
countries becoming more integrated and involved in free trade with one another, 
governments in the region are now more concerned with the stability of neighbouring 
economies.
In this thesis, the definition of arms transfers needs to have a meaning that is more suited 
and reflective of the way insurgent groups in Southeast Asia gather weapons. Here arms 
transfers to insurgent groups are defined as the, “acquisition of weapons through legal or 
illegal channels which are used for illicit or violent purposes”. The ability of insurgent 
groups to acquire weapons through legal channels are virtually non-existent. Any state 
that is involved in active armed conflict with insurgents would never support the transfer 
of arms by another state to the insurgent rebellion. It is more likely that arms acquired 
through legal channels will involve covert methods; that is arms transferred to non-state 
actors by government agencies. This gives states the ability to supply weaponry to non-
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state actors without breaking their export laws.  Illegal channels include the black market; 
battlefield acquisition and purchases from government stockpiles and forces. Furthermore 
the definition of arms transfers to insurgent groups can be extended to take into account 
only small arms, light weapons and the correlating ammunition which are made readily 
abundant to insurgent groups by a number of suppliers in Southeast Asia.
(iii) Insurgency 
For the purposes of this thesis the definition by the Uppsala Conflict Data Set has been 
used to define an active armed conflict1. The threshold to define an active armed conflict 
has been set at 25 battle deaths per year. As Gledistch et al (2002) states, “the lower 
threshold adopted here – 25 deaths in a single year is high enough for the violence to 
represent a politically significant event, although the precise local and international 
impact may vary” (ibid:617). Furthermore Gleditsch et al (2002) has defined internal 
armed conflict “occurring between the government of a state and internal opposition 
groups without intervention from other states” (ibid:619). Gleditsch et al (2002) has
placed armed conflict into three different subsets. Minor Armed Conflict involves at least 
25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle related deaths during the 
course of the conflict. Intermediate Armed Conflict involves at least 25 battle related 
deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in 
any given year. War occurs when there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year 
(ibid:619). 
 The Conflict Data Set lists three countries in Southeast Asia that were affected by active 
armed conflicts by insurgent groups in 2002. These countries and the respective insurgent 
groups in conflict were as follows; Burma/Myanmar: Shan State Army (SSA) and the 
Karen National Union (KNU); Indonesia: Gerakan Aceh Movement (Free Aceh 
Movement or GAM); and the Philippines: New Peoples Army (NPA), the Moro Islamic 
                                                
1 An active armed conflict is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, “as a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government of territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” (Gledistch et al, 
2002:618)
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Liberation Front (MILF), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG). The common observations that Gleditsch et al (2002) found is,
internal conflict has been the dominant form of conflict throughout most of the post-
World War II period (ibid:623). This is much the same case as in Southeast Asia, where 
more recently countries inside the region have faced a growing problem with intra-state 
conflict. 
Fearon and Latin (2003) have defined insurgency as, “a technology of military conflict 
characterised by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base 
areas” (ibid:75). Furthermore, insurgency as a form of warfare can, “be harnessed to 
diverse political agendas, motivations and grievances (Fearon and Latin, 2003:75). While 
Fearon and Latin (2003) find that the concept of insurgency is most clearly associated 
with communism its methods, “have equally served Islamic fundamentalists, ethnic 
nationalists, or ‘rebels’ who focus mainly on traffic in coca or diamonds” (ibid:75). This 
is generally the case in Southeast Asian conflicts, where most of the conflicts centre 
around ethnic and territorial disputes. Insurgency is often the result of retaliation to
government policies or suppression of a minority. According to Fearon and Latin (2003), 
“on the rebel side, insurgency is favoured by rough terrain, rebels with local knowledge 
of the population superior to the governments and a large population. All three of these 
factors aid rebels in hiding from superior government forces (ibid:76).
Insurgents while weak in military force compared to government armed forces are still
able to survive and prosper, “if the government and military they oppose are relatively 
weak-badly financed, organisationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly 
informed about goings on at the local level” (Fearon and Latin, 2003:80). Key factors that 
favour insurgency in countries according to Fearon and Latin (2003) that relate directly to 
insurgent movements in Southeast Asia are whether insurgents have the support from 
foreign governments or Diasporas who are willing to supply weapons, money or training. 
Furthermore, contraband goods such as coca, opium and diamonds which can be used to 
finance insurgencies are important in sustaining an insurgency (ibid:81). It can be argued 
that external support and contraband are two of the most important sources of finace for 
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insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. Ganguly (2003) finds that the persistence of ethnic 
insurgencies in South and Southeast Asia raise two broad questions. First, most of these 
insurgencies have seldom been foreign based sponsored, and second, most of the ethnic 
insurgencies in the region are based around low-intensity wars of attrition and the, 
“movement’s capability to maintain durability, visibility and audibility, especially under 
adverse conditions” (ibid:12-13). According to Ganguly (2003) durability, “comes from 
insurgents’ ability to obtain material support (base, training, finances, weapons, soldiers, 
intelligence etc) from internal and external sources” (ibid:13).    
1.4 Key Questions and Design of the Study
 As previously mentioned the case studies will consist of three countries, and analyse six
different insurgent groups, that are involved in active armed conflict, according to the 
Uppsala Data Set. Apart from these three countries, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia 
having armed groups still active inside their borders, there are other advantages for 
choosing these countries for analysis. As Tharckabaw (2000) a member of the KNU 
points out, in these three countries, “we see that there’s a fairly large number of ethnic 
groups, which have lived more or less in isolation, for centuries, in their own areas, 
before colonisation of the west” (ibid). Other advantages for analysing these three 
countries according to Tharckabaw (2000) are, “contrary to common accusations the 
ethnic conflicts in these countries started without any instigation by the old colonial 
powers or the communists” (ibid). Tharckabaw (2000) goes on to state, “we may also 
view them as conflicts resulting from resistance by the lesser ethnic groups against what 
is now known as internal colonisation” (ibid). 
Furthermore, all three countries have been listed by the Small Arms Survey 2003 as 
capable of producing small arms and ammunition. Small arms transfers have been 
analysed for this study in the context of internal conflicts and civil wars to highlight the 
effect small arms have on these conflicts. This takes into aspects the effects small arms 
have on the onset, progression, duration and intensity of internal conflicts. Currently only 
a handful of studies on the topic of small arms transfers in Southeast Asia are available.
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Even fewer studies take into account the impact small arms transfers to insurgent groups 
have on internal conflict in the region. In many of the conflicts in Southeast Asia small 
arms have been used to initiate conflict between an insurgence force and a ruling 
government, which has generally resulted in violence and battle-related deaths between 
the two sides.
The dynamics of tracing arms supply to insurgents in Southeast Asia will need to identify 
the source of the arms, who are the suppliers and their particular agenda, methods and 
routes taken to transport the arms and the final destination of the arms. To identify these 
factors, the case studies have been broken up into different sections. Key aspects of these 
sections identify the important issues that are have been understudied in the current 
literature. These aspects include the financing and resources insurgents are able to obtain 
in order to buy small arms and provide equipment in which they can wage armed conflict. 
Insurgent and rebel resources can then be tied into small arms transfers within the context 
of internal conflict and civil war literature. The current literature identifies these aspects 
separately but fails to tie them together within aspects of internal conflict theories in 
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, while studies have been done by scholars such as Sislin and 
Pearson (2001) who identify arms as influencing the progression of ethnic conflict by 
looking at variables such as duration and intensity, the case studies they have used do not 
include any countries from Southeast Asia.
Two aspects of small arms literature discussed in the context of internal conflicts that will 
be discussed in depth in this thesis will be the affects small arms have on the duration and 
intensity of intra-state conflict in Southeast Asia. Both these factors are important in 
understanding the phenomena of the detrimental effects small arms misuse by insurgent 
groups has on intra-state conflict in Southeast Asia. The duration of an internal conflict, 
is highly dependent on insurgent groups receiving arms supplies in which to wage war. 
Sislin and Pearson (2001) when discussing ethnic groups, find that if ethnic groups have 
prior access to significant arms supplies when fighting in an internal conflict, the conflict 
will last longer. On the other hand, ethnic groups that do not initiate violence are
generally not well armed (ibid:81). Increasing arms levels argue Sislin and Pearson 
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(2001) take civil violence to new levels, thus enabling the combatants to modify or raise 
their tactics and revert to a greater show of force. A simple proposition would be to state 
that, “a steady arm supplier to insurgent groups in active conflict will increase the 
duration of an internal conflict” (ibid:81). However, this proposition depends on many 
variables, including the intensity at the time of the conflict and the number of external
suppliers available to supply arms. Sislin and Pearson (2001) state that, “the more 
suppliers, the more the long –term commitment to continue backing their client; the 
combatant thus feels secure that resupply will be forthcoming” (ibid:90). Small arms play 
a significant role in internal conflict and by increasing the quantity of small arms to be 
made readily available, it may result in longer duration of an internal conflict.
Intensity of an internal conflict correlates with the availability of small and heavy 
weapons to insurgent groups. The greater the availability of heavy weapons according to 
Sislin and Pearson (2001) the more intense the fighting. However, small arms availability 
will allow insurgent groups to carry out sustained fighting. Furthermore intensity in an 
internal conflict argues Sislin and Pearson (2001) depends on groups being able to be
supplied weapons by a foreign supply. They state that, “external supply seems to fuel the 
fire and to sustain groups in their struggles” (ibid:93). It is likely that if an insurgent 
group lacks access to heavy weapons the ability of that group to engage in intense battles 
will be deficient. The severity of the battle will also be lower if heavy weapons are not 
present. However, this can make the conflict more durable and resistant to mediation or 
negotiation attempts.     
Other factors that are looked at in depth within this study, which provide an important 
insight into filling the current gap in the literature, is the ability of insurgent groups to 
acquire external and internal financial support. This includes looking at where insurgents 
get their funding and resources from and how this correlates to the purchase of small 
arms. This will see the investigation of rebel access to commodities (timber, gems etc) 
and how they use these contraband goods to sustain armed conflict with the purchase of 
small arms. Accessing some form of financial funding is an important factor in an 
insurgent group’s ability to purchase weapons from an external source. Without a form of 
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income an insurgent group struggles to military reequip itself to fight against a 
government force. This is something recognised by the ruling Burmese government the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) who initiated a programme in the 1960s 
known as the ‘Four Cuts’ aimed at stopping the flow of income to insurgent groups.
In summary, the breakdown of the analysis on the six different insurgent groups used in 
this thesis can be outlined in the diagram on the following page. The main goals of this 
thesis are to identify what external and internal sources insurgents groups are able to 
source both financially and military and how they use these resources to wage armed 
conflict and the effect is has on internal conflict in Southeast Asia, by looking at specific 
case studies.   
A number of key questions in the context of arms transfers to insurgent groups in 
Southeast Asia will guide the direction of this thesis, these are:
1. What are the external and internal, financial and military sources for insurgent groups?
2. What are the most important sources of supply for obtaining small arms? 
3. How does the supply, use and accumulation of small arms affect internal conflict?
The answer to these questions will involve the analysis of six different insurgent groups 
in three different countries in the region. This will require the examination of existing 
literature on arms transfers and internal conflict, while formatting any common 
denominators in the different case studies, then reaching a conclusion within a theoretical 
framework that is grounded in existing theory and research.
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Figure 1.1 Breakdown of Variables Used to Analyse the Insurgent Groups
Effects on Internal 
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1.5 A Preview of this Thesis
(i) Thesis Structure and Chapter Outlines
This thesis is broken up into six chapters. The first chapter already discussed, looks at the 
effects of small arms transfers to non-state actors, using South East Asia as the region for 
case studies. The second chapter looks at greater depth the existing research on the 
effects of small arms usage within intra-state conflicts. This chapter initially outlines a 
framework for evaluation on small arms in intra-state conflict. From here the chapter 
looks at current literature and breaks the existing research and literature into two main 
categories; small arms and intra-state conflict. The different variables that make both 
these topics unique and relevant to this thesis are then discussed. The topics of small arms 
and intra-sate conflicts are then placed in the context of Southeast Asia. This is followed 
by a current summary on the current literature and research already outlined in the 
previous part of the chapter.
From here the thesis moves into analysing the three case studies chosen in Southeast 
Asia; Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines and the relevant insurgent groups still 
operating in these countries. Key aspects and objectives in these case studies first focus 
on the historical background to conflict in these countries. The chapters then moves onto 
the analysis of the insurgents groups themselves discussing, the background and goals, 
finance and resources, arms transfers and the effects of arms transfers on internal conflict. 
The sixth and final chapter concludes the study of this thesis and the relevance of this 
study to the region of Southeast Asia. This chapter also summarises the key questions 
that had guided the direction of this thesis throughout. This thesis concludes with a brief 
policy analysis on possible policy recommendations for curbing the use of small arms by 
non-state actors in Southeast Asia.
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(ii) Limitations of this Study
This thesis will not provide detailed policy recommendations to solve the problem of 
small arms transfers in Southeast Asia, even though the study has a brief analysis and 
does make a few functional and realistic policy recommendations in the final chapter. 
Rather this thesis outlines the main causes of insurgent rebellions in Southeast Asia and 
why small arms are so important in intra-state conflict. This is provided by the detailed 
analysis of the insurgent groups involved in current conflict throughout countries in 
Southeast Asia. However, this thesis may hopefully still be of help to policy makers 
analysing small arms transfers within the context of intra-state conflict. 
A further limitation of this study involves only the certain analysis of countries and 
insurgent groups in Southeast Asia. Time permitting it perhaps would be better to include 
other countries from Southeast Asia. However, the three countries involved in this study, 
do represent some of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Furthermore, 
there is still largely a lot of guess work involved when finding the exact amount of 
weapons an insurgent group in Southeast Asia may possess. However, the amount of 
information and data sets available in the last few years and the setting up of institutions 
dedicated to small arms has increased dramatically. Hopefully in the near future data sets
on small arms will become as detailed as ones like SPIRI which currently only covers 
major conventional weapons. This will hopefully lead to further studies on all aspects of 
small arms use and misuse.   
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                                                              Chapter 2
EXAMINING EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF 
SMALL ARMS WITHIN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT
2.1 Small Arms in Intra-State Conflict: A Framework for Evaluation
The analysis of small arms transfers to insurgent groups is part of a wider base of 
theoretical material available on small arms and internal conflict. A framework for 
analysing the dynamics of arms transfers to insurgent groups as a social science question 
needs to be based on current research and appropriate methodologies. Therefore a 
framework looking at the topic of arms transfers needs to take into account subjective and 
objective assumptions as well as related conceptualisations and definitions. Furthermore, 
a framework will take into account the important variables which affect arms transfers to 
insurgents groups, such as the availability of weapons from an external supplier and what 
kind of finances an insurgent group requires in order to purchase small arms from an 
external supplier. A model that describes and allows for these kinds of variables has been 
developed by Klare (1995a).
Klare (1995a) has devised an arms transfer model that is linked to an earlier model which 
was termed the Proliferation/Arms Race model. Klare (1995a) has developed the 
Proliferation/Arms Race model further incorporating it into a new model which he has 
termed as the Diffusion/Global Violence model. It differs from the Proliferation/Arms 
Race model, as it allows for a number of new variables that affect arms transfers. The 
Proliferation/Arms Race model mainly focused on the transfer of arms and technologies
from a handful of major industrial powers to a number of developing countries as can be 
seen on the following page. This is in contrast to the Diffusion/Global Violence model 
which looks at the distribution of arms within societies by governments, as well as taking 
into account the distribution of arms by insurgents, private militias and criminal 
organisations. The new framework created by Klare (1995a) interchanges the word 
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Figure 2.1: The ‘Proliferation’ Model
Major Supplier                                                        Major Recipients
(Notably the U.S., USSR, France                             (Notably Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, 
Britain, Germany, Italy)                                            Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,                                                                                
                                                                                   Taiwan, and the two Koreas)
                  
                         Gifts or Sales of Major Military Systems
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‘diffusion’ for ‘proliferation’, “because it better describes the spread of arms throughout 
the world and at all levels of society” (ibid:3). Klare (1995a) states that the 
Diffusion/Global Violence model is useful, “because…the risk of explosive violence is 
greatest where the diffusion of arms coincides with the fragmentation of societies along 
ethnic, religious, tribe, caste and linguistic lines” (ibid:3). Klare (1995a) goes on further 
to state “it better incorporates the wide variety of actors who play a role in this trade, and 
highlights the importance of small arms and light weapons in the overall world security 
environment” (ibid:6). This is highlighted by the model itself on the following page.
Under this model Klare (1995a) has broken down studying the trade in light weapons into 
two main areas. The first area consists of the ‘process of diffusion’, which looks at arms 
entering and penetrating states and societies, by locating the principal sources of light 
weapons and charting the various routes by which they arrive at their ultimate 
destination. As Klare (1995a) states: 
“Under the diffusion model, we find that a large number of actors play a significant role in the 
production and distribution of weapons. These include not only governments and state-owned 
enterprises but also smaller and medium-sized firms, private brokers and distributors, insurgent 
and separatist forces and black market operators” (ibid:7).  
The second area consists of the ‘propensity of armed violence in divided and fragmented 
societies’, which analyses the production of small arms by countries that are affected by 
internal conflict. Furthermore, this area looks at the impact of light weapons diffusion on 
particular states and societies. In Klare’s (1995a) opinion “one thing is clear: the cascade 
of arms is contributing everywhere to the frequency, duration and intensity of armed 
violence” (ibid:16-17).
The following case studies in this thesis will follow the format of Klare’s framework by 
looking at the role small arms play in Southeast Asia’s internal conflicts. This will focus 
on the different supply methods of small arms to insurgent groups as highlighted by 
Klare's (1995a) model. Initially the case studies will analyse the different insurgent 
groups by discussing  the background and goals of these groups before moving on to 
discuss the ability of these insurgents groups to obtain finance and resources for their 
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Figure 2.2: The 'Diffusion' Model
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movement by looking at both external and internal sources. From here Klare’s (1995) 
framework will be used to analyse insurgent groups small arms use and ‘process of 
diffusion’. This will look at the principal source of weapons for that particular insurgent 
group, whether this is from external or internal supply and the methods used to transport 
these weapons. This section will also contain a list of the more popular weapons used and 
in possession by that particular insurgent group. From here the analysis of the insurgent 
groups will continue to follow Klare’s (1995a) framework by discussing the use of small 
arms by insurgent groups on the ‘propensity of armed violence’ in the case studies and 
how this is affecting internal conflict in a particular state. This takes account into factors 
such as the frequency, duration and intensity of armed violence and the effects it has on 
internal conflict in the case studies.
2.2 Small Arms and Intra-State Conflict: Current Research and Literature  
The remainder of this chapter highlights and analyses the current and existing research of 
small arms within internal conflict in general. More specifically, this chapter will 
examine in depth the current research on small arms in intra-state conflict within 
Southeast Asia, in particular the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma. The literature 
available on small arms and internal conflict come from a diverse range of fields 
including political science, international relations, sociology, psychology, economics and 
law. 
The broad theoretical materials available on small arms and intra-state conflict can be 
broken down into smaller categories that analyse each theory separately. For instance, 
small arms literature includes; the analysis of small arms transfers, sources of supply and 
demand for small arms, definitions and characteristics, as well as the manufacture and 
acquisition of small arms. On the other hand, literature on intra-state conflict covers 
aspects such as, civil and ethnic wars and the intensity and duration of an internal
conflict. The conclusion of this chapter will summarise the current literature and research 
on small arms and intra-state conflict in Southeast Asia, and draw attention to the current 
gaps in the literature. This section will also highlight how this thesis is filling in the 
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current gap in the extant literature and the theoretical contributions this thesis is making 
to address the current phenomena of small arms transfers to insurgents in Southeast Asia.
2.3 Small Arms Literature
(i) A General Overview
The focus on small arms research since the end of the Cold War has become evident with 
the amount of material and literature being produced by academics and researchers 
studying this topic. Largely this is due to the number of conflicts that are intra-state rather 
than inter-state based conflicts, and the fact that a leading cause of civilian casualties that 
occur in intra-state conflict, are from the misuse of small arms (Small Arms Survey 
2003:132). Much small arms literature that has been written since the 1990’s has been as 
a result of the reports and publications undertaken by the United Nations. In December 
1995 the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on small 
arms, with the assistance of a panel of government experts. The foreword to this report by 
the Secretary General outlined the problem of small arms circulation in today’s societies:
“Some of the most protracted armed conflicts in the world at present are those in which a 
recurring cycle of violence, an erosion of political legitimacy and a loss of economic viability 
deprive a State of its authority to cope with either the causes or the consequences of an 
excessive accumulation, proliferation and use of small arms” (1995).
The report is mainly a summary of the inadequate polices of arms control in many of the
countries throughout the world, and makes the point that the accumulation and transfer of 
small arms is related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts. Further to this, the 
report also points out that small arms do not cause the conflicts in which they are used, 
instead the availability of the arms increases the lethality and duration of conflicts by 
encouraging a violent rather than a peaceful resolution of differences (ibid:10).
The General Assembly requested the Secretary General to follow up this report with 
another (A/54/258, August, 1999) to check the progress being made on the previous 
report and to take further actions and make recommendations if necessary. The 1999 
report again highlighted the close relationship between arms accumulation and transfers 
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within internal conflict. Furthermore, the report found that the increased availability of 
small arms was a result of increased manufacturing:
“Among the main factors contributing to the availability of small arms and light weapons is the 
increase in the number of legitimate producers of such weapons combined with continuing 
illegitimate arms manufacturing… at the same time, a large proportion of the accumulation and 
flow of small arms and light weapons is constituted by recirculated weapons or arms from 
existing stockpiles” (ibid:8).
The most recent document the United Nations has published is the 2003 report 
(A/58/138, 11 July 2003) which was prepared to, “examine the feasibility of developing 
an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable 
manner, illicit small arms and light weapons”. 
The 2003 report focused on the tracing of small arms transfers. The Report identified 
three key elements that would help in the tracing of small arms, these were, “marking, 
record-keeping and international cooperation” (ibid:12). Issues related to tracing weapons 
in the report, included illicitly produced small arms, which were initially manufactured 
legally but ended up in the illicit market. The 2003 report defines ‘illicit’ as the 
“production, possession, use, stockpiling, trade, brokering, transfer and reactivation of 
small arms and light weapons, when these activities occur in violation of the law” 
(ibid:15). Furthermore, the 2003 report outlines a number of routes and methods where
small arms are diverted to the illicit market,
“(a) domestic leakage, through, theft, the action of corrupt Government officials of the 
breakdown of state control; (b) false end-user certificates or violations of end user undertakings; 
(c) the small-scale transfer of weapons legally acquired in one State into a neighbouring State; 
and (d) Government supplies to non-State actors or countries under embargo by the United 
Nations Security Council or under other restrictions” (ibid:14-15).
One of the leading experts in the study of small arms has been Michael T. Klare who has 
written numerous articles, chapters in collected work, and published and edited a number 
of books1. In Klare’s (1997) article he finds that there are many reasons why small arms 
figure so prominently in intra-state conflicts, one such reason is that small arms require 
                                                
1 See Bibliography for a list of references.
Chapter 2 27
limited resources to buy and are more accessible in the arms market. When taking into 
account logistical considerations, the use of small arms by insurgent groups are favoured 
over heavy weapons because of their simplicity to operate. Furthermore Klare (1997) 
finds that small arms are suitable in internal conflict as the goal of ethnic warfare, is not 
so much victory on the battlefield but rather intimation by members of another group
(ibid:174). Klare (1999) further expands on the advantages of small arms in intra-state 
conflicts. According to Klare (1999); the low cost and wide availability, lethality, 
simplicity and durability, portability and concealability, make small arms attractive for 
irregular forces in internal conflict (ibid:2). Conflicts involving small arms often persist 
for a long period of time and usually result in a stalemate between the various parties 
(Klare, 2001:1). The characteristics of small arms make them the perfect weapon for 
insurgent groups in Southeast Asia, and are the principal weapon of choice for use 
against government forces in the region.
One of the more recent articles in small arms literature has been published by Garcia 
(2004). Garcia (2004) highlights the importance of small arms in international security 
today and states, “while nuclear weapons were used once, small arms and light weapons 
are used everyday, everywhere, contributing to international security” (ibid:3). Garcia
(2004) also finds that research and action on small arms should follow certain norms and 
trends. This includes looking at the different actors involved in the arms trade since the 
end of the Cold War and recognising that arms brokers as well as governments operate on 
the fringes of law. Furthermore, Garcia (2004) has found that there has been a changed 
matrix of conflicts from international types of dispute to civil and ethnic types of unrest 
(ibid:13). The small arms issue according to Garcia (2004) has issues that are 
multidimensional in approach and multifaceted in nature (ibid:38). Garcia (2004) like 
other academics and commentators highlights the importance of researching the trade in 
small arms, by stating that, “light weapons have historically been assumed to follow the 
same trade patterns as major conventional weapons. Yet this assumption has proved to be 
increasingly erroneous in the post-Cold War era, as small arms trafficking has augmented 
despite a depressed market for major weapons” (ibid:15).    
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(ii) Definitions and Characteristics
Small arms by their broadest definition can include everything from knives to sticks 
(Krause, 1998:2) However, many scholars and researchers prefer to give small arms 
defined boundaries and characteristics. Numerous studies often use the two terms ‘small 
arms’ and ‘light weapons’ interchangeably to describe weapons that do not fit into the 
same category as major conventional weapons. However, the United Nations have broken 
the two terminologies into separate categories. Small Arms refer to those weapons 
designed for personal use, while light weapons are designed by several persons operating 
as a crew (1997:11). The United Nations have categorized the following weapons into 
two groups where small arms include “revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and 
carbines, assault rifles and light machine guns” and light weapons include “heavy 
machine-guns, hand held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers and portable anti-
craft guns etc” (2003:14). Nevertheless, both small arms and light weapons are not easily 
distinguishable on the battlefield with insurgent groups using whatever weapons they can 
find in which to wage armed conflict.
Karp (1995) places small arms into four different contexts that helps explain the different 
characteristics of small arms from other weapons. First, small arms can be defined by 
exclusion that is those weapons not listed by the major data sets such as SIPRI. Second, 
small arms are those weapons that can be carried by a normal infantry soldier. Third, 
small arms can be extended to include weapons that can be transported by pack animals 
and light vehicles2. Finally, small arms in ethnic conflict can be defined empirically, 
listing all the weapons used in internecine conflict (ibid:64).
Characteristics of small arms have many defining features that distinguish them from 
other armaments. Rana (1995:2) list’s the characteristics that distinguish small arms from 
other weaponry. Accordingly they have one or more of the following characteristics:
- Weight/Portability
                                                
2 Karp defines small arms and light weapons as one class of weapon.
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- Explosive yield/size of the projectile
- Mode of operation
- Maintenance and logistic requirements
- Rate of fire and calibre
Furthermore Rana (1995:2-3) has broken down small arms into the following major 
categories based upon their performance:
- Revolvers and self loading pistols
- Sub-machine guns, assault rifles and rifles
- Machine guns
- Grenades
- Fuel air explosives
- Mines
- Anti-tank weapons
- Anti-aircraft weapons
As can be seen the characteristics of small arms revolve around their ease of operating 
and their ability to be carried by an individual solider. The performance of small arms 
while being dangerous and lethal, are not sufficient or powerful enough to have the same 
impact that heavier weaponry like tanks or aircraft have in internal conflict and civil 
wars.
(iii) Manufacture and Acquisition of Small Arms: Sources of Supply and Demand
Rana (1995) has split the world market of small arms into four distinguishing features. 
First, there are a number of methods through which small arms can be acquired whether 
through private individuals, smuggled across borders, or obtained through skirmishes. 
This is in comparison to major weapons that can only be acquired through manufacture of 
trade. Second, small arms unlike heavy weapons can move across borders and exchange 
hands within countries, with relative ease. Third, most major weapons are conducted 
through government-to-government transactions, while the trade in small arms is mainly 
between private individuals or non-state actors. Finally, the trade of small arms can be a 
result of, “leaking, rupturing and continuing pipelines of small arms”. These pipelines 
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were of strategic importance in the Cold War, and still provide channels for funnelling
small arms in today (ibid:6-7).  
Sislin and Pearson (2001) place the available sources of arms into three broad 
distinctions: “domestic procurement, indigenous production, and importation” (ibid:30).
Sislin and Pearson (2001) state that “domestic procurement differs from indigenous 
production in that in the former case, arms are present in finished form (often acquired or 
stolen from government armouries or on the battlefield), while in the latter, they are 
manufactured, modified, or remanufactured” (ibid:30). Domestic procurement requires 
less financial resources, and has greater certainty of delivery than importation, and is a 
preferable means of acquisition. Indigenous production has the advantage of not being 
very expensive to produce weaponry, however, production will be quite limited because 
of the skill required to make advanced small arms. Importation is the most costly and less 
reliable option; however, non-state actors may acquire arms through this method, which 
they may not otherwise have been able to obtain through other sources of supply (Sislin 
and Pearson, 2001:46-47). 
There are three main channels for the supply of small weapons to non-state actors as 
discussed by Boutwell and Klare (1998), which are the, “Legal Channels, the Covert and
Grey-Market Channels, and the Illicit Production and Black-Market Channels (ibid:3). 
Generally, insurgent groups do not acquire their arms through legal channels, as no 
external government is prepared to take the risk of supplying weaponry to these groups. 
Furthermore, with the increased transparency of arms transfers from the major small arms 
producers to their allies and clients occurring, it is increasingly harder for insurgent 
groups to acquire weapons through legal channels. Also with the rise of Islamic 
militarism and terrorism in general, external governments are increasingly reluctant to 
supply weapons to any non-state actors. However, there are cases of this occurring post 
Cold War, for instance both the two major military powers, the United States and Russia 
were supplying weapons to opposing forces in Angola.
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Insurgent groups that rely on importation and legal channels as their main source of 
weaponry, face two major obstacles, their economic resources and the few suppliers that 
are willing to provide them with weapons (Wezeman, 2003:22). However, the reasons for 
governments to do so are varied. A government may seek to gain influence with a 
particular community, thinking of the future if that group is to come to power. 
Furthermore, governments may supply arms to insurgent groups, as part of an aid 
package to an ethnic community at risk, because of their suppression from the ruling 
government. On the other hand, the supply of arms from external government to 
insurgent groups may be the result of trying to prelude the need for military intervention, 
or to influence or bring about to the end a conflict (Sislin and Pearson, 2001:41). 
Direct commercial sales are also a form of legal channels in which insurgents can acquire 
weapons. According to Klare (1995b) most smaller weapons are sold by private firms 
through normal commercial channels (ibid:3). Generally firms that export weapons are 
subject to some form of domestic or international law and are required to have licenses 
which allow them to export weapons. This is highlighted by Klare (1995a) who states, 
“once provided with a valid export licence, the supplier is usually free to transfer the 
goods involved through normal trade channels” (ibid:11). However, there are many 
loopholes in this system, such as the ability to forge export licenses and the relative ease
many firms have of being able to dispense with government regulations.  
Covert channels are defined as, “channels that operate with government support even 
though in violation of official government policy, most often by government agencies or 
private companies linked to such agencies” (Boutwell and Klare, 1998:3). Examples of 
this include United States government assistance to the Nicaraguan contra and Afghan 
mujahideen rebels fighting Marxist governments in the 1980s (Pearson, 1994:60). A 
similar channel of supply is termed the ‘grey-area’ phenomena. This channel falls in 
between the legal and illegal channels. Grey area phenomena can loosely be defined, “as 
threats to the stability of sovereign states by non-state actors and non-governmental 
processes and organisations” (Chalk, 1997:5). Like the covert channel of supply the grey-
area channel of supply was mainly as a result of Cold War policy, and has largely ceased 
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to be a source of supply for non-state actors. However, these methods of arms supply 
according to Klare (1995a) have contributed significantly to the duration and intensity of 
internal violence (ibid:14). Furthermore, supply of small arms through these channels can 
contribute to global violence even after their initial role in internal conflicts. This occurs 
with the ending of violent conflict, and the subsequent lack of employment opportunities 
insurgents find in their new environment. Instead, insurgents may turn to banditry, drug 
trafficking and arms smuggling to supplement their income, often using guns acquired 
from foreign patrons during the earlier fighting (Klare, 1995a:14).
The illicit transfer of small arms is made up by a variety of channels. It differs from the 
covert and grey market channel, in the sense that the acquisition of these weapons is 
illegal and against domestic and most international laws. The covert and grey-market 
channel can consist of transfers that are approved by the exporting state without the 
knowledge of the state the weapons are being exported to. The illicit transfer of weapons 
includes ‘leakage’, which is generally the theft of government stocks by soldiers and the 
subsequent sale of these weapons to non-state actors and the black market. Klare (1995a) 
lists a number of methods through which the illicit transfer of small arms can occur, 
“through raids on government arsenals and private gun stores; through the cooperation of 
friendly or (corruptible) military and police officers; and through assaults on police and 
military patrols” (ibid:15). This channel of supply is arguably the most important method 
for non-state actors wishing to acquire small arms.   
Klare (1995a) also notes that the transfer of illicit small arms can occur between 
insurgents and criminal organisations. Klare (1995a) states, “just as established 
governments give or sell arms to other governments, so do insurgent and criminal 
organisations transfer arms among themselves, whether for ideological reasons (as in the 
case of Marxist and Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla groups) or for profit” (ibid:16). 
Furthermore, while not common, insurgent groups that share similar ideological beliefs 
may trade weapons with each other, to prevent government forces from overwhelming or 
military defeating an insurgent force.        
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As far as illicit ‘craft’ production is concerned, information supplied to the United Nation 
shows that illicit production of small arms takes place in at least 25 countries (Small 
Arms Survey, 2003:26). Craft production can occur from more developed countries like 
Chile of South Africa to less developed countries like Ghana and the Solomon Islands. 
Many are comprised of nothing more than a nail which is attached to a spring and then to 
strips of a car’s inner tube or to a water piping (Rana, 1995:5). However, most insurgent 
groups cannot manufacture their arms from scratch. According to the Small Arms Survey 
(2003), political factors tend to be the most important determinants of craft production 
(ibid:27). Demand for these illegally produced weapons can be a result of internal 
conflict where a non-state actor, such as an insurgent group, has limited access to an 
external arms supplier. Furthermore, high prices of imported small arms can also 
encourage the production of illicit small arms (Small Arms Survey, 2003:27).
The black market is a major source of small arms for insurgent groups. Black market 
deals are usually profit motivated and are conducted by private individuals or private 
organisations (Kartha, 1999:51). Being profit motivated transfers, insurgent groups can 
find a number of suppliers willing to transfer small arms. Black market transactions may 
also include ‘secondary diffusion’ characteristics, that is trafficking in weapons that were 
once part of a grey-market transaction somewhere else (Kartha, 1999:51). As Pearson
(1994) points out most black market transactions involve small arms, “because of the 
difficulty of packaging and concealing major weapons transfers without some 
government cooperation” (ibid:60). The upsurge in black market transactions in recent 
years is largely a result of increasing internal conflict throughout the global system, and 
the activities of insurgent groups in these conflicts. Furthermore, the rise in black market 
arms transfers has been a result of numerous UN arms embargoes (Klare, 1995b:3).
Black market transfers also involve a significant number of transactions from 
neighbouring states who had or were involved in internal conflict. These states usually 
have accumulated an excessive amount of arms, and instead of disposing of them, may 
sell them on to other insurgent groups involved in internal conflict. This may lead to the 
establishment of pipelines between suppliers and insurgent groups, recycling weapons 
from previous conflicts to be used in current armed conflicts.
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(iii) Small Arms Transfers
The transfer of weapons from a supplier to a buyer can involve many complex procedures 
and transactions. Many factors have to be accounted for such as, modes of transport, drop 
off points and method of payments. Furthermore, there are also brokers and shippers who 
may organise arms transfers for weapons they do not actually own, but have arranged to 
sell them on the behalf of a client. Wood and Peleman (2000) comment that:
“Brokers are middlemen who organise arms transfers between two or more parties. Essentially, 
they bring together buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers and insurers to make a deal, 
especially where the players are divided by culture, politics and/or geography. They do so for 
financial consideration, taking a commission from the arms supplier, the arms recipient or both” 
(ibid:129).
For merchants to operate effectively, they need to depend upon a number of factors 
according to Hartung (2001), “the collaboration, acquiescence, or downright 
incompetence of governments, and upon the operations of a relatively open, unregulated 
global system of transportation and finance” (ibid:82). Merchants also benefit from the 
lack of transparency that occurs in most arms transfers.
Most arms transfers that incur to insurgent forces are those originating from the black 
market. Generally this is because most insurgent groups are excluded by law from access 
to the legitimate arms market (Klare, 2001:2). According to Wezeman (2003) actors 
involved in illegal arms transfers many include:
“Corrupt government officials, dealers who buy and sell arms, arms brokers who facilitate 
contacts between potential buyers and sellers of weapons and who do not own the weapons 
being offered for sale, and persons involved in the transport and smuggling of the weapons”
(ibid:24)
These actors are purely motivated by profit, and do not take into consideration by turning
a blind eye, to the consequences and harm such transfers might have. This is highlighted 
as a concern by the United Nations (UN) member states, who in their view believe, 
“poverty alleviation and economic growth are undermined by the availability and misuse 
of illegal small arms and light weapons” (Small Arms Survey, 2003:126).
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Sislin and Pearson (2001) when discussing arms transfers to ethnic groups suggest that 
acquiring arms is a function of several elements, which include, “resources, availability, 
and delivery, plus capability and situational amenability” (ibid:44). Analysing the 
diffusion of arms, which looks at how small arms enter and penetrate societies by 
locating the source from which they have arrived has again been discussed by Sislin and 
Pearson (2001). When considering whom to acquire arms from, ethnic groups take into 
several basic considerations, including, 
“Whether or not its resources are adequate; another has to do with whether arms or intervention 
from outside the country are likely. The availability of arms in relation to the stability and 
strength of the government and the likelihood of successful weapon deployment are further 
considerations, and the impact of having or using the weapons weighs in as well” (ibid:45)
These arguments are discussed in the table below:
Table 2.1 Opportunities and Constraints of Three Modes of Arms Acquisition
Critical Factors Importation Domestic 
Procurement
Indigenous 
Production
Availability Can obtain 
sophisticated arms
Spare parts may be an 
issue
Generally limited to 
small arms, except in 
cases of state 
breakdown
Sufficient quality may 
be an issue
Generally limited to 
small arms 
Sufficient quantity 
may be an issue
Resources Required High, but money can 
be raised from foreign 
contributions or local 
resources
Low Low
Shipment Safety Arms may be seized 
prior to delivery
Generally not salient; 
storage considerations
Generally not salient; 
storage considerations
-Sislin and Pearson (2001:45)
According to Sislin and Pearson (2001) it is possible to make two general assumptions 
about ethnic group’s arm-seeking behaviour. First, ethnic groups have preferences for 
their sources of arms, and secondly, leaders of these groups will try and maximise the 
value of any arms transfers. Ethnic groups will also spend fewer resources on arms than 
more, while choosing safer acquisition methods over more risky ones (ibid:46). However, 
ethnic groups like other non-state actors have to weigh up the advantages and 
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disadvantages of the various methods of small arms supply and whether to use various 
arms suppliers, when they are involved in active armed conflict.
2.4 Intra-State Conflict Literature
(i) A General Overview
Since the end of the Cold War, the focus on conflict has shifted from inter-state to intra-
state, as a majority of conflicts that now occur are intra-state rather than inter-state. For 
most governments, especially those in the developing world, protecting their internal 
borders, rather than their maritime borders, has become their number one defence 
priority. With the increased threat of civil war breaking out, it is not financially feasible 
for developing countries to stockpile weapons in the possibility that they will be attacked 
by another country. Instead, the threat perception of most developing countries since the 
end of the Cold War is the danger of an internal conflict turning into a full blown civil 
war. The Human Security Report records that in 2002 there was only one inter-state 
conflict (between India-Pakistan) while there were 31 civil wars involving at least one 
rebel group, and 35 internal conflict that involved only non-state actors (Capie, 2004:3)
Rana (1995) makes the comment that “where the military more powerful combatant still 
has the same chance of ending the war through victory, this is unlikely in most intra-state 
conflicts” (ibid:8). Indeed, most intra-state conflicts in developing countries will often 
stagnate because neither side is military powerful enough to defeat the other. Rana (1995) 
has placed armed conflicts within the political context into four categories. First, there are 
the random acts of violence by unlawful individuals. Second, there are sporadic 
incidences of violence, by different groups seeking greater cultural and economic benefits 
from the state. Third, sporadic incidence of violence can occur by a group’s intent on 
removing the current sovereignty of a state. Finally, intense acts of violence can occur, 
with the breakdown of the state and all its territories (ibid:8).
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Intra-state wars are different from inter-state wars for a number of reasons according to 
Rana (1995). Intra-state conflicts tend to have a domino effect and spread across other 
countries in the region, while inter-state are more prone to outside involvement. 
Furthermore, intra-state conflicts are prone to fragmentation, where a lot of the effects are 
irreversible (ibid:9). Intra-state conflicts are also a result of weak states. Characteristics of 
a weak state include, institutional structures which are underdeveloped and high poverty 
rates with a slow economy. Rana (1995) makes the comment that “the absence of 
recognised avenues for redressing the discontent arising from these weaknesses leads to 
breakdowns of law and order, to secessionist movements, to outright civil war” (ibid:10). 
Hence most underdeveloped or third world countries will be prone to some form of 
internal conflict.
(ii) Insurgents involved in Intra-State Conflict
Insurgent groups are made up from a variety of different actors, structures and goals. One 
group involved in internal conflict, might have the goal of gaining autonomy over a 
particular part of a region within the state, while another group may have the goal of 
completely taking over the country or creating a new government. Some groups may 
even just wish for a greater share and allocation of budget resources from a government. 
On the other hand, a insurgent group may just be fighting for purely financial reasons, as 
their standard of living is better off than what it would be participating in a states 
economy. Furthermore, some insurgent groups have more financial resources than other 
and are better equipped to wage civil war. Largely an insurgent group’s resources and 
structural system will depend on the strategic environment they are placed in. Most 
insurgent groups are fighting in the context of political violence, where they are 
struggling to overthrow the government or trying to achieve autonomy.
The finance an insurgent group receives when it is involved in internal conflict is critical 
in allowing these groups to carry out armed conflict. This is highlighted by Klare (2004) 
who states, “whatever the original motivation for the establishment of a particular 
paramilitary organisation, it must find some way of generating operating funds” 
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(ibid:120). Klare (2004) finds that when insurgent groups try and finance the acquisition 
of arms and other military commodities, “they morph into predatory organisations” 
(ibid:120). This can cause further problems in the conflict cycle as the leaders of these 
groups may become contaminated by the opportunities for personal enrichment, “so will 
both seek to increase their illicit gains and to resist efforts by outside parties to mediate or 
terminate the conflict” (Klare, 2004:121).   
Insurgent groups within internal conflict have a particularly large impact on the arms 
trade, especially arms acquired through illicit channels. According to Capie (2004) there 
are three reasons why non-state actors warrant particular attention in the context of the 
small arms agenda. First, non-state actors are important participants in the trade in small 
arms and ammunition. Second, in internal conflict they are important military and 
political actors. Third, the international community has cracked down on the use of small 
arms use by non-state actors, largely due to the work achieved by human rights 
organisations.
(iii) Intensity of Warfare in Intra-State Conflicts
The intensity of fighting in internal conflicts is often the result of each side being able to 
receive a sufficient supply of armaments in which to carry out warfare. For governments 
in a weak state receiving arms supplies from external actors or governments is vital for 
defeating an insurgent group. Likewise, an insurgent group that has sufficient arms 
supplies from one particular source or a variety of sources will be able to carry out 
intensive fighting for longer periods. As Sislin and Pearson (2001) state, “in the recent 
literature on internal wars, it is apparent that arms are a factor in the opportunity for 
ethnic groups and governments to use violence as a form of political expression, and in 
their willingness to do so” (ibid:63).
Intensity is measured as casualties divided by time (Sislin and Pearson, 2001:93). It  has 
generally been presumed that conflicts involving heavy weapons will be more intense. 
However, as seen by conflicts in East Timor and Rwanda, this is not necessarily always 
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the case. Groups that are involved in intense struggles are usually those with some form 
of external support. As Sislin and Pearson (2001) state, “external supply seems to fuel the 
fire and to sustain groups in their struggles” (ibid:93).
Ammunition is also crucial to the ability of an insurgent group to carry out armed 
conflict. Without ammunition, weapons are useless by themselves. Most automatic riffles 
like the AK47 use a lot of ammunition in short bursts. However, the area of ammunition 
is often overlooked by researchers and academics when studying the area of small arms. 
The intensity and duration of internal conflict is often dependent on how much 
ammunition an insurgent group has at their disposal. Without a constant supply of 
ammunition it is often impossible for insurgent groups to engage in battles with 
government forces for any length of period. However, if this source of supply for 
ammunition is forthcoming, a general proposition would be to expect that this would 
increase the intensity as well as duration in internal conflict.
(iv) Duration of Warfare in Intra-State Conflict
The duration of internal conflict is highly dependent on arm supplies to either side at the 
time the conflict is occurring. The greater the arms supply (especially to a non-state 
actor) it is more likely that an internal conflict will be drawn out. This is highlighted by 
Sislin and Pearson (2001) who state, “the essential assumption about arms and duration is 
that increases in armament provide greater opportunity for actors already willing to fight, 
and that changes in arms to one actor alter the willingness of the other actor” (ibid:89). 
Furthermore, Sislin and Pearson (2001) find that there are three conditions that will
favour longer domestic war, this being; increased quantity of arms available, increased 
number of suppliers and deployment of heavy weapons. Sislin and Pearson (2001) find 
that heavy weapons are more associated with shorter conflicts, while light weapons tend 
to be involved in longer wars (ibid:91). This is largely a result of the inability of either 
side to win the conflict, because of the restrictive damage that small arms and light 
weapons can do. Furthermore, argue Sislin and Pearson (2001) the greater the number of 
external arms suppliers, the longer the war, as suppliers have a “long-term commitment 
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to continue backing their client, the combatant thus feels secure that resupply will be 
forthcoming” (ibid:90).
When an internal conflict breaks out into civil war, the duration of the civil war is largely 
dependent on whether each side can disarm each other. According to Fearon (2002) “a 
quarter of the 122 civil wars starting since 1945 lasted two years or less, and a quarter of 
all civil wars have lasted at least 15 years” (ibid:2). Fearon (2002) has found that there 
are two main causes for long running civil wars. First there are ‘peripheral insurgencies’
which is described as civil wars involving rural guerrilla bands operating near the states 
borders, which have been remarkably difficult to end (ibid:3). This is because peripheral 
insurgencies involve ‘sons of the soil’ dynamics which involve land or resource conflicts. 
The second case relates to, the ability for a rebel group to have readily access to funds
through contraband such as opium, diamonds or coca,  which will effect the duration of a 
civil war (ibid:3).
Other factors according to Fearon (2002) which effect the duration of internal conflicts
and civil wars includes ethnic heterogeneity, per capita income, population, ethnic and 
secessionist wars and overall costs associated with the conflict. Ethnic diversity is usually 
associated with longer wars and sons of the soil cases. Per capita income is negatively 
associated with civil war duration but is statistically insignificant. Ethnic wars also last 
longer in a civil conflict. Finally, costs (lethality) are related to civil war duration when
the conflict can be conducted at a fairly low cost (ibid:15-19). The longer the duration in 
a civil war according to Fearon (2002) is also a result of both sides in the conflict 
developing strategic data on each sides capabilities, tactics and resolve (ibid:22).
2.5 Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts within Southeast Asia
The use of small arms within internal conflict in Southeast Asia is caused by a number of 
factors. Most insurgent groups in the region are highly dependent on the supply of small 
arms, as they have no access to major weapons. Bedeski et al (1998) lists a number of 
reasons why the illicit trade in small arms within Southeast Asia has flourished. First, 
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inadequate controls and checks at borders, due to incompetence and corruption allow 
steady flows of arms into the region. Second, infeasible costs and technological 
difficulties make implementing effective controls difficult. Third, lack of coordination 
and cooperation among regional states has been prominent. Finally, the lack of 
international law on what constitutes illicit arms transfers has increased the illegal arms 
trade (ibid:5). 
Following this Capie (2002) lists four factors that shape the illicit arms transfers in 
Southeast Asia,
“First the large number of intra-state conflicts in the region and the concomitant need for 
illegally sourced weapons among non-state actors. Second, the region is home to several post-
conflict states where large numbers of military small arms and light weapons can be easily 
obtained. Third, Southeast Asia’s long maritime and continental frontiers are extremely difficult 
to monitor and police. The fourth and related point is that the region is home to a significant 
number of ‘weak states’ (ibid:15).
Another factor to take into consideration also, is legal controls on privately licensed 
firearms, which also contributes to small arms proliferation in the Southeast Asian region 
(Kramer, 2001:7). For instance the Philippines has no general requirements to be met 
prior to the application process, except the applicant must be over 21 (ibid:7). The main 
problem the countries face in Southeast Asia is that there are no universal legal control on 
arms production and transfers in the region. 
According to Capie (2002) most small arms used in internal conflict in Southeast Asia are 
recycled weapons from former conflicts (ibid:17). In most of the literature available on 
arms trafficking in Southeast Asia, Thailand is considered one of the most important, if 
not the most important centre for arms trafficking in Southeast Asia. Two reasons for this 
are, Thailand’s central location in the region and the previous role Thailand has played in 
supplying weapons to other conflicts in the region. (Kramer, 2001:1). This is especially 
the case in conflicts like Indonesia and the Philippines. Thailand’s policy of creating 
‘buffer zones’ against neighbouring countries that were perceived as a threat, has led to 
the supply of weapons to Burma, to be used in the conflict with Cambodia (Kramer, 
2004). However, when the Cambodian conflict came to an end, arms formerly in the 
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Khmer Rogue stockpiles began making their way from Cambodia back to Thailand to be 
sold on the black market (Kramer, 2004). This highlights the importance of recycled 
weapons being used in more than one conflict in Southeast Asia.   
Chalk (2001) lists a number of countries that supply arms to non-state actors in Southeast 
Asia. According to Chalk (2001) Cambodia represents probably the most important 
source for illicit arms (ibid:3). This has mainly been due to the stockpiles of weapons that 
had been built up during conflict throughout the 1980s, and recycled into other conflicts 
in the region. Chalk (2001) states, “Thailand acts as the main transit area for light arms 
from Cambodia, with maybe as many as 80% of all illegal consignments passing through 
the country” (ibid:4). Further sources of supply from outside the region, but within close 
proximity include, Pakistan, China and North Korea. Most of these weapons pass through 
Thailand on there way to supplying non-state actors in the Southeast Asian region. Chalk 
states that, “in Thailand, a study conducted by Chulalongkorn University in 1997 put the 
country’s illegal economy at Bt400 billion (US $9.4 billion) – equivalent to 10% of the 
national economy, a significant proportion of which was generated through the 
underground weapons trade” (ibid:8).
The Small Arms Survey (2003) estimates the global production of small arms and 
ammunition to be around US$7.4 billion (ibid:4). The Survey (2003) also estimates that 
98 countries have the capacity to produce small arms. The Asia-Pacific region has an 
estimated 20 countries with the ability to produce small arms, which constitutes 21% of 
the number of countries able to produce arms worldwide (ibid:11). All the case studies in 
this thesis; the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia are all listed by the Small Arms Survey 
(2003) as being able to produce and manufacture both small arms and ammunition. 
However, they are not considered major or medium producers of small arms or 
ammunition in the Asia-Pacific region. The amount of firms and states capable of 
producing small arms in the Asia-Pacific region has increased from 23 and 14 in the 
1980s to 31 and 14 in the 1990s respectively (Abel, 2000:83). While the increase from 23 
to 31 in the number of companies producing small arms in the region is reasonably 
modest, it is likely as a result of sources citing China North Industries and Chinese State 
Arsenals as their main suppliers, while other sources cite 16 arms producing factories 
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there (Abel, 2000:84). In total the value of the military hardware used by sub-state armed 
groups worldwide has been as high as US$3.5 billion in recent years, nearly a quarter of 
the orthodox trade in major weapons in 1992 (Chalk, 1997:12).
Having vast areas of territories to cover allows for a lot of illicit arms transfers to occur in 
many Southeast Asian states, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. The assistant 
secretary of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nafisah Mohamed has passed the 
comment that, “the most difficult and challenging part is the illicit transfer of small arms 
and light weapons by sea” (Dursin, 2001:3). Many of the states in the region are still 
recovering from the economic crisis that had occurred in the late 1990s. States like 
Indonesia which are still struggling to cope with the democratisation process, have little 
money to spend due to a poor economy and crippling fighting with insurgent groups in 
the resource abundant Ache region. This has given easier access to arms smugglers for 
offloading arm shipments in unpatrolled parts of states territories. Furthermore, the large 
amount of goods that pass through various Southeast Asian ports is largely unchecked, 
plus many of the people working in customs are prone to corruption or open to bribery.
2.6 Summary on the Current State of the Literature and Research Methodologies   
Annual studies published like the Small Arms Survey are beginning to highlight the 
effects small arms misuse can have on internal conflict throughout many regions in the 
world. This has led to the increase in research on small arms proliferation and the effects 
it can have on civilians with the misuse of these weapons by groups like non-state actors, 
criminal organisations and drug syndicates. A more in-depth understanding on the effects 
small arms can have on intra-state conflict is becoming more apparent in the current 
literature and recent studies. This is largely a result of many governments in developing 
countries throughout the world identifying the determinant effects small arm misuse can 
have on national security. For many of these countries the dominant security threat in the 
past had been the possibly of nuclear weapons finding their way into the hands of 
neighbouring states. However, with the rise of intra-state conflicts in the last twenty years 
many developing nations are finding that their primary security threat is coming from 
internal factors, such as the rise of insurgent groups. While much of the current literature 
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and discussions in various forums has been made of the problem of small arms 
proliferation, mention is made rarely of Southeast Asia. According to Kramer (2001) this 
is a result of most ASEAN states national positions on small arms proliferation being 
reactive rather than proactive. Kramer (2001) goes on to state, “there have been few 
resources committed to analysing the small arms situation within ASEAN” (ibid:2).
Much of the current literature on small arms has been published since the end of the Cold 
War. Many studies by the United Nations and experts in the field such as Michael T. 
Klare have promoted future research in the subject and have instigated further research 
into the topic of small arms. However, while small arms literature is growing, it has only 
recently been thrust into the limelight, meaning that for researchers and policy makers 
alike there is still need for research findings for policy formulation and evaluation. Most 
of the literature on small arms that exist in Southeast Asia has only recently been 
developed. Bits and pieces in chapters existed discussing small arms within internal 
conflict in Southeast Asia, but no study existed focusing solely on small arms within 
Southeast Asia. Capie (2002) doctorate thesis has been the first major study focusing 
solely on small arms production and transfers in Southeast Asia. This provides the reader 
with a good overview on the topic of small arms in Southeast Asia.   
There are numerous gaps in the literature that this thesis will attempt to highlight and fill 
in the remaining chapters. First, this thesis in the following case studies will point out the 
relevant effects small arms have on the security of Southeast Asian nations and the 
growing use of these weapons in internal conflict. This will be shown by developing the 
correlation between insurgent movements and the increasing use of small arms by these 
groups within internal conflicts. This involves identifying a number of factors involving 
insurgent movements such as, finance, ability to acquire small arms and the threat small 
arms possess on national security. Overall this thesis will provide a more in-depth study 
of individual insurgent groups who were recently or still are currently involved within 
internal conflict in Southeast Asia and hence need some form of arms supply to continue 
fighting government forces.
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Many current theories fail to address the phenomena of small arms transfers because why 
studies exist that look solely at one particular insurgent group (for instance GAM) no 
particular study solely analyses these insurgent groups and their supply and access to 
small arms. Furthermore, there is a lack of studies in the current literature that ties rebel 
finance with the connection of small arms transfers within Southeast Asia. By focusing 
on the external and internal supply of this connection it makes it easier to trace where the 
main supply of small arms is coming from. This also helps develop the theoretical 
contribution of this thesis by further developing intra-state conflict theory by highlighting
the effects small arms transfers to insurgents groups have on the intensity and duration of 
internal conflicts within Southeast Asia. It also develops and highlights the link between 
rebel finance and small arms. By following this line of theory this thesis will be able to 
create a framework for evaluation on the effects of small arms in internal conflict by 
focusing more in-depth on one region, which will clearly outline what support military or
financially the insurgents receive. For most internal conflicts small arms have been the 
principal instrument of violence and it is the job of researchers and academics to inform 
policy makers of the best way in which to deal with these problems and the real threat 
that small arms possess to international security.      
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Chapter 3
BURMA/MYANMAR
3.1 The Historical Background to Conflict in Burma
Burma has one of the most ethnically diverse populations in Southeast Asia. This 
associated with a ruling military regime who have a history of suppressing ethnic 
minorities has given many insurgent groups in the country reason to continue fighting. 
There are numerous ethnic groups in Burma including Mon, Shan, Rakhaing 
(Arakanese), Burman, Karen, Karenni, Chin, Kachin, Palaung, Pa-O, Kayang, Wa and
Lahu (Htoo, 2000:36-37). Despite the numerous ethnic groups who inhabit Burma, the
Burmese government has been unwilling to take into consideration the contrasting ethnic 
culture that exists in many of the states. Peace agreements have been signed with various 
opposition and insurgent groups in the past, but many of these agreements have been 
centred on economic concessions, rather than dealing with ethnic civil liberties. Instead 
many of these ethnic groups have been subjected to human rights violations and 
suppression of their religious and cultural beliefs by the Burmese government. This is 
despite Burma’s 1948 constitution adopted after independence from the United Kingdom
which “recognised the special position of Buddhism as the country’s major religion, but 
granted freedom of faith and worship…to all persons” (Maung, 1959 cited in Selth, 
2003:3). Clearly the liberties granted to ethnic minorities in Burma for the freedom and 
faith to worship has not occurred, especially since the overthrow of the democratic 
regime in 1962 by the military under the leadership of General Ne Win. Ne Win opposed 
a power-sharing arrangement between the minority states and the Burma majority areas.
This has made Burma prone to insurgent rebellions, in a country run by a military backed 
government, where freedom of speech has become a criminal act. These groups involved 
in the rebellion have chosen instead to “challenge the validity of an independent nation 
state whose definition they did not fit” (Thomson, 1995:273). This has seen thousands, 
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possibly tens of thousands of people killed in conflict in Burma, along with the 2 million 
people that have been displaced by continuous fighting (Project Ploughshares, 2003)1.
Burma’s population is made up of a majority of Theravada Buddhists which according to 
Burmese government statistics accounts for 90% of the 50 million people (Selth, 2003:3). 
However, even if this figure is likely to be inflated by the Burmese government as 
suspected, the proportion of Buddhists in Burma would be at least 80% (Smith, 1991 
cited in Selth, 2003:3). The minority of the population is made up of Christians and 
Muslim who are estimated to represent about four percent each, followed by Hindu and 
Chinese inhabitants (Selth, 2003:3&5). The ethnic groups that make up this minority such 
as the Shans and Karens have been included as one entity and have been grouped into one 
culture, this being the dominant Theravada Buddhist (Thomson, 1995:272). This has led 
to resentment by minority groups like the Shans and Karens, who believe that the Burma 
government has no plans of making the country a democratic nation, which would take 
into consideration minority rights and views. With the 1974 Constitution dissolving the 
two previous sections, Burma proper and the ethnic states created by the previous 
constitution, “armed struggle of the ethnic organisations consequently gained momentum 
between 1974 and 1988” (Htoo, 2000:43). The 1974 constitution divided Burma into 
seven ethnic states, “largely inhabited by non-Burman people, and seven geographical 
divisions largely inhabited by the majority Burman people (Htoo, 2000:43). However, 
this gave greater control to insurgent armies in states like the Shan and Karen, who now 
enjoy greater support and sympathy for their movements.
Insurgent rebellions have been a major problem for the Burmese government since the 
countries initial independence. A year after independence Burma faced two contrasting 
types of rebellion, one from the communist uprising and the other from a series of 
separatist revolts by ethnic minorities (Tan, 2000:72). Twelve main ethnic groups have 
been involved in ethnic revolts, but the ones that have been running the longest and are 
still involved in active armed conflict come from the Shan and Karen states. At the 
beginning of Burma independence, the Karen nation was the best organised minority 
                                                
1 There were 3,000 casualties alone during civil protests in 1988
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group (Fredholm, 1993:99). According to Thomson (1995) the Karen uprising is the 
oldest continuous, ethnic revolt in the world (ibid:274). The Karen are also one of the 
largest ethnic groups who have failed to gain recognition as an independent nation-state 
in mainland South-East Asia (Smith, 1994:42). Estimates of the population of the Karen 
vary, from anthropologists who estimate the Karen population in Burma to be around 
four million. By contrast the Karen National Union (KNU) “claims there are over seven
million Karen whereas the ruling Burmese government the State, Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC)2 calculates that there are just over 2.5 million” (Smith, 1994:42). The 
KNU have been the most significant of the ethnic insurgent groups in Burma however, a 
majority of their power evaporated in January 1995, when their headquarters at 
Manerplaw was captured by the Burmese armed forces (the Tatmadaw). Subsequent 
defeats at the hands of the Tatmadaw, left the group without a base of operations, and 
instead the group have now had to rely on guerrilla tactics to combat the Tatmadaw. Like 
the Karen State, the Shan State has had numerous ethnic militia and insurgent groups 
operating within its border. According to Fredholm (1993) “in the 1960s the total armed 
strength of the various Shan factions was estimated to be at most 8,000” (ibid:158). The 
main insurgent group in the Shan State has been the Shan State Army (SSA) but there 
power like the KNU’s has evaporated over time. However, they still remain the largest 
and best organised insurgent force in the Shan State.
  
3.2 The Growing Use of Commodities and Contraband in Burma to Fund Conflict
Since 2001 Burma has surpassed Afghanistan as the largest opium and heroin producer in 
the world (DEA, 2002:1). Burma is part of the Southeast Asian heroin and opium 
producing region, along with Laos and Thailand, known as the Golden Triangle. Many of 
the insurgent groups still operating in Burma are involved in the drug production and 
trafficking trade. For many of these groups, this constitutes their primarily source of 
income, which can be used to fund their rebellion and purchase small arms. Not only 
have insurgent groups been involved in the trade in opium, but so to have government 
forces who have taken advantage of state weakness and the exploitation of natural 
                                                
2 The State Peace and Development Council succeeded the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) in November 1997 as the ruling Burma government.
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resources and other commodities (Sherman, 2003:226) While undermining insurgent’s
group’s access to the drugs trade and the subsequent income they derive from it, the 
Burmese government has been able to take a greater share of the lucrative drug market.
Groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA) have been known to use money from 
drug trafficking to finance the purchase of weapons3. Money from illegal logging has also 
been a major source of revenue for many insurgent groups in Burma. This practice tends 
to occur in areas where insurgent armies have signed cease-fires with the SPDC (Brunner 
et al, 1998:18).
The supply of these weapons comes from the black market in Cambodia, where they can 
be shipped through Thailand by gun smugglers. Weapons available for purchase include 
M-16s, Chinese made AK47s, M79 grenade launchers, RPG rockets mortars, hand 
grenades and Surface to Air Missiles. An M-16 assault riffle can be delivered to Burmese 
insurgents at the Thai-Burmese border for between 4,500-8,000 baht, depending on its 
condition (BurmaNetNews, 1994). As well as Cambodian supply, weapons may also be 
purchased in Southern Mizoram (http://acd.iss.org). The Indian Navy have also cut off 
illegal arms shipments that are passing through the Andamans and Nicobar Islands that 
have been bound for Burma insurgents. Furthermore, there has been reported interest by 
Burmese insurgents in purchasing arms from Afghanistan, due to the large number of
surplus Soviet and United States weapons still available (BurmaNetNews, 1994). The 
Tatmadaw for a number of years had been outgunned by insurgent forces who had better 
weapons like the Chinese Ak47s and American weapons such as the M16s, M70s, 
mortars and rocket launchers (Smith, 1991:100). However, few of Burma’s insurgent 
groups have been well armed, and none have seriously threatened the ruling SPDC
(Selth, 2003:16).   
With the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 
September 1988 there was an upsurge of fighting in the countryside by ethnic, ideological 
and narcotics-based insurgent groups. With Burma’s government in political turmoil 
                                                
3 The USWA is believed to have a 16,000 strong army and is currently an ally to the Burmese government. 
The SSA are military engaged with the forces of the USWA as well as the Tatmadaw. In return the SPDC 
allow the USWA to continue with their drug trade, which has made the USWA one of the largest drug-
trafficking organisations in Southeast Asia (Marshall, 2005).
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there was potential for insurgent groups to cash in on the lucrative drug trade. Other 
lucrative forms of trade in Burma include those “involving jade, timber, opium, luxury 
and other black market goods, but over the years antiques, cattle and other agricultural 
produce have also been illegally exported in huge quantities abroad” (Smith, 1997:106). 
Many insurgent groups that still operate in Burma deal in these and other commodities 
and contraband goods. Unofficial World Bank estimates place 40 percent of Burma’s 
annual Gross National Product by trade on the black market, by early 1988 (Smith, 
1994:97). The ability of insurgents groups to control this trade generally reflects the 
strength of their armed force. This is highlighted by Smith (1991) who states, “most are 
extremely adapt at protecting and controlling their own trade routes” (ibid:99).
3.3 The Karen National Union (KNU)
(i) Background and Goals
 The KNU was formed in February 1947 from a merger of existing Karen parties and in 
June 1947 declared to the world the formation of the Karen Free State of ‘Kawthoolei’ 
(Smith, 1994:44). The KNU was created and led by Christian Karen and remained open 
to all Karens regardless of religion like its predecessor the Karen National Association 
(KNA) (Fredholm, 1993:27)4. The Karen believes that they have the right to autonomy 
and independence from the Burmese government. This claim has been based around 
arguments that the initial colonial powers in Burma should have recognised the Karen 
nation as a separate state. Instead it was grouped as part of Burma (Thomson, 1995:282). 
These claims have clearly been outlined in the goals set out by the KNU after one of their 
congress held at Maw Ko, Nyauglebin district in June and July 1956. According to the
website of the KNU5 the political aims of the group were laid down in this congress and 
they still apply today. These goals include the establishment of a Karen State with the 
right to self-determination, the establishment of national states for all nationalities and the 
establishment of a genuine federal union. The KNU will also pursue the policy of 
national democracy. The Karen people have been fighting for an independent state since 
                                                
4 The KNU underwent a brief name change to the Karen National Untied Front (KNUF), but changed its 
name back to the KNU when its chairman Mahn Ba Zan was replaced by Bo Mya (Becka, 1995:111).
5 See www.karen.org
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January 1949 when the government outlawed the KNU which resulted in Karen personal 
defecting from the Burmese army. Up until this point there had been no full-scale conflict 
between the two sides until the formation of the KNU in 1947, despite the Karen having 
called for an independent Karen state since the 1930s (Global Witness, 2003:71).
The KNU despite suffering serious military set-backs in the last few years is still believed 
to be the largest insurgent force still involved in armed conflict in Burma6. Estimates of 
their strength vary, but they are currently believed to have a combined strength with 
scattered units of pro-democracy students of 3000 to 4000 troops (Pederson et al, 
2000:170). This is a far cry from an estimate of a one time high of 10,000 troops under 
arms, still commanded by veterans of the British Army (Smith, 1994:45). The initial 
headquarters of the KNU were based in Mannerplaw from 1974 to 1995. However, 
SLORC offensives leading to the fall of the Mannerplaw base, plus the formation of a 
breakaway group the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) severely weakened the 
KNU. Factions between the Buddhist and Christian members in the KNU had led to the 
internal division within the group. It is believed that the split may have been engineered 
by the SLORC, as DKBA support was instrumental in the downfall of the Mannerplaw
and Kawmoorah headquarters (Global Witness, 2003:72). Further offences by the Burma 
military in 1997 basically crushed the remaining Karen rebels, who were driven out of 
their bases in the eastern mountain ranges (Tan, 2000:75). This prevented the KNU from 
defending fixed positions and instead the group have had to rely on guerrilla tactics 
(Global Witness, 2003:71). Lintner (1991) writing before the SLORC military offensives 
claims the “Karen rebel area measured about 5-6000 square kilometres and formed a 400 
kilometre long narrow border strip from the area opposite Mae Sariang in Thailand to the 
north to the Mawdaung Pass near Prachuap Khiri Khan in the South” (ibid:18). It is 
unlikely the KNU control this much territory in the Karen state currently, or are unable to 
defend any fixed position in the Karen State.
However, the KNU continue to military engage the Burmese army, despite having 
occurred major setbacks. A reason for this is the KUN has maintained substantial 
                                                
6 The KNU formally inaugurated the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) in July 1947, which 
became the KNU’s military arm (Becka, 1995:110). This in turn has become the Karen National Liberation 
Army (KNLA) which is currently the KNU's military arm (Capie, 2002:63).
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infrastructure and government organisations of their own (Smith, 1997:105). The KNU 
have still not signed any cease-fire agreements with the SPDC but according to Zaw 
(2002), the “KNU have engaged in serious dialogue aimed at achieving peace in Karen 
State, but these have stalled over Rangoon’s insistence that the KNU lay down arms as a 
precondition for reaching a political settlement”. Furthermore, Mahn Sha a member of 
the KNU dismisses the idea that the KNU is a spent military force. Sha believes that due 
to the more cost effective approach of guerrilla fighting, the KNU have been able to 
streamline their military struggle and will continue to be the thorn in the side of the 
SPDC (Zaw, 2002). There is no doubt that the KNU have suffered from serious 
casualties, but they have still managed to secure financial resources to fund their 
campaign, which is a significant factor in why the SPDC have failed to crush the 
rebellion
(ii) KNU Finance and Resources
The KNU have struggled to obtain support and funding from abroad, something that has 
plagued the group since their formation. There main supporter, had been Thailand, when 
the Thailand government supported having the ‘buffer zone’ policy between themselves 
and Burma. This policy encouraged Burmese insurgents on the Thai border to continue 
fighting the Burmese government, thus giving Thailand a buffer-zone between them and 
the Burmese military. It is unknown how much support Thailand has given over the last 
few years to the KNU, however, with the recent abandonment of the buffer-zone policy
and the fall of Manerplaw, it is likely that any aid from Thailand to the KNU is minimal.
Nevertheless, there have been claims recently that the Thailand government is reverting 
back to the previous buffer-zone policy (Zaw and Sai, 2001)7. The KNU website does 
proclaim that they receive no external support; (we) “continue to fight for our freedom 
intensively, single-handedly and without aid of any kind from anyone”. The KNU also 
believe that a reason for their setbacks is because, “we had to stand on our own feet and 
fight alone without aid of any kind from any country”. These claims have been backed up 
by KNU chairman Saw Ba Thin Sein at the 53rd anniversary of Karen National
Resistance Day in January 2002. Thin Sein claims that the KNU receives no external 
                                                
7 However, Bangkok publicly is still pursuing a policy of closer ties with Rangoon.  
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assistance (Zaw, 2002). Also deputy chairman of the KNU General Saw Bo Mya in an 
interview, has stated that, “the civil war has dragged on for the last five decades and the 
KNU has never received any kind of assistance from anywhere” (Zaw, 2003). The KNU 
have struggled to gain sympathy for their cause, despite Thin Sein claiming that the KNU 
has sympathy from both inside and outside Burma (Zaw, 2002). However, sympathy for 
their cause has failed to turn into external support. This is in comparison to insurgents 
groups in the Philippines and Indonesia who have been able to gain sympathy for their 
movements, which in turn has resulted in material assistance. Instead, lack of external 
support has meant that the KNU have basically had to rely on internal sources of income 
to finance their rebellion.
The KNU have managed to achieve a significant internal infrastructure for acquiring 
funding and resources. By establishing trade gates on the Thailand border, the KNU were 
able to derive a significant income. According to Global Witness (2003) the KNU levied 
a 5-10% tax on goods being passed through trade gates established by the KNU, where 
the trade consisted of, “value-added consumer goods being imported into Burma and raw 
materials, including teak, cattle, precious stones and minerals going to Thailand” 
(ibid:71). Revenue gathered from this tax after trade gates were established by the KNU 
in 1964, was between one and two million baht ($40,000 and $80,000 at an average 
exchange rate in the 80s of 25 baht to the dollar), on average trade passing daily (Global 
Witness, 2003:71). Other estimates by the KNU finance minister in 1983 placed the 
income of the trade zones at 500 million baht or US$75 million (Smith, 1997:106).
Individual trade checkpoints like the Wan Kha gate earned the KNU 5 million baht daily, 
before the SPDC was able to take control (Zaw, 2002). The first such trade gate was 
established at Palu south of the Thai border town of Mae Scot in 1964 (Lintner, 1991:17).
Taxation on goods like teak at the trade gates earned the KNU US$60/m³ (Bryant 1997, 
cited in Brunner et al, 1998:17). However, with internal divisions in the KNU resulting in 
the split and formation of the DKBA, much of the lucrative trade points held by the 
KNU, were seized by the Tatmadaw and the DKBA, after continuous military offensives.
It has now become extremely difficult for the KNU to collect tax from goods on route to 
Thailand.
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The KNU have also been heavily involved in the illegal logging trade. This was a key 
factor in the formation of the DKBA, who felt that the proceeds from logging were being 
unfairly distributed (Global Witness, 2003:71). It is arguably the most crucial source of 
current funding for the KNU, now that the trade gates have been taken over by the 
Tatmadaw. However, like the trade gates, many forest areas and sawmills once held by 
the KNU were captured by the DKBA/SLORC offensives in the mid 1990s (Global 
Witness, 2003:76-77). Concessions paid by logging companies also provide another 
source of income for the KNU. For example the Htoo Company subcontractors pay a 
bond to the KNU as well as having to pay SPDC troops from engaging the KNU in 
battles (Global Witness, 2003:76). Many of the logging concessions granted to Thai 
companies by the Burma government were in KNU controlled areas, allowing roads to be 
built, giving greater access to the Tatmadaw. However, this did give the KNU a chance to 
place tax on these companies, until the SLORC ended all ‘cross-border’ logging 
concessions with foreign companies in June 1993 (Smith, 1994:99). Tax from charcoal 
making also provides a small income for the KNU, but control over this trade is generally 
held by the SPDC and DKBA (Global Witness, 2003:79). 
The KNU have also been rumoured to have been involved in drug trafficking. However, 
the official KNU stance according to Padoe Mahn Sha Secretary General of the KNU is
the continuation of a policy to crack down on drugs (Zaw and Sai, 2001). A recent attack 
by KNU troops on a Burmese army outpost, according to the KNU was because 
methamphetamines were being smuggled into Thailand from this outpost (Zaw and Sai, 
2001). In an interview with Thin Shein, he outlines the policy of the KNU on drugs. He 
states, “from the very beginning, the KNU has been against drug trafficking and 
producing. Anyone found in possession of drugs is given a very severe penalty, including 
capital punishment” (Zaw, 2000b). Furthermore, the official statement on the website 
states, “Kawthoolei will never permit the growing or refining of opium or the sales and 
transport of illicit drugs through its territory”. However, it is likely that at some time the 
KNU have been involved in the drug trafficking business, although at a low level.
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(iii) The KNU and Small Arms Transfers: The ‘Process of Diffusion’
Like the KNU’s external sources of finance and resources, their ability to find an external 
supplier who is willing to supply small arms, has been basically non-existent. However,
Thailand has been accused by the SPDC for a number of years, of supplying the KNU 
with weapons. The problem of obtaining arms form external sources has been recognised 
by the KNU, who state, “when we took up arms, we attained great successes and 
occupied many towns and cities. We soon suffered military reserves, however, as we had 
not prepared for revolution and therefore, had no stockpile of arms and ammunition”8. In 
the KNU’s early formation the main problem was the increasing lack of supplies and 
ammunition the KNU were unable to acquire. However, according to Smith (1997), vital 
arms purchases could be arranged in Thailand, provided they could be paid for in hard 
currency (ibid:106). The money for purchases on the Thai black market usually came 
from the tax collected on trade gates (Lintner, 1991:17). These usually consisted of 
Vietnamese, Laotian or Thai surplus U.S. weapons. This helped the KNU build up a 
substantial arms and ammunition stockpile, of which had been lacking in the past 
(Fredholm, 1993:110&119). Later supplies of weapons to the KNU have come from 
China-made “Khmer surplus”, which were sometimes inferior in quality (Fredholm, 
1993:119). There are also reports that black market dealers, who were once the main 
source of weapons suppliers for the KNU, are now gun-shy about supplying the 
insurgency (Zaw, 2004).
Internal sources of weapons come mainly from battlefield acquisition. There are not as 
many reports of corrupt Burmese soldiers being involved in the illegal arms trade, in 
comparison to countries like Indonesia and the Philippines. However, this is probably due 
to the lack of information reported by the SPDC regarding such occurrences. Attacks on 
weapons depots are a common for the KNU to be involved in. This is especially the case 
with outposts near the Thailand border, where they provide an easier target for insurgent 
forces like the KNU. The KNU have also been known to manufacture there own 
weapons, however, not always with great success (Fredholm, 1993:119). The KNU
brigade leadership in the military arm of the KNLA are to a certain extend in charge of 
                                                
8 See the Karen website, www.karen.org
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providing arms and ammunition, as well as food and other supplies (Fredholm, 
1993:119).      
The KNU despite their lack of external support, still possess a number of small arms. 
Weapons captured in a forest village in the Phadi village on 27 March 1995 were 
believed to belong to the KNU. The weapons included M-16 rifles, AK rifles, anti-
aircraft artillery, anti-tank rocket launchers and the relevant ammunition. Arms and 
equipment acquired by the KNU has improved over time from their initial establishment
to their current standings. This is highlighted by Lintner (1991) who states, “the rag-tag 
Karen guerrillas started to look almost like a regular army, with smart uniforms, steel 
helmets and officers’ insignia” (ibid:17). Journalist Bruce Connew who spent some time 
with the KNU insurgents, comments that when attacked, the KNU were able to respond 
with machine guns, rockets, rifles and grenades (1999:61). Connew (1999) also 
highlights how important Claymore mines are to the KNU, when ambushing and 
attacking the Tatmadaw forces (ibid:62). This point is highlighted by Selth (2000) who 
has found that various insurgent forces in Burma like the KNU have acquired landmines 
from many sources, such as the United States, Russia and China. Before the fall of 
Manerplaw the KNLA brigade were believed to have its own arsenal of landmines with a 
large workshop being based at its headquarters (Selth, 2000).  
(iv) The Propensity of Armed Violence by the KNU and the use of Small Arms
Despite most of the insurgent groups in Burma failing, because they lack the ability to 
acquire external and internal material assistance, the KNU has still managed to be 
successful in sustaining their separatist objective, by means of armed conflict. There is no 
doubt that the KNU has suffered at the hands of the Tatmadaw, and as a result has lost 
control over large parts of territory in the Karen state. This has seen the subsequent 
demise of lucrative income derived from taxes on trade checkpoints and logging. 
However, by moving to guerrilla tactics the KNU have been able to minimise the cost 
associated with running an irregular army, and despite having no external aid, they have 
been able to maintain an army capable of continuing to fight the ruling SPDC. The 
example of the KNU shows how vital it is for an insurgent group to have some form of 
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internal income and support, in order to continue with military offensives. Despite having 
no external aid other than Thailand, where aid is now believed to be minimal, the KNU 
have demonstrated that it is possible to rely on internal methods to acquire finances and 
resources, as well as small arms. In comparison to other insurgent groups operating in
areas of Southeast Asia, like Mindanao in the Philippines and Aceh in Indonesia, the 
KNU have had virtually no external aid and have basically been involved in armed 
conflict with the Burmese government with no outside help at all.
Despite the lack of international support for the KNU, the group has continued to be 
involved in armed conflict that has stretched over a number of decades which has been 
characterised by its duration and numerous cease-fires and peace agreements that have 
failed. A significant reason for this, is that despite the inability of the KNU to acquire 
small arms from outside sources, they have still managed to acquire enough weapons 
internally to continue to engage the SPDC troops in battles. The Burma government has 
highlighted that if it can cut down an insurgent group’s finance and resources, it can 
severely restrain the ability of an insurgent group like the KNU to operate. However, 
acquiring possession of arms internally, or through the black market is something the 
KNU have continued to achieve, making the conflict cycle in Burma more difficult to 
solve. Despite the SPDC being able to cut back on the external income the KNU were 
able to achieve throughout the 70s and 80s, the KNU have still managed to finance their 
ongoing operations.
With the military offensive against the KNU in the mid 1990s, battles between the two 
sides have become less intense and frequent. A large factor due to this is the inability of 
the KNU to field as many troops as they had in the past. Another factor is the lack of arm 
supplies the KNU have, and the diminishing income the KNU are faced with, meaning 
fewer arms can be purchased on the black market. However, the KNU have shown that 
even with lack of finances and arms suppliers, if some form of arms supply is present, be 
it external or internal supply, it will be enough to continue carrying out guerrilla 
operations against government forces. This highlights how easy it is for conflicts to 
stagnate if an insurgent force has any form of arms supply whatsoever, and is unwilling 
to lay down their arms in peace talks or cease-fire agreements. It also highlights how vital 
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arms supplies are in allowing groups like the KNU to continue to carry out armed conflict 
against the ruling government of the state. 
3.4 The Shan State Army (SSA)
(i) Background and Goals
The Shan State Army was formed by representatives of the three largest insurgent groups 
in the Shan State after a meeting on 22 April 1964. Fredholm (1993) comments that, 
“since then the SSA has remained the main politically motivated insurgent group in the 
Shan State” (ibid:159). The political wing of the SSA the Shan State Progress Party 
(SSPP) was formed on 16 August 1971 and become part of the National Democratic 
Front (NDF) of which the KNU was part of (Fredholm, 1993:160). A few years later in 
1977 the SSA leadership was torn by factionalism over the alliance with the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB). This caused the SSA to split into two different factions. The first 
faction consisted of SSA North which comprised of the SSPP who then allied with the 
CPB. The SSA South (SSA-S) which shifted to closer cooperation with the Third Chinese 
Irregular Forces of General Li Waint made up the second faction. Despite the split, the 
SSA was able to field 8,000 to 9,000 troops, despite only having enough arms for half of 
this force (Fredholm, 1993:162). In 1989 a majority of the fighting force of the SSA 
made a truce with the SLORC, while the remainder allied with the Kachin Independence 
Organisation (KIO) (Becka, 1995:183).
The SSA like the KNU has had the explicit goal of secession from Burma, but as 
Silverstein (1958) points out, the government has large investments in the Shan State and 
the region is an important source of raw materials (ibid:57). Hence it is unlikely that the 
Burma government will ever grant independence to the Shan state. Estimates of SSA 
troop strength in the 1970s were around 3,000 (Fredholm, 1993:160). The current 
headquarters of the SSA are based in Loi Tai Leng. The SSA claim that a tenth of Loi Tai 
Leng's population are soldiers at arms (Marshall, 2005).  The leader of the SSA insurgent 
group Colonel Yawd Serk believes that the Shan people still support them in their quest 
to obtain their own sovereignty (Zaw, 2000a). Estimates of SSA troops according to 
Thailand-based analysts range from two thousand to six thousand (Moncreif, 2002).
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However, the SSA may possibly have the highest turnover of any insurgent army in 
Burma (Fredholm, 2003:164). Currently, the SSA have been listed by Eriksson and 
Wallensteen (2004) in the Uppsala Dataset as an unclear case due to insufficient 
information regarding the group being involved in active conflict.  
(ii) SSA Finance and Resources
Like the KNU, the SSA has struggled to gain income from external sources. In an 
interview with SSA leader Colonel Yawd Serk, he claims that “I used to ask for [arms] 
assistance but what we ask for now is to solve [our] problems in peaceful ways (Zaw, 
2000a). It is likely that the reason for this is that, there are few if no willing suppliers to 
provide financial assistance to the SSA. Although there have been allegations by Thai 
based news reports that the Thai military has covertly supported the Shan, despite Shan 
leaders denying the allegations (Moncreif, 2002). In the Shan State itself, there are little 
minerals or other resources suitable for plundering, which could be used to purchase arms 
and ammunition (Fredholm, 1993:164). In a more recent interview Yawd Serk, claims 
that the Shan exiles overseas provide a source of income (Marshall, 2005).   
Internal sources of income for the SSA is again similar to that of the KNU’s. Like the 
KNU, the SSA earns revenue from taxing goods at check-points when they are crossing 
the border into Thailand (Moncreif, 2002). This revenue includes taxes of 5 percent 
imposed on dry goods and 10 percent on the value of cattle (Fredholm, 1993:164). The 
SSA before its split had been alleged to be involved in the drug trade. Renard (1996) 
states that, “in 1973 the SSA and Lo Hsing-han agreed to offer to sell the annual Shan 
opium crop to any recognised international or governmental body” (Yawnghwe, 1987, 
cited in Renard, 1996:61). However, in the 1970s the SSA harvest of opium was only 0.2 
percent of all opium produced in the Shan State at the time. Nevertheless, the SSA still 
levied a 10% opium tax on the growers, and another 10% on the buyers (Lintner, 
1993:20). There have also been allegations that the SSA are still involved in heroin and 
methamphetamine trafficking (DEA, 2002:9). However, officially the SSA has adopted a 
strong anti-drug policy “in hopes of gaining political and military support from Thai and 
American authorities” (Moncreif, 2002). Furthermore, there have been reports in Thai 
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papers that the SSA is now active in attacking drug traffickers and the army is fighting 
against the illicit drug trade (Zaw and Sai, 2001)9. Yawd Serk reiterates that the SSA is 
not involved in the drug trade and is funded by taxing goods such as logs and livestock 
(Marshall, 2005). Other forms of internal finance also come from villagers who are 
obliged to pay tax and contribute rice and timber exports to China (Fredholm, 1993:164 
& Lintner, 1993:60).        
(iii) The SSA and Small Arms Transfers: The ‘Process of Diffusion
The SSA has struggled to obtain weapons both externally and internally since the early
formation of the group. Initially in the 1960s weapons were so scarce that there was only
one rifle to every five soldiers and the group has frequently been the poorest armed group 
in the Shan State (Fredholm, 1993:158&159). This has meant that many troops in the 
SSA have been expected to account for every bullet they fire (Fredholm, 1993:161).
Capie (2002) states that, “in addition to weapons captured from the Tatmadaw, most of 
these are bought illicitly from Thailand, Laos and southern China” (ibid:65). Most of the 
weapons acquired by the SSA have come from internal sources and supply. Generally 
this has been from ambushes and raids on government forces and stockpiles of weapons. 
The weapons the SSA are equipped with include the Ak-47 assault riffle, pistols of 
varying calibres and Russian-made RPK M-47 rifles (http://acd.iss.org).   
(iv) The Propensity of Armed Violence by the SSA and the use of Small Arms
The SSA are clear examples of how ineffective insurgent groups can be if there ability to 
access arm supplies is limited. While the SSA has been the main Shan insurgent groups 
in Burma for a number of decades there ability to challenge the Tatmadaw and the ruling 
SPDC has been extremely limited. This is in contrast to the KNU who for a number of 
years were able to secure a number of bases in the Karen state. The main difference 
between the two groups was the ability to acquire small arms. While the KNU did have 
the same problems of sources of supply for small arms as the SSA, they were able to 
acquire a number of financial windfalls (such as tax’s on trade gates) that allowed them 
                                                
9 According to Marshall (2005) the SSA claim that they killed 337 UWSA soldiers in April 2005 alone, 
who are known drug traffickers.
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to purchase small arms on the black markets. This was definitely an advantage the SSA 
did not have, and highlights the disadvantages of not having external supporters that 
insurgent groups in the Philippines and Indonesia enjoy. The SLORC and later the SPDC 
recognised the importance of first stopping the financial income insurgent groups like the
SSA were able to enjoy and then restricting the ability of these groups acquiring weapons 
through internal sources.
However, the limited finance and arms supply the SSA have been able to receive has still
meant that the duration of armed conflict in the Shan State has been prone to longevity. 
The intensity of battles in recent years has been very light and the number of casualties 
reported by either side has been minimal. This has been mainly due to the overwhelming 
superiority the Tatmadaw has had over any insurgent force in the Shan State in the last 
few years. Like the KNU the SSA has had to rely on guerrilla tactics to engage the 
Tatmadaw. This has had mixed results, on one hand it has allowed the SSA to get away 
with having minimal armaments in its possession, while on the other hand it has meant 
that the SSA have basically conceded any territory gains made in the Shan State in 
previous years. The frequency of battles between the two sides has also been minimal, 
with the SSA more concerned about ammunition preservation.
While the conflict has been less serve in the Shan State in the last few years, the SSA
have still continued to recruit members in the hope that they may force the SPDC to the 
negotiation table. However, this has been conditional on the SSA disarming themselves, 
something they are not prepared to do. Despite the lack of support for insurgent 
movements in the Shan State, armed conflict has continued due to the erratic supply of 
internal income and arms supply. However, it is likely that any insurgent force in the 
Shan State will struggle to engage in frequent and intense battles with the Tatmadaw in 
the future, unless a steady source of income and arms supply can be found. This will 
mean that conflict by Shan insurgent forces will continue to stagnate and perhaps end, 
unless the conditions for insurgents to prosper in the Shan State improve. Leader Colonel 
Yawd Serk, "is not expecting peace for his long-time suffering Shan anytime soon” 
(Marshall, 2005).           
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3.5 Conclusion and the Analysis of Key Questions on Burma
Internal Conflict in Burma has largely in the last few years been kept under control by the 
ruling SPDC government. However, it is likely that ethnic tensions are boiling 
underneath and that conflict will flare up again in the near future. For a group like the 
KNU or the SSA, the lack of external support has largely hampered any offensives 
against the Burmese government. This has meant that both of these groups have been 
solely reliant on internal sources for finance and arm supply. The black market has been 
an option for purchasing weapons for both of the groups, however, lack or finances has 
prevented any substantial purchases. This is highlighted by the table on the following 
page. Out of the three case studies presented in this thesis, the Burmese military ‘the 
Tatmadaw’ has been the most successful in being able to suppress any ethnic rebellion. 
This has largely been due to the ‘Four Cuts’ counterinsurgency policy introduced in the 
1960s by the Burmese government, “designed to defeat armed groups by cutting off their 
supplies of food, sources of funding, recruits, and intelligence” (Sherman, 2003:229). 
However, this has come at the cost of a decline in the standards of living for many ethnic 
Burmese because of the substantial increase in the military budget by the ruling military 
regime.
Another factor the SPDC has been able to use in obtaining control over insurgent forces 
in Burma, is the offering of economic incentives to insurgent groups to encourage 
disarmament and the signing of a cease-fire. The crack down on sources of funding for 
insurgent groups in Burma by the SPDC especially in the last few years has been vital in 
preventing arms purchases by the KNU and the SSA. This is in contrast to previous 
decades where the KNU were able to acquire substantial income from taxes on trade 
gates, where this money could then be used to obtain small arms. This is highlighted by 
Sherman (2003) who comments “by the 1960s, however, a burgeoning black-market 
trade-fuelled by macro-economic mismanagement and nationwide insurgencies of 
essential commodities-enabled these armed groups to increasingly self-finance the 
procurement of arms and ammunition” (ibid:232). This internal finance obtained by 
insurgent groups like the SSA and the KNU became even more important when what 
little external support the groups obtained from Thailand, gradually stopped with the 
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abandonment of the buffer zone policy. This is again pointed out by Sherman (2003) who 
states, “gaining control over illicit economic activity became essential to the very 
survival of ethnic minority insurgents groups” (ibid:233). This was especially the case for 
the KNU and the SSA. However, due to the Tatmadaw being able to cut down the flow of 
income from these activities, the KNU and SSA have lost control of many of the trade 
gates they once operated. In the case of the KNU, the revenue that had previously been 
obtained from illegal logging has been severely affected. This has had a flow on effect in 
their ability to secure supplies for weapons and armaments.
Table 3.1 Summary of KNU and SSA External and Internal Sources
The Karen National Union
Sources of Finance and Resources Sources of Small Arms
External  Thailand (Limited)  Thai-black market – Surplus U.S 
weapons
 China made “Khmer Surplus”
Internal  Trade Gates – Tax
 Illegal Logging
 Tax from Charcoal making
 Drug Trafficking (Minimal) 
 Battlefield Acquisition – Raids 
and Ambushes
The Shan State Army
Sources of Finance and Resources Sources of Small Arms
External  Thai military (Possibility)  Black Market – Thailand, Laos 
and Southern China
Internal  Trade Gates – Tax
 Drug Trafficking (Minimal)
 Taxation – Shan People
 Illegal Logging – China
 Battlefield Acquisition – Raids 
and Ambushes
    
The KNU and the SSA have shown that it is still possible to continue armed conflict 
against a ruling government of a country, provided that there is still some form of internal 
income and arms supply. However, the lack of an external actor willing to support any 
form of insurgent group in Burma has severely hampered the progress and goals set out 
by these groups. This is something insurgent groups in the Philippines (and to a lesser 
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extent in Indonesia) have not had to face. However, the increased military operations 
against these two insurgent groups have come at the determinant of people in not only the 
Karen and Shan states, but also throughout the whole of Burma10. Nevertheless, the 
ruling SPDC have shown that by cutting off the sources of income and finance for 
insurgent groups in Burma, it is indeed possible to contain insurgent activities in these 
areas. Although this can be argued that this method is a short term solution to a problem, 
as it still does not address the ethnic grievances held by many  groups like the Karen and 
the Shan.
The access and accumulation of small arms was something both the KNU and SSA were 
able to achieve, when they had control over numerous trade gates, in which they were 
able to gather tax. However, the subsequent demise of being able to control these trade 
gates has left both groups with little finances to purchase small arms. This has meant that 
for both the KNU and the SSA, being involved in active armed conflict, to a large extend 
has been determined by their arm supplies, which within the last few years has been very 
limited. While internal conflict in Burma has continued to be prone to longevity, the 
intensity of battles between insurgent and government forces has decreased over the last 
few years, since the falling of many key headquarters and bases in the Karen and Shan 
states. Despite these set backs both insurgent groups in Burma have still shown that it is 
possible to continue fighting in an internal conflict situation with limited arms supplies 
and suppliers. 
  
    
                                                
10  The Burma Project states that “According to United Nations statistics the SLORC spends 222% more on 
military spending than it does on health and education combined” (The Burma Project, 2005)
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Chapter 4
INDONESIA
4.1 The Historical Background to Conflict in Indonesia
Current violent conflict in Indonesia has largely been centred on an armed struggle
between the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), over 
control of the Aceh province. Previous conflict areas in Indonesia have included Maluku, 
Timor and West Papua/Irian Jaya. The Aceh province has an area of nearly 250,000 
square km, located on the northern tip of Sumatra Island with a population of about 4.1
million people. According to Kooistra (2001) the roots of the conflict, “date back to the 
end of the nineteenth century when the Dutch colonial powers decided to expand their 
colonial rule to the sultanate of Aceh” (ibid:15). Furthermore, Tan (2000) comments that,
“the resentments have been exacerbated by the differences between the pious Muslim 
culture of Aceh and the more secular, abangan culture and lifestyles of the Javanese, who 
dominate the armed forces and bureaucracy” (ibid:36). The continuing conflict in Aceh 
has to a large extend been over the control and distribution of natural resources in the 
area. The Indonesian government has frequently been accused by the Acehnese people of 
exploiting the natural resources in the region, resources that the Achenese feel they 
should have control of. The profitability of extracting natural resources from the region is 
hard to ignore. Robinson (1998) states that, “through the 1980s it [Aceh] contributed 
between $2 and $3 billion annually to Indonesian exports, making it the third largest 
source of exports after Riau and East Kalimantan” (ibid:135). ExxonMobil in Aceh alone 
generates 30 percent of the country’s oil and gas export income, or about $1.2 billion a 
year (Renner, 2002:41).
Initially in Aceh an anti-establishment umbrella organisation was founded in 1939 before 
the Second World War, by reformist religious called the All-Aceh Ulama Association. In 
1953 an insurgency broke out, led by PUSA leader Daud Beureueh, which ended in 1957 
when Aceh was granted provincial status (Kooistra, 2001:15). However, the seeds had 
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been sown for future insurgent movements in Aceh to carry out armed conflict against the 
Indonesia government. This future conflict after the Daud Beureueh led rebellion was 
fuelled by President Suharto and his ‘New Order’ management policies. Again control of 
natural resources in Aceh was at the forefront to the New Orders management’s policies 
of exploiting natural resources after the discovery of oil and LPG in the 1970s. This 
coupled with continuing repression by the army and social injustices, created many of the 
causes of the current conflict in Aceh. This led to Hasan di Tiro leader of the Aceh 
Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) and founder of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
or Free Aceh Movement (GAM) declaring Aceh an independent state on the 4th of
December 1976.     
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim state with a population that exceeds 200 million 
people, centred on the four islands of Sumatra, Java, Kalimatan and Sulawesi 
(Sjamsuddin, 1984:117). Roughly about half the population is Javanese. Yemeni traders 
brought Islam to Indonesia 700 years ago. This has led to many Islamic political parties 
and political organisations being committed to turning Indonesia into a pure Islamic state
(Abuza, 2003:61). More recently a new President was elected during the 2004 elections 
in Indonesia. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former general, took over the 
reins in place of ousted President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Previously Yudhoyono had 
been a minister in charge of national security under Megawati and was regarded as being 
influential in peace negotiations with GAM. A majority of the pre- election build-up was 
dominated by the increasing terrorism and corruption scandals facing Indonesia. Seen as 
more of a reformer than his predecessor, President Yudhoyono stated in an interview not 
long after he came to power, that to fight terrorism, “we will improve the capabilities of 
our intelligence, police and immigration officers to detect terrorist activities” (Elegant 
and Tedjasukmana, 2004). When asked about restarting peace negotiations with GAM, 
President Yudhoyono responded by stating:
“There is an opportunity for us to end the conflict in Aceh with a new policy. I appeal to the 
leaders of the separatists to reunite with [Indonesia], and the soldiers to come out [from hiding] 
and disarm. That would be the end of the armed struggle, and would allow for special autonomy 
to be carried out” (Elegant and Tedjasukmana, 2004).
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Within a year of this interview, a peace agreement was signed between GAM and the 
Indonesian government. This had given renewed hope that there can be permanent cease-
fire between the two sides. The agreement was signed in Finland on 15 August 2005 and 
was built around the understanding that GAM will not push for independence and will be 
allowed to participate in Indonesian politics. In return, GAM will disarm and demobilise 
its members and hand over their weapons to international monitors. In 2001, mostly 
civilian casualties accounted for the 2000 people who were killed, along with the several 
thousand more in earlier years. This is on top of the overall death toll in Aceh since 1961 
which may be as high as 100,000 (Renner, 2002:42&45). 
4.2 The Growing Gun Culture in Indonesia
The rise of the Aceh rebellion and terrorist organisations like Jemaah Islamiya has further 
driven the demand for small arms in Indonesia. Furthermore, weapons are being recycled
from other conflict zones outside Indonesia, like East Timor, where they are then finding 
their way into the hands of insurgent groups like GAM. The Jakarta Post reported that 
arms are being smuggled into Indonesia from Thailand, India, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Sabah in Malaysia. Major suppliers and producers of smuggled arms to Indonesia include
China, North Korea, Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan (The Jakarta Post, July 10, 2002).
This is a result of the sheer mass of Indonesian coastline, stretching around 81,000 
kilometres, made up of 17,506 islands which makes it difficult to guard against arms 
smuggling (The Jakarta Post, July 10, 2002). Furthermore, the location of Aceh at the 
head of the Malacca Strait, which links the Pacific and Indian Oceans, is one of the 
busiest waterways in the world. This makes it harder for Indonesian authorities to
intercept any illegal arms shipments that may be bound for insurgent groups like GAM.
Legislation and legal controls by Indonesian authorities like many other Southeast Asian 
nations suffer from inadequate policies, corruption and mismanagement. While in
comparison to other countries like the Philippines, Indonesian legal controls are an 
improvement, they are still poor in comparison to the neighbouring country of Australia. 
Like the Philippines, Indonesia has no law regulating the activities of arms brokers 
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(Kramer, 2001:24). However, unlike the Philippines, licences for guns in private 
possession are granted in Indonesia “only to individuals who have reached a high-level 
position within their occupation, whether civilian, civil servants or those serving in the 
military or police” (Kramer, 2001:7). Furthermore, licenses in Indonesia are only valid 
for one year, while in the Philippines licences are valid until the death or legal disability 
of the licensee (Kramer, 2001:10). 
4.3 The Gerakan Aceh Meredeka: Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
(i) Background and Goals
The Free Aceh Movement was founded by Hasan di Tiro in 1976 in response to the 
continuing injustices faced by the Aceh people, due to the constant suppression by the 
Indonesian government. The military wing of GAM the Angkatan Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (AGAM) was led by Abdullah Syafi’i until his death in January 2002 (Schulze, 
2004:13). This was the second insurgency faced by the Indonesian government after the 
Daud Beureueh led rebellion. The main difference between the two insurgent movements 
was Beureueh wanted to transform all Indonesia into an Islamic state, while di Tiro 
sought Achenese independence. GAM’s ideology is based around freeing Aceh from 
political control of the regime in Jakarta, using the argument that Aceh did not 
voluntarily join the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 but was incorporated illegally1
(Schulze, 2004:6). Hasan di Tiro believed that if Aceh could become an independent 
state, foreign support would be more forthcoming as external governments would no 
longer be interfering with Indonesian domestic affairs (Sjamsuddin, 1984:116). By 1979 
the insurgent force had mostly been crushed by the TNI, however, continuing human 
right abuses and extraction of resources from the area led to the resumption of armed 
conflict in 1989. Robinson (1998) highlights this point by stating:
 “the escalation and persistence of violence and instability after 1989, I have argued, was 
primarily the result of the specific doctrines and practices employed by the Indonesian armed 
                                                
1 This document is written by di Tiro himself, and is available to download on their official website, 
www.asnlf.net 
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forces in their efforts to quash the incipient rebellion-in particular the use of systematic terror 
and the forces mobilization of civilians as military auxiliaries” (ibid:153-54).
The other main insurgent group in Aceh was also founded by Hasan di Tiro, ASNLF, 
however there have been no reports of members of the ASNLF being active and the 
group is only nominally led by Hasan di Tiro from his exile in Sweden (Project 
Ploughshares, 2004).  
While the Aceh rebellion is heavily Islamic in nature, Tan (2000) comments that there are 
also historical, nationalist and economic factors at work (ibid:34). All these factors have 
contributed to the increasing difficulty of ending armed conflict in Aceh. In May 2003 
Indonesian officials estimated the GAM had approximately 5,200 members, with a 
military strategy focusing on economic and political targets, with the aim of disrupting 
administration in the region (http://acd.iiss.org). However, other estimates place the 
strength of GAM forces from about 15,000 to 27,000 (ICG, 2001:7). According to the 
ISS Armed Conflict Database, GAM highlights three main issues in order to sustain 
support among the populace of Aceh. These issues include; economic problems;
transmigration of the ethnic Javanese population; and discontented feeling about the 
presence of Indonesia security units in the area (http://acd.iiss.org). Ross (2003) has 
divided GAM into three incarnations according to when they have been involved in 
active conflict:
“The first in 1976-79, when it was small and well equipped, and was easily suppressed by the 
military; the second in 1989-91, when it was larger, better trained and well equipped, and was 
only put down through harsh security measures; and the third beginning in 1999, when it 
became larger and better funded than ever before, challenging the Indonesian government’s 
control of the province” (ibid:2).
However, even though GAM has increased its military muscle, it still pales in 
comparison to the size of the Indonesian army. Nevertheless, by continuing to gain 
support among the Achenese population by highlighting current issues of dispute, GAM 
will continue to provide a threat to the Indonesian army. 
  
Under former President Megawati Sukarnoputri peace talks resumed with the leadership 
of GAM in 2001, after previous peace talks had broken down in 2000. However, 
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Megawati only offered limited autonomy in the peace agreements and fighting resumed 
in October 2001. A peace accord was signed on December 9 2002, allowing the 
Acehnese greater autonomy, but again the peace process broke down in April 2003 with 
GAM leaders rejecting autonomy in favour of independence (Abuza, 2003:67).
Furthermore, both sides failed to comply with agreement terms; “rebel fighters were 
reluctant to disarm and Indonesian security forces failed to withdraw to defensive 
positions” (Project Ploughshares, 2004). This led to the Indonesian government declaring 
martial law in the province of Aceh. More recently, President Yudhoyono has urged 
GAM members to lay down their weapons and join efforts to rebuild Aceh after a 
tsunami devastated the region. President Yudhoyono made the comment that, “I call on 
those who are still raising arms, to come out…let us use this historical moment to join 
and be united again” (ABC News Online, January 3, 2005). On December 27 2004, 
Yudhoyono ordered a halt to offensive operations against GAM and focused the TNI on 
securing all humanitarian operations (Tedjasukmana, 2005). This has resulted in a peace 
agreement between the two sides, signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, allowing the 
GAM to participate in Indonesian politics. At the time of writing the peace agreement 
was holding.
(ii) GAM Finance and Resources
When GAM were formed in 1976 and began armed conflict, they faced many obstacles, 
one of which was where they were going to get finance from to buy small arms and pay 
for operating costs that are associated with an irregular army. This problem was never 
really solved by the insurgent group and was a major factor in its resulting defeat by the 
Indonesian army in the late 1970s. However, regrouping by GAM forces at the beginning 
of 1989 saw them develop a better strategy of acquiring finance and resources to run their 
operations. Schulze (2004) states that there are three main sources of revenue for GAM, 
“taxation, foreign donations; crime; drugs and kidnapping” (ibid:24).
Initial external support for GAM was provided by Libya, who also gave the insurgent 
group extensive training in guerrilla tactics in the 1980s and helped establish the 
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movement (http://acd.iiss.org). However, while Libya had provided training, it did not 
supply GAM with any additional funds or weaponry (Ross, 2003:17). This was despite 
Hasan di Tiro promising his soldiers military and financial assistance from Libya as well 
as the United States (Sjamsuddin, 1984:114). Further funding from external Diasporas is 
also believed to come from sympathisers in southern Thailand and Malaysia (Tan, 
2000:40). Schulze (2004) believes that the largest amount of foreign donations comes 
from Acehnese expatriates in Malaysia, with an estimated 5,000 Achenese in Kuala 
Lumpur providing donations (ibid:27). Another source of possible external income for 
GAM may come from Al-Qaeda, according to US officials, who believe there may be 
some ties between the two groups. However, the official GAM stance with Al-Qaeda is 
one of no contact, and currently only limited direct ties between GAM and Al-Qaeda 
have been uncovered (Abuza, 2003:176). Like the insurgent forces in Mindanao, GAM 
have had to rely heavily on internal sources of income, which are relatively diversified.
Internal finance comes from taxation on the Acehnese people and donations from 
wealthier Acehnese (Schulze, 2004:25). Wealthier villagers have been found to be openly 
harassed by GAM members demanding money, with repercussions severe if this does not 
occur (Kooistra, 2001:17). AGAM commander Sofyan Dawod and spokesman believes 
that most of the population does not mind paying GAM taxes, as taxes to the Indonesian 
government, “are then used to send troops and kill them [Achenese] while we use the tax 
to defend them” (Schulze, 2004:25). There have also been reports that GAM have carried 
out piracy attacks on ships in Indonesian waters and have made explicit threats to disrupt 
shipping in the region (South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2002). GAM has also been accused 
of funding their operations with illegal logging, drug running and prostitution 
(Committee on Ways and Means, 2003). There have been reports that illegal logging is 
continuing in Aceh and parts of Northern Sumatra and is being shipped to Singapore and 
Malaysia. Ships carrying these logs have been intercepted several times after leaving 
Acehnese ports. Singapore is a favoured destination as they have excellent conditions for 
‘cleansing’ timber of its origins and shipping it to the United States (Committee on Ways 
and Means, 2003). There has also been evidence that GAM has been involved in the 
trading and cultivation of marijuana and other drug trafficking activities (Schulze, 
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2004:27). Furthermore, GAM has been known to generate income by taxing major 
business in Aceh, including Mobil Oil, PT Arun and ASEAN Aceh Fertilisers (Capie, 
2002:41). Also contractors are supposed to be taxed 10 per cent of their profit; small 
shops 2.5 per cent (Nessen, 2005). Kidnapping has also provided another generating 
source of income for GAM. Recently in May 2004, 150 civilians were released in a deal 
brokered by the International Committee for the Red Cross and the Indonesian Red 
Cross, according to Humans Right watch (Fisher, 2005). Media coverage showed GAM 
fighters to be well fed, clothed and armed, many of them carrying expensive satellite 
phones (Elegant, 2004). 
As can be seen, GAM relies heavily on internal sources of income. While Diasporas from 
overseas Acehnese provide a source of external income, GAM has been prepared to find 
any new methods and means possible of generating finance and resources. Indonesian 
military estimates from April 2003 claimed that:
“GAM received a monthly ‘tax revenue’ of Rp 230 million from Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and 
Sabang, Rp 10 million from Pidie, Rp 36 million from East Aceh and Tamiang, Rp 682 million 
from Central Aceh, Rp 77 million from West Aceh, and Rp 70 million from South Aceh and 
Aceh Singkil” (Schulze, 2004:27)2.
In an interview in TIME magazine a GAM representative by the name of Tengku, stated 
that, “it costs a lot of money to run a big campaign and the Indonesians economy is 
weak”. He goes on further to say, “We can wait until the money runs out. We have fought 
them for 27 years. We can fight on for three times that long until the Indonesians finally 
get tried and goes home” (Elegant, 2004). This is a clear example of the lengths GAM 
members are prepared to go to, despite having irregular sources of income. Despite this 
setback, the International Crisis Group in their report believe that the, “AGAM is not 
particularly well prepared, trained or disciplined, but a hard core could sustain a lengthy 
guerrilla campaign” (ICG, 2001:9).  
                                                
2 Data was obtained from Indonesian Military Intelligence (SGI), Lhokseumawe, April 2003
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(iii) GAM and Small Arms Transfers: The ‘Process of Diffusion’
The weapons and equipment GAM now have access to is far superior to the weapons 
they first acquired at the start of armed conflict in 1976. These weapons included old 
guns and remnants left over from WWII (Sjamsuddin, 1984:114). Arms possessed by
GAM are estimated at between 1,000 and 1500 modern firearms, a few grenade launchers 
and a few mortars (ICG, 2001:7). Like the Mindanao insurgent groups in the Philippines,
GAM relies heavily on internal sources to acquire small arms and lacks access or the 
capability to acquire heavier weaponry. Operations and ambushes against the Indonesian 
army as well as buying weapons direct from TNI personal has been the most significant
source of acquiring weapons for the GAM (http://acd.iiss.org). Nevertheless, some 
external support still exists for GAM. External sources of weapons acquired by GAM 
have come from Malaysia via Thailand (Project Ploughshares, 2004). A number of 
shipments have been seized off the Malay Peninsular, which may have been intended for
GAM (Chalk, 2001). Expatriate supporters from Aceh in Malaysia and Singapore have 
also been known to smuggle small quantities of arms to Aceh through southern Thailand 
(ICG, 2001:8)  However, no foreign government recognises GAM, and as such GAM has 
no foreign sanctuary or support from a friendly government (ICG, 2001:8). This problem 
was highlighted in the 1980s when GAM forces were easily defeated by the Indonesian 
army, due to lack of funds and arms from external backers (Ross, 2003:14).
Bedeski et al (1998) is of the opinion that insurgents in Indonesia are among the least 
likely to receive small arms from abroad, as their numbers are small and they do not have 
the mechanisms to raise adequate funds for weapon purchases (ibid:10). Nevertheless, 
there have still been numerous reports of arm shipments to GAM. Muhamad Duad a 
member of GAM, was captured in the Adaman Sea north of Sumatra, with a cache of 
weapons that came from a Thai source. Daud stated that, “his rebel movement has long 
had connections with Thai gun runners and they regularly came to buy weapons”. Daud 
goes on to claim, “his group had concluded at least five deals with Thai gun runners since 
2002, involving some 200 machine guns and grenade launchers” (Jinakul, 2004).
Inadequate naval patrolling and corrupt officials has enabled this weapons trade through 
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Thai middlemen to continue (Kearney, 2002). Furthermore, two Thai army sergeants 
were arrested in the south of the country carrying 15,000 bullets, grenades, landmines and 
TNT explosives. It was suspected that these were to be dispatched to GAM forces
(Mahmood, 2003). The terrorist organisation Abu Sayyaf has also been linked to 
supplying GAM fighters with weapons (Morella, 2001).  Arms purchased through the 
Cambodian black market and smuggled through Northern Malaysia is also a possible 
supply of weaponry for GAM.
Internal sources of weapons still remain the primary source of weapons for GAM. This 
can include, “government stockpiles; either acquired from defectors, purchased from 
soldiers or corrupt officials, stolen from government arsenals, or procured during 
insurgent operations” (Kramer, 2003). Reports suggest that state-owned weapons maker 
PT Pindad has been supplying weapons to GAM (Yamin, 2000). Pindad is only supposed 
to provide weapons to the TNI, however there have been accusations that workers of the 
company run their own arms business outside of work. These accusations come after 
Jakarta police found vehicles carrying ammunitions and weapons stored in boxes labelled 
‘Pindad’, on their way to GAM (Yamin, 2000). Police have also arrested army personal 
on suspicion of selling arms and explosives to GAM, after raids on houses netted 
significant supplies of ammunitions and weapons (Manggut et al, 2002). The weapons
GAM possesses are varied. They have in their arsenal AK-47s  and M-16s as well as 
locally made guns (Kearney, 2002). Locally guns are preferred as they are better suited to 
the ammunition which can be sourced locally within Indonesia (Kearney, 2002). 
However, GAM still posses a number of obsolete rifles and weapons left over from the 
Second World War. A shortage of arms means most GAM fighters are only equipped 
with homemade firearms, explosive devices or sharp/blunt instruments (ICG, 2001:7). 
(iv) The Propensity of Armed Violence by GAM and the use of Small Arms
The Free Aceh Movement and the use of small arms by the group highlights how an 
insurgent movement can stagnate without enough firepower. The position of the two 
sides involved in conflict, the GAM and the Indonesian government, has been inflexible 
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and has resulted in increased violence in the country. The GAM has used small arms to 
carry out armed conflict with the objective of making Aceh an independent state from 
Indonesia. The impact of illicit small arm usage in Indonesia has been significant. Since 
the conflict has begun, some 12,000 people have been killed, with 6,000 people dying 
since the second phase of the conflict began in 1998 (Project Ploughshares, 2004). Many 
more have been displaced and made homeless. The main problem that lies at the heart of 
the Aceh conflict, is that the Aceh rebels are not strong enough to military defeat the 
Indonesian forces. Furthermore, like the NPA insurgent force in the Philippines, GAM 
have been mainly reliant on raids and ambushes on Indonesian forces to acquire arms. 
This has meant that battles in Aceh are frequent, but are of low intensity, as the 
insurgents do not have enough arms or ammunition to carry out prolonged military 
offensives.
There is also evidence that GAM like other insurgent groups have used peace talks and 
cease-fire agreements to re-group and re-arm. After the signing of the ‘Cessation of 
Hostilities Framework Agreement’ in 2002 a decline in the casualty rate in the conflict 
occurred. However, the agreement was abandoned in May 2003, after accusations by the 
Indonesian government that GAM were using the agreement to rebuild their government 
structure, expand their influence in the countryside and rearm themselves with new 
weapons (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003:36). This has furthered increased the duration of 
conflict in the region, as GAM have been able to re-arm themselves after long periods of 
fighting with the TNI. This has been critical as GAM have struggled to acquire small 
arms in the past, and resulted in their subsequent defeat soon after their formation.
Tan (2000) finds that GAM have “never really had the numbers or ability to hold on to 
large swathes of territory, unlike the much larger Moro rebel movement in Mindanao”,
but “there is an external dimension present in the form of relatively stable arms supply 
and financial support from sympathisers abroad” (ibid:40&41). While internal sources 
are an important source for weaponry and finance, external sources still provide a 
valuable source for supply of arms and income to insurgent forces. In GAM’s early 
formation Hasan di Tiro placed too much emphasis on gaining external support, meaning 
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that finding new internal support was neglected (Sjamsuddin, 1984:116). However, as 
can be seen in the case of GAM, internal support is not sufficient enough for the 
movement to carry out a full scale civil war. This is in comparison to the insurgent 
groups in Mindanao who are better funded financially and are able to acquire arms with 
more ease externally. However, as Tan (2000) highlights, “the conflict has been 
characterised by durability, resistance to negotiated settlement and growing severity” 
(ibid:41). A lot of this can be attributed to the supply of weaponry GAM has acquired. 
While limited in their finance and resources, GAM have continued to carry out armed 
conflict in Indonesia, resulting in increased duration of the conflict, as well as increasing
the frequency and intensity of battles.
4.4 Conclusion and the Analysis of Key Questions on Indonesia
The effects of internal conflict in Indonesia have been drawn out by insurgent groups and 
the correlating use of small arms. GAM the main insurgent group that were until recently
involved in active armed conflict in Indonesia has used various sources of finance and 
resources to acquire small arms. Like other insurgent groups in the region, GAM has had 
to rely heavily on internal sources to acquire small arms. As highlighted by the following 
table of external and internal sources on the following page, GAM have had no foreign 
government backing, unlike the insurgent forces in Mindanao. Instead GAM has had to 
rely on expatriate supporters and corrupt military personal from other countries. This
table supports Bedeski et al (1998) opinion that GAM are among the least likely to 
receive small arms abroad. However, GAM has sourced enough weaponry internally to 
continue to carry out armed conflict. Suppliers of small arms such as workers from arms 
manufacturer Pindad a state owned enterprise has been enough for GAM to survive and 
gradually strengthen its support over the last few years. Furthermore, GAM has gained 
enough support from sympathizers overseas and established enough contacts with arm 
suppliers, that it still possesses a significant threat to the Indonesian government.
When it has come to financing their rebellion GAM have had to significantly diversify 
their sources, due to their lack of external finance. This is due to the irregularly of 
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obtaining income through methods such as kidnapping, prostitution and crime. However, 
GAM have been able to obtain a steady source of income, by levying tax’s on Achenese 
people, both rich and poor and to a certain extent major business, if they are willing to 
pay. GAM has also made explicit threats to disrupt shipping in the region (South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, 2002). It is likely that one of the factors for doing this would be to gain 
contraband goods from the ships. Contraband goods such as marijuana and logging also 
provide a valuable source of income for GAM. External income has been absent from 
most of GAM’s periods of active conflict. Libya provided training and resources for 
members of GAM’s insurgent force, but no exchange of money or weapons has known to 
have occurred. Malaysian has been accused by the Indonesian government of providing 
GAM with money and weapons, something which has been continually denied by the 
Malaysian government. The most income GAM acquires externally comes from foreign 
donations and diasporas from overseas supporters and workers. 
Table 4.1 Summary of GAM External and Internal Sources
The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: Free Aceh Movement
Sources of Finance and Resources Sources of Small Arms
External  Libya
 Diasporas - Southern Thailand and 
Malaysia
 Indonesian Military
 Malaysia – via Thailand
 Expatriate Supporters – Malaysia 
and Singapore
 Thailand Suppliers and Military
  Abu Sayyaf
 Cambodian Black Market – via 
North Malaysia
Internal  Taxation – Aceh People and Major 
business (e.g. Mobil Oil)
 Crime
 Drug running
 Trade and Cultivation of Marijuana
 Kidnapping
 Piracy
 Illegal Logging – Aceh and Northern 
Parts of Sumatra
 Prostitution
 Battlefield Acquisition – Raids 
and Ambushes
 Leakage of Government 
Stockpiles – ‘PT Pindad’
 Purchases off Government 
Soldiers – Black Market Sales
Small arms transfers to GAM have been vital in the insurgent group being able to re-
establish itself as a group that has been able to make the Indonesian government 
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acknowledge that there is and has been, serious problems in the management of Aceh. 
The supply of weaponry to GAM and their ability to replenish their stocks was vital in 
the late 1990s, as it allowed the group to resume active armed conflict, after a period of 
inactivity. Without this supply it would have been likely that GAM would have been 
unable to resume active armed conflict after the insurgent group was crushed by the 
Indonesian military in the early 1980s. Access to small arms and ammunition has allowed 
GAM to carry out long periods of fighting. The use of small arms by the GAM in Aceh 
has made the conflict more durable and fighting has become more intense over the last 
few years. This can be seen in the overall causality figures suffered in the internal conflict 
in Aceh, with 5,000 of the 12,000 casualties, mostly civilians occurring since 1998 
(Project Ploughshares, 2004). 
   
Like the conflict in Burma, GAM lacks access to heavier weapons, which hinders their 
progress. This is something that does not seem to bother leaders, who believe that if 
guerrilla tactics can not win, the cost of continuing the Aceh operation by the military 
will eventually be too much for the Indonesian government to stomach. This is pointed 
out  by Schulze’s (2004) interview of  GAM member Amni bin Marzuki, who states, 
“from a military perspective there is no way for us to defeat them of for them to defeat 
us…we want them to spend more money on this operation. We want to exhaust them 
financially” (ibid:41). This highlights the willingness of GAM fighters in continuing 
violent conflict, no matter how long  a period it may take to defeat the Indonesian 
government. Furthermore, the use of ceasefires and peace agreements has also allowed 
GAM to rearm and build up supply of their stocks. Overall, GAM have shown that there 
ability to find arms supplies whether it has been internally or externally has been a key 
factor in the insurgent movement resuming active armed conflict after long periods of 
inactivity.  
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Chapter 5
THE PHILIPPINES
5.1 The Historical Background to Conflict in the Philippines
Conflict in the Philippines has occurred on a regular basis between non-state actors and 
government forces. This has contributed to the detriment of many impoverished people 
living in the Philippines. The usual indicators of what causes conflict in a country are 
present in the Philippines. The country suffers from a poor Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), and the income per capita ratio is relatively low. Low school enrolment and a 
high infant mortality rate are also poor when compared to Western countries1.
Furthermore, the country is run by a government who find’s it extremely difficult to 
contain both a nationwide communist ideological based insurgency and ethnic
insurgencies in the province of Mindanao. These insurgencies have contributed to the 
Philippines having the attributes of a weak state, with a government that relies on 
external support in order to combat insurgent forces in the country. Poverty and 
unemployment has been rife in the Philippines even though the country is home to a vast 
area of natural resources, which is largely centred in the Mindanao region2. The 
Philippines is also home to contrasting ethnic groups, which has made the region prone to 
internal conflict3.
This chapter will focus on three insurgent groups in the Philippines, the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the New 
Peoples Army (NPA). This is not to say that these are the only three insurgent groups 
operating in the Philippines, but according to Eriksson et al (2003) they were the main 
                                                
1  The GDP in the Philippines for 2003 was US$80.6 million. The infant mortality rate was 28 per 1000 live 
births. Furthermore, 7% of the population aged 15 years plus are illiterate (Development Economics central 
database, World Bank, 2004). 
2 37% of the population in the Philippines is below the national poverty line (ibid). The unemployment rate 
in 2004 was 11.4% (CIA, The World Factbook, 2004).
3 The ethnic groups consist of the: Christian Malay 91.5%, Muslim Malay 4%, Chinese 1.5%, other 3% 
(CIA, The World Factbook, 2004).
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insurgent forces involved in active armed conflict along with the Abu Sayaf Group 
(ASG) in 20024. The NPA, MNLF and the MILF are historically the most well known 
insurgent forces in the Philippines and provide the reader with a greater understanding of 
the supply of small arms to insurgent forces and the relative effect it has on intra-state 
conflict in the Philippines. They also have a long history of being involved with small 
arms transfers5.
The Mindanao conflict began with the colonisation of the Philippines by Arabs and then
later the Europeans, which meant two contrasting religions, were now competing for the 
attention of the indigenous population6. The Arabs introduced Islam to the South while 
the Europeans introduced Christianity to the North (Islam, 2003:196). According to Islam 
(2003) the roots of the separatist movement in the Philippines “lie in the profound 
cultural and religious differences between the Christian, colonised North, and the 
Muslim, non-subjugated South” (ibid:200). This has meant the Muslim area of Mindanao 
has been dominated by Catholic and Protestant culture and belief, causing widespread 
mistrust from the local Muslims who live in this area. The Mindanao conflict is centred 
on a territorial disagreement between the Philippine government and the two main 
insurgent forces the MNLF and the MILF. According to Abuza (2003), “some 120,000 
people have been killed in Mindanao Province alone, while tens of thousands of people 
have become refugees in Malaysia in three decades of war” (ibid:33). Between 1972-
1975 alone, 60,000 civilians were estimated to be killed from fighting in Mindanao 
(Mercado, 1984:163). At this time about 80% of the entire Philippine military force was 
deployed in Mindanao (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004:488). A significant amount of these 
casualties is due to the use of small arms by insurgent groups7. The ethnic insurgent 
                                                
4 However, in the latest update on the Uppsala dataset by Harbom and Wallensteen (2005) the list contains, 
the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the MILF as the only 
insurgent groups involved in active armed conflict in 2003.
5 Only recently has the ASG been receiving international attention due to their increasing terrorist activity. 
However, little is still known about their military capacity or where their source of arms comes from.
6  Religion in the Philippines has been broken down as follows: Roman Catholic 83%, Protestant 9%, 
Muslim 5%, Buddhist and other 3% (CIA, The World Factbook, 2004).
7 85% of external deaths in Mindanao in 2000 were attributable to small arms injuries (Oxfam 
International, 2001)
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movement in Mindanao is in contrast to the conflict caused by the NPA who follow a 
communist based ideology.
According to Buss (1987), “communists have been active in the Philippines since 1930, 
when the Philippine economy was suffering the effects of the Great American 
Depression” (ibid:117). Communism in the Philippines has gained support from many 
individuals, who feel that the reason why poverty is so predominate in the country, is 
because of the Western capitalist ideological system introduced into the Philippines by 
countries like the United States. Jones (1989) comments that the Philippine revolution:
“Was a product of the classical Third World fusion of the peasant unrest and nationalism, and it 
was shaped by a convergence of forces at work in the 1960s: the war in Vietnam, humiliating 
inequities in the relationship between the Philippines and the United States, the political 
radicalism that was sweeping college campuses from Michigan to Manila, and the Cultural 
revolution in the People’s Republic of China” (ibid:5).
The base of the communist movement in the Philippines was focused on the workers and 
the pheasants, rather than the high socio economic class. This allowed for communist 
movements such as the NPA to form pockets of resistance in local communities and 
villages, where there was greater sympathy for their movement. From here insurgent 
groups could use these base camps to wage armed conflict against government forces.   
5.2 The Relative Ease of Acquiring Small Arms in the Philippines
There are three main sources for acquiring small arms in the Philippines; local 
manufacture, smuggling, and diversions from government stocks (Garrido, 2003). Local 
manufacture is based around the cities of Danao and Manduae. These two cities have 
numerous manufactures and  illicit producers of small arms. According to the Small 
Arms Survey (2003), “as of April 1998, there were about 45 legal firearms manufactures, 
522 authorised dealers, and 133 gun repair shops in the Philippines, according to the 
Firearms and Explosive Division of the National Police” (ibid:34)8. Many of the 
manufactured weapons are made by local gunsmiths in backyard shacks, using any form 
of materials they can get their hands on. Seno (1996) states that, “a roughly made .38 
                                                
8 Cited in Lubang, 2002.
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calibre pistol takes three weeks to produce at a cost of $8. It will go to a middleman for 
$14 and then on to the end-user for nearly $60” (ibid). These middlemen often sell on 
these weapons to criminals and drug lords, as well as non-state actors. Production by 
local manufactures is often the result of demand for low cost weapons that is fuelled by 
criminal groups, rebel groups and for personal defence (Small Arms Survey, 2003:33).
The lack of law and regulation in the Philippines regarding the making and possession of 
small arms is one of the most lax in the ASEAN states. Policy development are 
responsibilities of the Philippine Centre for Transnational Crime (PCTC) under the office 
of the president, which has continued to be constrained by insufficient funding and 
capacity (Pattugalan, 2003:4). This has contributed to the problem of small arm 
proliferation in the Philippines, as a result of, “liberal gun laws, civil strife and ineffective 
law enforcement arising from insufficient capacity, corruption and political influence on 
law enforcement” (Pattugalan, 2003:4). There are as many as 2 million unlicensed guns 
in the Philippines, which further fuels the intra-state conflict in the region (Teves, 2002).
However, this is not seen as a problem by a majority of the local population in the 
Philippines. Instead gunsmiths are seen as part of the long-standing gun culture that has 
been operating in the Philippines over a number of decades. Out of the ASEAN states the 
Philippines, “is the only country that seems to have no general requirements to be met 
prior to the (gun) application process, except that the applicant must be over 21” 
(Kramer, 2001:7). Furthermore, Philippine law does not require licensed private small 
arms to have a unique, distinguishing mark to allow for inventory control and weapons 
tracing (Kramer, 2001:10). The legislation that exists in the Philippines has fuelled the 
insurgencies in Mindanao and has allowed greater freedom for arms brokers to operate in. 
Philippine legislation has also given the opportunity to individuals to diverse legal small 
arms to the illicit circuit (Kramer, 2001:24). This has seen a continuing trend of small
arms being diverted from government stocks into the illicit circuit and black market.
The smuggling of small arms in the Philippines has proved to be a substantial problem 
for the Philippine government. Not only is there the problem of arms flowing into the 
country that non-state actors may acquire, but there is also the problem of arms flowing 
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out of the Philippines. In 2002 the Taiwan coast guard seized 173 guns and over 8000 
rounds of ammunition from a boat near the coast of Tamsui, which had come from the 
Philippines (Huang, 2002). The arsenal had a market value of NT$70 million, which 
included submachine guns, M16s, satellite phones, and the accompanying ammunition 
(Huang, 2002). Furthermore, there is also Philippine involvement in the Japanese 
underworld with the criminal group Yakuza. Firearms are coming from illegal producers 
in Cebu and are exported from different exit points like Batangas, Ilocos Sur and northern 
parts of the Philippines (Dursin, 2000). With the increased sophistication of arms 
smuggling in and from the Philippines, there is a plentiful supply of weapons for 
insurgent groups to acquire. How much they buy, will often depend on their finances and 
resources.     
5.3 The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
(i) Background and Goals
The MNLF was one of the initial insurgent organisations in the Philippines that had the 
aim of turning Mindanao into an independent state. The organisation was formed by Nur 
Misuari, a professor at the University of the Philippines in 1968 and the group began an 
armed insurgency in 1972 (Abuza, 2003:38). Their main objective was the complete 
liberation of the Moro homeland (Islam, 2003:202). This would be achieved by two 
forms of resistance: parliamentary participation and armed struggle (Mercado, 1984:160).
The MNLF relinquished its goal of independence for a Muslim homeland in favour of an 
autonomy agreement with the government in 1987 (Abuza, 2003:40). Apart from 
independence other goals included the changing of political power in order to limit the 
distribution of poverty (Yegar, 2002:268). The MNLF was supported by young secular-
educated Muslims, which according to Quilop (2000), “was a region-wide network of 
organisations that tried to consolidate the various existing (Muslim) forces” (ibid:22).
Initial fighting between the MNLF and government forces lead to President Ferdinand 
Marcos imposing martial law on the country in September 1972, and the immediate 
collection of all guns from civilians. By the end of 1972 the two armed forces carried out 
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a full-scale civil war on the island of Jolo. By 1973 mainland Mindanao was also at war. 
A cease fire occurred in December 1976 in Tripoli, Libya. The Libyan government also 
promised to scale down the support of the MNLF by cutting down the flow of weapons.
However, the peace agreement did not last long with reoccurring disputes over the 
parties’ leadership (Guitierrez and Borras, 2004:67). Nevertheless, the common 
denominator in the MNLF leadership continued to be Islamic ideology (Madale, 
1984:179).  
The government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996 in the ceremonial hall 
of Malacanang Palace after 47 months of negotiations. A crucial part of the peace 
agreement was centred on not forcing the MNLF to disarm of demobilise. At the time of 
the peace agreement military records showed some 17,700 MNLF members, compared to 
a peak strength of 21,200 individuals in 1977 (Makinano and Lubang, 2001:25&30).
However, recent peace efforts from the government and MNLF have broken down due to 
a lack of agreement over key issues. In November 19 2001, a faction of the MNLF, led 
by Nur Misuari, took up arms again. In nearly two weeks of fighting some 147 people 
were killed (Abuza, 2003:43). Nonetheless, many individuals within the MNLF still 
believe that a peace process can be worked out between the group and the government. 
These has seen reduced conflict between the MNLF and the government, and in the most 
recent Uppsala dataset (2005) the MNLF have not been included, because they were not
involved in active armed conflict, and had not reached the threshold of 25 battle-related 
deaths (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). However, the MNLF have still been known to 
carry out skirmishes with the Armed Forces of the Phillipines (AFP). One of these 
skirmishes occurred more recently on the island of Jolo in February 2005. Estimation of 
deaths included 22 soldiers and 60 rebels. The current conflict however does not involve 
the MILF (Spaeth, 2005a:38). It is believed that the conflict come about as Misuari 
realised that he would lose re-election as governor of his mega- province (Spaeth, 
2005b:35).   
Much of the lack of fighting by the MNLF has been due to the rival insurgent force the
MILF recruiting members from the MNLF. This was a result of some of the MNLF 
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members not willing to commit to the peace process with the Philippine government. For 
many of the members in the MNLF, being granted autonomy would not suffice. Instead 
they were only committed to the peace process, if the Philippine government gave the 
Mindanao region full independence. Currently Misuari is in custody after the 2001 
attacks, but he claims that 99 percent of MNLF members still consider him as their leader 
(Manila Bulletin, January 1, 2004). However, why the MNLF is no longer as strong as 
the MILF, there still remains loyal members to Nur Misuari, which means that for the 
Philippine government the MNLF still have to be viewed as a security threat.  
(ii) MNLF Finance and Resources
 There are a number of external and overseas supporters who have provided a significant 
amount of money and resources for the MNLF movement, especially in the past. Many of 
these supporters came from the Middle East. Libya even established an Islamic 
Directorate of the Philippines to coordinate overseas assistance to the MNLF (Tan, 
2000:18). In 1972 Nur Misuari received $3.5 million from the Solidarity Fund of the 
Islamic Conference Organisation (Yegar, 2002:273). Within the region itself the 
Philippine government has frequently accused the Malaysian government of providing 
both military and financial assistance to the MNLF9. Although this has been frequently 
denied by the Malaysian government, there is a compelling evidence to suggest that if not 
currently, in the past the MNLF had received training in guerrilla tactics within Malaysia.
Aid from Malaysian did however diminish after 1969 when the Philippines and Malaysia 
moved to closer cooperation with the ASEAN states (Yegar, 2002:270). Libya has not 
denied helping rebel groups in Mindanao in the past. In the Lumper Islamic conference in 
1974, a Libyan spokesman told the press that his government was helping rebel groups in 
Mindanao ‘in all forms’ (George, 1980:232). Furthermore, in April 1982 a documentary
that aired on Australian television tied both the Libyan government and the Malaysian 
government together, by claiming British and Australian mercenaries were training the 
                                                
9 Indonesia has also been accused of supplying finances and arms to the MNLF. However this is 
unsubstantial evidence. See Yegar (2002:273) 
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Moro guerrillas in Malaysia and that they were financed by Libyan leader Colonel 
Gaddafi (Samad, 1990 cited in Tan, 2003:33).
Other important external support also came from Syria and Iran who approved the 
revolutionary qualities they saw in MNLF (Buss, 1987:110). Financial support also came
from the donations of diasporas from the 16,000 Muslims workers, contracted in the 
Middle East. MNLF cadres have also received secret military training in many of the 
Middle Eastern countries who support the MNLF’s cause, and have returned to the 
Philippines as Muslim commandos (Buss, 1987:112). The ability of Misuari to liaison 
with foreign suppliers of arms was crucial in allowing fighting to continue after the 
MNLF's formation (Yegar, 2002:270).
Within the Philippines the MNLF has also been involved in drug trafficking activities to 
finance their movement. The DEA (2003) believe that the MNLF is involved in the 
production of marijuana, and provides the security for other marijuana fields. 
Furthermore, the DEA (2003) also believe that the MNLF may be involved in the 
production of crystal methamphetamine. In some cases, the MNLF have used drugs as 
contraband in order to buy small arms. Other internal finances come from, “some of the 
MNLF members who go to urban centres with letters from the Field Commanders 
soliciting zakat (alms) for the movement” (Madale, 1984:83). Furthermore, the MNLF 
have benefited from villager support who apart from providing money, have also 
provided commodities such as rice, chicken or root crops (Madale, 1984:184). In many 
instances money raised from these Muslim communities may have been diverted to buy 
small arms (Makinano and Lubang, 2001:19).
(iii) The MNLF and Small Arms Transfers: The ‘Process of Diffusion’
Most of MNLF’s small arms come from battlefield acquisition or are bought from
government soldiers (McDonald, 1987:14). This was especially an important method for 
the MNLF later on, when external aid of arms supply started to dry up. The MNLF as 
well as the MILF have also established pipelines for small arms transfers among the 
Maguindanao and Maranao populations of south-central Mindanao (Davis, 2003).
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Improved tactics and capabilities in guerrilla warfare from 1977 to 1981 led to reported 
successful ambushes and attacks against government forces (Mercado, 1984:166). The 
most powerful weapons the MNLF possess are the 61mm and 81mm mortars, which were 
both captured in battles. Furthermore, the MNLF also possess a small number of small 
motor boats, which have M60s and .30 calibre Brownings mounted onboard them 
(McDonald, 1987:15). The MNLF are also believed to have the ability to make their own 
small arms and ammunitions, at a low level capacity. These include home made mines as 
well as the M79 grenade launcher (McDonald, 1987:15 and Yegar, 2002:272).
Ceasefires between insurgent and government forces can also affect the cost and supply 
of weapons, as the MNLF has found out. Data Halun Amilussia of the Lupal 
Revolutionary Committee stated that “since the ceasefire the price of the weapons has 
gone up very much”. Amilussia goes on further to state, “when we were fighting, we took 
weapons from the soldiers that we killed, or sometimes we could buy their weapons. Now 
there is a cease-fire, we do not get weapons from fighting since we can only buy. It is 
very expensive” (McDonald, 1987:13).
 This highlights the importance of insurgent groups like the MNLF being able to source 
weapons from government forces. Without this source of small arms, insurgent groups 
find it hard to acquire small arms, because of the cost factor. This leads to the bizarre 
situation as described by McDonald (1987), “of some new recruits in the MNLF 
expressing half-heartedly the desire to resume fighting so that they can get weapons of 
their own” (ibid:13). McDonald (1987) further relates the price of weapons to the 
intensity of fighting during periods of hostilities. When a large number of weapons were 
captured by the MNLF there was less demand for guns on the market. For example an 
M16 would sell for P10,000 and a 45. Colt for P2000-3000 during hostilities. These 
prices would jump to P16,000 and P8,000-9,000 respectively during a ceasefire. 
Furthermore, the correlating ammo used in these weapons would also increase during a 
ceasefire (McDonald, 1987:14).  
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Foreign military aid in the past, was a major source of small arms for the MNLF. 
However, with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent greater transparency in 
government’s external arms transfers, there has been a decline in the availability of 
external sources for the MNLF in small arms. Two of the most common foreign rifles 
used are the FAL 7.62 and the G1, both of which are Belgian made (McDonald, 
1987:14). However, the most common weapon used by the MNLF is the M16 assault 
rifle (Oxfam International, 2002:3). Again, many countries in the Middle East had in the 
past provided the MNLF with small arms and ammunition. Much of the reason of 
supplying military aid to the MNLF, by Middle East countries like Libya, was to further 
their own interests in the country, and encourage the Islamic connection between 
themselves and the Philippines. Malaysia may have provided aid in the forms of arms as 
early as 1986 (Yegar, 2002:270). Pakistan has also been accused of supplying the MNLF 
with arms in the past. Libya supplied numerous weapons to the MNLF during the 1970s. 
According to Yegar (2002), ‘Libyan arms shipments arrived in Sabah by way of two 
Arab emirates in the Persian Gulf” (ibid:272). The arms were then transferred by boat to 
the Southern Philippines and were believed to consist of AK 47s. Furthermore, according 
to Davis (2003) it is probable, "that both the MNLF and the MILF were able to import 
supplies of United States material abandoned in Vietnam after the communist victory of 
1975 and later sold onto the international arms market” (ibid). The claim of Vietnamese 
involvement in arms transfers to Mindanao insurgents was further highlighted, when in 
1992 a shipment of United States rifles, which originated from Vietnam, was reportedly 
purchased by local officials in Mindanao (Makinano and Lubang, 2001:13).  However,
the MNLF forces were still outgunned by the superior weaponry of the AFP during this 
period.     
(iv) The Propensity of Armed Violence by the MNLF and the use of Small Arms
There is no doubt the use of small arms by the MNLF has greatly influenced the conflict 
cycle as well as peace processes in the Philippines by causing greater instability. The use 
of small arms by the MNLF to carry out violence and armed conflict in the region has 
greatly increased the duration of internal conflict in the Philippines. Tan (2000) sums this 
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up by stating, “the MNLF launched its struggle for independence in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, but after three decades of fighting, the Moro problem has remained 
intractable as ever” (ibid:32). A significant part of this intractability has been due to the 
constant source of small arms supply available to the MNLF. The ability of the MNLF to 
have a continuous source of supply accessible has made it increasingly difficult for the 
Philippine government to end the Moro conflict. Very few MNLF members turned over 
their weapons to the government after the 1996 peace accord. This has been highlighted 
with tensions again flaring up between the Misuari loyalists in association with Abu 
Sayyaf on the southern island of Jolo. Despite the long periods of inactivity by the 
MNLF, they were still able to source a method of supply, in which they could carry out 
armed conflict on the island of Jolo.
The frequency of clashes between the MNLF and the AFP has also been a result of the 
constant source of supply of small arms the MNLF has been able to acquire. There are 
also suggestions that the MNLF have used peace talks and cease-fires to re-arm and build 
up their supply of arms over the years. This can be a feasible argument with evidence to 
suggest that due to the price of small arms increasing by a significant amount during 
cease-fires, the MNLF may not be able to sustain the purchase of weapons through black 
market suppliers. Instead the MNLF may have been forced to break cease-fires in order 
to replenish stocks of small arms and ammunition. This can account for the frequency 
and longevity of armed conflict between the MNLF and the Philippine government.
5.4 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
(i) Background and Goals
The MILF were formally established in 1984 and have become the largest and most 
powerful insurgent force in the Southern Philippines after splitting from the MNLF. The 
MILF took advantage of ceasefires in the mid 1990s to build up its own strength, so that 
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it is the dominant Moro insurgent group in the region, instead of the MNLF10 (Tan, 
2000:24). The main difference between the two insurgent groups according to Quilop 
(2000) is the MILF has desired Mindanao to be an Islamic state, while the MNLF have 
settled for the idea of a secular state in the Southern Philippines (ibid:23). This has 
allowed the MNLF to be more willing to compromise than the MILF. The MILF by 
breaking away from the MNLF, enabled the group to distinguish itself from the 
leadership of Nur Misuari, “and to justify to the Arab world their struggle for jihad so 
that assistance like arms and zakat, the obligatory alms imposed on Muslims, could be 
extended to them” (Vitug and Gloria, 2000 cited in Quilop, 2000:23). As Tan (2000) 
points out the MILF acts as a de facto government which overseas large areas of territory 
in Mindanao (ibid:21)
The former chairman of the MNLF’s Foreign Affairs Bureau who joined the MILF, has 
distinguished the MILF from the MNLF by stating, “we want an Islamic political system 
and way of life that can be achieved through effective Da’wah, Tarbiyyah and Jihad” 
(Tigalo, 1996 cited in Islam, 2003:205). Salamat Hahim who founded the initial
breakaway group from the MNLF, known as the ‘New Leadership’, supported autonomy. 
The MILF believes that it has more secular aims than the MNLF, and according to 
Salamat, “the MILF adopts the Islamic ideology and way of life” (Abuza, 2003:40).
Salamat has also stated that “the demand of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is 
precisely no less than an independent (sovereign) Moro Islamic State”, and the MILF’s 
long-term plan “is to continue this war until independence is granted” (Abuza, 2003:44).
The Philippine government and the MILF have embarked on numerous peace talks. In 
July 18 1997 a cease-fire was signed that lasted for nearly three years (Abuza, 2003:45).
A peace agreement was supposed to be signed before 30 January 1998. However in May 
1999 negotiations reached a deadlock after the MILF demanded that the talks be held in 
Malaysia, Indonesia or Libya. The government believed that the peace process must be 
resolved locally (Islam, 2003:207). In 2000 the peace process broke down, when the 
                                                
10 After the signing of the peace agreement by the MNLF in 1996, military figures show an increase in 
MILF's strength from 8,000 in 1996 to 15,420 as of June 1999. Furthermore MILF's firearms holdings 
increased from 10,227 in December 1998 to 11,351 by June 1999 (Makinano and Lubang, 2001:30).
Chapter 5 91
Joseph Estrada administration considered the development projects as ‘unnecessary’ and 
that they were ‘simply coddling the MILF’ (Tiglao, 1996 cited in Abuza, 2003:46).
Furthermore, the government also believed that the MILF was expanding its controlled 
areas, while negotiations for peace were taking place (Quilop, 2000:26). However, a 
cease-fire was signed in Tripoli in July 2001, which lasted until the resumption of 
conflict in February 2003, when Philippine troops attacked an MILF base camp near the 
town of Pikit. Peace talks had been suspended indefinitely until recently when the 
government and the MILF agreed to form a joint team that will go after terrorists in 
Mindanao. This paved the way for the reopening of peace talks in Kula Lumpur in 
February 2005 where the issue of ancestral domain was discussed (Ma, 2004). However,
the peace talks have been delayed with the continuing political scandal facing President 
Gloria Arroyo over allegations of poll-rigging. At the time of writing the peace talks 
brokered by Malaysia were due to resume in Kula Lumpur late January 2006.
(ii) MILF Finance and Resources
There have been numerous overseas countries that have financially supported and 
provided resources to the MILF movement at some point and time. An estimate at being 
able to field a standing army of 35,000 according to Tan (2000) is due to the ability of the 
MILF to obtain funds from countries like Malaysia, Pakistan and the Middle East, who 
are sympathetic to their cause. In its initial years of fighting Libya has been sighted as 
providing the MILF with most of its finance and resources.
According to the DEA (2003) the MILF like the MNLF receive funding from a number 
of criminal activities, including kidnap for ransom, petty crimes and drug trafficking. The 
MILF have also been linked to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the regional Islamic 
terrorist network Jemaah Islamiya. Military reports believe that bin Laden has been using 
relief agencies as conduits to provide financial aid to the MILF (Hong Kong AFP, 
February 21,1999)11. The support MILF has enjoyed from Al Qaeda is not a new 
                                                
11 One of these relief agencies accused of providing financial aid was the Saudi-based charity, the Islamic 
International Relief Organisation (IIRO) run by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. According to Abuza, (2003), an 
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occurrence. According to Abuza (2003), “the roots of MILF contact date back to the 
period of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the MILF sent an estimated 500 to 
700 Filipino Muslims to undergo military training and join the mujahidin” (ibid:90). Al 
Qaeda funding has become more important to the MILF in recent years, with Libya 
reducing its financial assistance to both the MILF and the MNLF (Abuza, 2003:95). 
However, most of the MILF’s income and resources are still from internal sources and 
the trading of contraband goods.
Extortion of business like logging companies is a big revenue earner for the MILF. 
Furthermore, the MILF has been known to impose taxation on locals in small 
communities. According to Abuza (2003) the MILF have many schemes aimed at 
financing their rebellion:
“The MILF also runs legitimate businesses, including several manpower agencies, such as 
Pyramid Trading and Manpower Services, that are active in the dispatching of the 1 million 
Philippine OFWs to the Middle East each year. In addition to revenue from these companies, the 
MILF also receives kickbacks from other Moro OFWs to the Middle East. The MILF has a vast 
network of financial holdings and front companies, including many in Manila. The MILF also 
relies on covert funding from Islamic charities, especially the World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth, Islamic Wisdom Worldwide, and the Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines” 
(ibid:96).
This highlights the diversion of financing the MILF have been able to achieve. If one 
flow of finance is stopped the MILF will still be able to rely on other sources of income.
This has allowed the MILF to have a significant amount of income, when purchasing 
small arms. However, the main problem according to spokesman Shariff Moshin Julabbi 
is still how much money they can raise to pay for small arms (Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 11, 1999).
(iii) The MILF and Small Arms Transfers: ‘The Process of Diffusion’
Like the MNLF, the main supply of weapons for the MILF is battlefield acquisition and 
leakage of government armaments. However, there have been reports that the MILF has 
                                                                                                                                                
"Abu Sayyaf defector said the IIRO was used by bin Laden and Khalifa to distribute funds for the purchase 
of arms and other logistical requirements of the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF” (ibid:93). 
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built a firearms factory, “somewhere in Central Mindanao” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
January 11, 1999). Shariff Moshin Julabbi apparent consultant of the MILF stated, “the 
factory has 97 workers who could produce high-calibre weapons and ammunition like a 
replica of the Russian grenade launcher RPG-2, 60mm mortars, bullets and bombs” 
(Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 1999). However, Jaafar states that the factory “is 
modest when compared with conventional firearms factories” (Philippine daily Inquirer, 
January 11, 1999)12. According to Julabbi the government are still among the major 
suppliers of firearms to the MILF, and most of the rebels M16 and M14 riffles and bullets 
are bought directly from military personal (Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 1999).
This is a claim that is repeated by both the MILF and Philippine government officials.
However, the official spokesman for the MILF Ghadzali Jaffar has stated that, “in 
fairness to the military, we have many sources of firearms” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
January 11, 1999). Internal supply of small arms for the MILF also comes from the spill-
over in the black market from Luzon in the Visayas (Davis, 2003). There have also been 
reports that the MILF have tried to buy a number of midget submarines (Kaufman, 2003).  
Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network, as well as providing money to the MILF, 
have also been accused of providing small arms to the MILF. There have been reports 
that the MILF were awaiting an arms shipment to arrive in February 1999, which had 
been purchased by money provided by Osama bin Laden (Hong Kong AFP, February 21, 
1999)13. According to sources in the report the shipment was to contain 3,000 assorted 
high-powered weapons, from Kalashnikov rifles to anti-tank rockets and landmines.
Other external sources of supply have been rumoured to come from a North Korean arms 
dealer named Rim Kyu Do. According to press report documents recovered from a fallen 
enclave of the MILF, the rebels had made payments for machine guns, explosives, 
grenades and other battle hardware in 1999 (Agence France, March 13, 2003). Invoices 
for the weapons totalled nearly two million dollars. Iraq has also been touted as a possible 
supplier of small arms to the MILF according to House of Representatives defence 
                                                
12 Other reports site the MILF as being able to produce RPG-2, American M-79 grenade launcher and .45 
calibre pistols as well as crude anti-personnel mines and bombs (Davis, 2003).
13 "Osama bi Laden brother in law Saudi businessman Mohamed Jamal Khalifa financed a number of non-
government organisations in Mindanao, that are suspected of being used to channel finances to rebel 
groups” (www.sapt.org). 
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committee chairman Prospero Pichay (Agence France, March 13, 2003). Also 
unconfirmed reports indicate that China and Malaysia have provided the MILF with 
small arms (http://acd.iiss.org). Furthermore, weapons that are purchased through arms 
smugglers are often obtained via Sabah state in eastern Malaysia (http://acd.iiss.org).
According to the IISS Armed Conflict Database the MILF have a various assortment of 
small arms in possession. Some of the riffles in use by the MILF date from the 1970s, to 
the more modern M-14 or M-16 rifles. Furthermore, the MILF also use Garand M1 
carbines and FN FALs, high powered assault rifles, sniper rifles, as well as a variety of 
personnel and anti tank landmines. Heavier weapons used by the MILF include M60 
general-purpose machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers (http://acd.iiss.org). Much 
of the weapons used by the MILF are of American origin, mainly due to the Philippine 
military being supplied with weapons through aid packages by the American government. 
This further highlights the importance of the MILF being able to acquire weapons not 
only through battlefield acquisition but also corrupt personal in the Philippine military.
(iv) The Propensity of Armed Violence by the MILF and the use of Small Arms
There is no doubting that the acquisition of small arms by the MILF has been used as a 
means of armed struggle in which to further the group’s goals. However, this has often 
come at the detriment of the resulting impact the use of small arms has had on the 
Philippines. Not only has the use of small arms increased the intensity and duration of 
internal conflict in the Philippines, but it has also contributed to the frequency of civil 
war breaking out in the country. The MILF have been prepared to go to the negotiating
table with the Philippine government, but on too many occasions this has been a ploy by 
the insurgent group, to regroup and rearm themselves, during cease-fires. 
The MILF are also an example of how small arms are effective in waging internal 
conflict through the use of continuous violence. When the MNLF where at the 
negotiating table with the government the MILF used this time to build up there own 
resources and armaments, so it would be the dominant insurgent force in the Moro 
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region. Documents captured in  February 2003 by the AFP showing receipts for the 
acquisition of weapons, have led to AFP spokesman Colonel Essel Soriano, stating that 
the MILF, “is preparing for war and using the peace talks and the peace agreement as 
cover” (Kaufman, 2003). Documents according to Soriano also stated that the MILF is 
planning for, “waging all-out war against government forces through simultaneous and 
relentless attacks; mounting massive sabotage operations; ambushing military and police 
convoys; setting up checkpoints and taking hostages and landing arms along beaches” 
(Kaufman, 2003). Even if the MILF does not carry out these operations, it still highlights 
the vital role small arms play in the continuous cycle of internal conflict in the 
Philippines and how small arms fuel the continuing ethnic clashes in the country.
The MILF are still not strong enough to compete with the AFP military so they continue
to carry out guerrilla operations. According to Oxfam International (2001), “the guerrilla 
tactics adopted by the MILF since the middle of 2000 were widely perceived by the local 
population to be exacting much higher civilian casualties than before”. This has furthered 
the duration of intra-state conflict in the country. The AFP have access to armoured 
fighting vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters, while the MILF have no access to these 
or other heavy weapons. Hence they are reliant on a continuous supply of small arms in 
which to wage civil war. This has meant that fighting between the MILF and the AFP is 
prone to longevity. The intensity of fighting has never reached great heights because the 
MILF lacks access to heavy armaments. The role the MILF has played within intra-state 
conflict in the Philippines tends to suggest and highlight that if one side in a conflict, 
especially a non-state actor lacks access to heavy weapons, an internal conflict will 
become more intractable and durable.
5.5 The New Peoples Army (NPA)
(i) Background and Goals
The New Peoples Army (NPA) was formed as the military arm of the Communist Party 
of the Philippines (CPP) on 29 March 1969 (Casambre, 2004:465). Initial membership of 
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the NPA consisted of only a few hundred, however, its numbers swelled to several 
thousand during the early 1970s (Mediansky, 1987:2). By 1985, the NPA was active in 
63 of the nations 73 provinces (Mediansky, 1987:4). According to military estimates in 
1988 the NPA had about 24,000 guerrillas with an arsenal of more than 10,000 high 
powered rifles, grenade launchers and a few mortars (Jones, 1989:9)14. Chapman (1987) 
makes the comment that the, “insurgents military war was one of ambushes, raids and 
assassinations mounted for one of two purposes: to gather arms or to show their peasant 
allies that they could be protected and the government forces punished” (ibid:15)
According to Mediansky (1987) the NPA is based on a Maoist insurgency doctrine that 
envisages three successive phase. These are:
“The present stage, ‘the strategic defence’, is primarily focused on building the basis of nation-
wide insurgency; the next phase, ‘the strategic stalemate’, is achieved when the insurgency is 
strong enough to frontally challenge the forces of the government; the final phase, the ‘strategic 
offensive’, occurs when the fortune of the two sides have been reversed and the government is 
forced to adopt a defensive posture” (ibid:5).
The NPA view their insurgent movement as being in the advanced stage of the strategic 
defensive. Accordingly, small arms play a vital role in the NPA moving through the 
various stages. Casambre (2004) states that the “government considers the following as 
the roots of the armed conflict: massive and abject poverty, iniquitous of wealth and 
control over the base of resources needed for livelihood, injustice, and poor governance” 
(ibid:471). At present the NPA has been listed as a terrorist group by the United States, 
the European Union, Australia and Canada following the September 11 attacks on the 
United States. The NPA has been labelled by the Philippine military as the countries top 
security threat.
(ii) NPA Finance & Resources
Compared to the ethnic insurgent groups of the MNLF and the MILF, the NPA struggles 
financially to raise the same sort of capital and finance outside of the Philippines. Instead 
the NPA has had to be more self-reliant on acquiring finance and resources to run their 
                                                
14 Other sources estimate the NPA having 10,000 fighters in 1986 (Casambre, 2004:467).
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insurgent campaign. However, the NPA did receive funding from China during their 
initial formation. But ties between the NPA and China were cut in 1975-1976 with the 
opening of diplomatic relations between Manila and Beijing and the death of Mao (Jones, 
1989:8). Instead, the NPA as in insurgent movement relied on pheasant support and the 
use of contraband goods to finance their rebellion and buy armaments. Chapman (1987) 
describes the NPA as having a revolutionary underground committee that was in total 
control of finance. They financed the electricity and water systems from extorted “taxes” 
on businessmen (ibid:15).
Revolutionary taxes imposed on rural communities by the NPA, was crucial to the 
funding of the NPA movement. In NPA controlled communities the people are asked to 
give food and a few pesos that are within their means. Commercial enterprises such as 
logging provide a more substantial source of income. Failure to pay can result in 
destruction of logging equipment and assassination of company employees (Mediansky, 
1986:7). According to Vitug (1993) the CPP impose a one or two percent tax on the gross 
income of a company being targeted. The Armed Forces estimate the total income of the 
CPP in 1987 at P22 million, of which P4.8 million came from revolutionary taxes 
(ibid:133). Commercial enterprises in NPA controlled areas such as logging companies 
are likely to regard revolutionary taxes as part of conducting operations in the area.
Initially, demands by the NPA for logging companies consisted of basic requests like 
medicine, food and shoes. This was followed by greater requests for the payment of 
money to the NPA, which was not a significant amount by logging company standards 
(Vitug, 1993:125). Furthermore, the NPA see the logging companies as a source of 
income rather than destroyers of the environment and forests (Vitug, 1993:130). Logging 
companies concessions according to the AFP are the most lucrative form of taxation the 
NPA has, worth about P100 million yearly, most of which comes from northern Luzon 
(Vitug, 1993:134).
The NPA have not only received finance from pheasants and logging companies, but also 
politicians, landlords, businesspeople and Catholic bishops. In turn by providing 
accommodation, money and weapons, the NPA would provide protection from criminals, 
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guarantees against assassination, support on Election Day, and the right to travel through 
communist-dominated areas, and be unhampered in their business activities (Jones, 
1989:10-11). NPA control over resources and rural communities also provided a source 
of income for the insurgent group. This is discussed by Rutten (1996) who states:
 “within rural communities the NPA acquired control over vital resources: villagers’ 
contribution in food, cash, and information for both the political and military cadres; as well as 
manpower for part-time positions in the village or full-time posts as mobile cadres or armed 
fighters” (ibid:115).
The NPA also recruit it personal locally, usually individuals from rural communities, who 
often are suffering from continuing hardships. It is the rural support base that is crucial to 
the NPA’s survival and prosperity.
Jones (1989) highlights the diversity of NPA financial resources, when CPP computer 
disks that were captures by the AFP show that the world stock markets, were a major if 
not a leading source of funds for the revolution (ibid:245). Furthermore, Jones (1989) 
comments that:
“A significant share of NPA and Party activities were supported by an elaborate system of 
taxation primarily targeting larger foreign and Filipino owned businesses, large landowners, 
concerns engaged in ranching, fish and prawn culture, logging and mining, and even 
government corporations” (ibid:245).
Because of the lack of external support for the NPA’s movement, the NPA have
developed a significant internal infrastructure to support the running costs of its army.
(iii) The NPA and Small Arms Transfers: The ‘Process of Diffusion’
Like the Moro insurgent groups in the Philippines, the NPA has had to be self-reliant on 
obtaining their own weapons. Most of the supply has come from battlefield acquisition, 
leakage in government stockpiles and purchases from corrupt officials. Chapman (1987) 
estimates that some 10,000 high-powered riffles, pistols and machine guns have been 
obtained in this fashion over the years (ibid:114). The chairman of the CCP Armando 
Liwanag admits that despite having been able to increase the number of firearms 
available to the NPA in the last few years, soldiers in the NPA still outnumber the 
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available rifles 3:2 (Liwanag, 2003). There have also been reports that the NPA has 
underground factories which make primitive shotguns and handguns (Jones, 1989:244)15.
The NPA has also been lacking in external suppliers for small arms. Thus, when trying to 
acquire small arms, they find themselves in the same futile position as when trying to 
raise finance and resources from external sources. Most of the armed confrontations with 
government forces are used for the explicit purpose of trying to obtain and capture 
weapons.
External support for small arms to the NPA has been linked to the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO), who are reported to have provided one shipment of weapons to the 
NPA through the international black market in 1981 (Chapman, 1987:19). North Korea 
and China have also been reported as a possible source of small arms for the NPA. China 
delivered a shipload of Chinese arms and ammunition to the NPA in July 1972 in the 
named boat ‘Karagatan’. However, the government managed to intercept a majority of 
the shipload when the boat ran aground (Jones, 1989:50&76). Later in 1973, another 
arms shipment was planed from China to the NPA. But once again the boat ran aground 
south of Taiwan (Jones, 1989:78-79). Jones (1989) states, “the rebel movement had also 
developed close relations with Nicaragua and to a lesser extend with Cuba and Libya” 
(ibid:9). Satur Ocampo a top leader of National Democratic Front16 in 1986 discussed 
the possibility of accepting arms from the Russians, however the Russians had shown 
little political interest in the CPP and the NPA previously. Nevertheless, Satur believed 
that with American intervention in the region it could unlock the possibility of other 
sources of supply being open to the NPA, due to anti-American sentiments. Satur states 
that, “getting more sophisticated arms is now a real question for us. With the [growth] of 
the NPA, we must face the question of new sources of sophisticated guns” (Chapman, 
1987:220). In an interview with Nathan Quimpo former chairman of the NDF he explains
the difficulty of the CPP-NPA moving from a guerrilla movement to a group capable of 
                                                
15 This claim is backed up by Armando Liwanag who states, "that we can produce certain weapons” 
(Liwanag, 2003).
16 The NDF were established in 1973 and are linked with the CPP and the NPA under one umbrella 
organisation.
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regular warfare. This was mainly due to the lack of external support for weapon supplies. 
Quimpo goes on to state:
“The Soviet bloc is no longer there, China is not interested in exporting revolution any more, 
and North Korea is suffering from economic hardships. I don’t think North Korea would be in 
such a position to export or provide arms and ammunition to the NPA, as it was willing to do in 
the late 1980s” (Distor, 2003:2).    
Quimpo goes on further to states that even if there was a source of arms available 
externally for the CPP-NPA, “the other problem is how to get these arms in; this was 
never solved by the CPP-NPA. There were several attempts in the 70’s and again in the 
80’s, but they all failed” (Distor, 2003:2).
The lack of military external support for the NPA, led to the ‘agaw armos’17 campaign, a 
campaign designed to secure weapons to expand the NPA forces (Mediansky, 1986:12-
13). This involved trying to encourage defections from the AFP and using ‘sparrow 
units’18 to attack small army units and policemen on patrols. According to Chapman 
(1987) black market sales were the second largest source of military hardware for the 
NPA19 (ibid:190). Chapman (1987) highlights this point by further going on to explain 
that a soldier earned 1,000 pesos a month and payment was usually delayed. Furthermore, 
the NPA could purchase almost any type of AFP armament as long as it could raise the 
money (ibid:189-190). The NPA also partakes on raids and ambushes with the specific 
goal of acquiring weapons. Raids will consist of NPA squads surrounding a military 
outpost, outnumbering soldiers three and four to one. Ambushes involve guerrillas lining 
both sides of a country road, digging foxholes at the edges of the fields and covering 
themselves with dirt and cane (Chapman, 1987:114). For example one raid on a 
Philippine Military Academy netted 21 automatic riffles, 14 carbines, 6 machine guns, 1 
bazooka, grenade launchers and more than 5,000 rounds of ammunition (Jones, 1989:47).
The NPA have many various weapons in their arsenal. Again a majority is American
made, because of battlefield acquisition from the AFP American supplied weaponry. 
                                                
17 Arms Grap
18 “A three-member assassination squad assigned to liquidate informers or other enemies and kill isolated 
police and military men for their weapons (Chapman, 1987:117)
19 The first being weapons captured in battle
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According to Chapman (1987) the NPA armoury consists of “American made M-16s, M-
14s, World War II-vintage garands, grease guns and machine guns. The only weapons not 
manufactured in the United States were Russian AK-47s” (ibid:116). The IISS conflict 
database states, “the NPA is known to possess M16s, H&K guns, M30 and LMGs.
However, Chapman (1987) found that despite the supply of the weaponry to the NPA, 
ammunition was in short supply, and each fighter was only permitted to fire only five 
rounds a day, regardless of their mission (ibid:116). Furthermore, the lack of heavy 
weapons by the NPA has meant the guerrilla war has stagnated. Nevertheless, the NPA 
believe that if they could acquire heavy weapons it would change the complexion of the 
war and bring the group closer to parity with government forces. An NPA commander 
stated that, “we are unanimous in thinking that if we cannot get heavy weapons we 
cannot win at guerrilla warfare” (Jones, 1989:242). This could cause further instability in 
the region with the United States responding to the acquisition of heavy weapons by the 
NPA, by means of providing the Philippine government with more sophisticated 
weaponry to battle the insurgent movement (Jones, 1989:9). More recently, there have 
been claims that the NPA is in a military alliance with the MILF, who are supplying the 
NPA with arms, a claim denied by MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu who stated that, “our 
alliance doesn’t include the sharing of weapons” (Kaufman and Ma, 2004).
(iv) The Propensity of Armed Violence by the NPA and the use of Small Arms
While the NPA differs ideologically from the ethnic Moro conflict, the same problems 
face the NPA as the Moro insurgents. Lack of heavy weapons by the NPA, has forced the 
two sides into a form of military stalemate. The NPA are aware that they cannot defeat 
the AFP with the weapons they have in their arsenal, while at the same time the AFP are 
powerless to end the guerrilla warfare perfected by the NPA. Chapman (1987) comments 
that the NPA, “is still essentially a raid-and-ambush army, desperate for arms and unable 
to defend territory anywhere the government forces cared to challenge it” (ibid:121).
However, despite numerous offences by the AFP, the NPA have yet to be military 
defeated.
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The supply of small arms to the NPA has been steady enough for the NPA to wage a 
continuous armed conflict since their formation in 1969. The frequency of clashes 
between the two parties occurs often. This is mainly due to the NPA’s method of 
acquiring arms through raids and ambushes. However, the intensity of fighting between 
the NPA and the AFP is relatively low. This is not only due to the lack of heavy weapons 
the NPA possess but also the lack of ammunition the NPA have. Accordingly they are 
unable to carry out sustained conflict The NPA are still reliant on guerrilla tactics to 
defeat the AFP. These tactics consist of concentration, dispersal and shifting with 
flexibility, with the goals of sizing arms from the AFP (Liwanag, 2003). Tactics that the 
NPA are aware will not defeat the Philippine military. The lack of heavier weapons the 
NPA has in its arsenal, means the NPA are confined to fighting within their own 
controlled territories. This is recognised by the leadership in the CCP, who realise that 
until there is further growth in the NPA, there will not be enough new recruits that can 
bring professional and technical expertise useful to the armed revolution (Liwanag, 
2003). However, the NPA still enjoys popular support in the countryside, and it is likely 
that as long as they have some form of supply of small arms, the AFP will struggle to 
military defeat the NPA. This will mean that low intensity but frequent clashes between 
the two forces will continue to increase the duration and intractability of intra-state 
conflict in the Philippines. 
5.6 Conclusion and the Analysis of Key Questions in the Philippines
Small arms proliferation and misuse has not only harmed innocent civilians and caused 
thousands of casualties in the Philippines, but they have also fuelled the fire for conflict
to continue in a country that is ravaged by insurgent groups. Fighting by insurgent groups 
in Central Mindanao has resulted in 70 percent of the population being displaced in 2000 
(Oxfam International, 2001). As can be seen in the tables on the following page, 
insurgent groups in the Philippines largely rely on the same internal sources for small 
arms. This is by far the most productive sources of small arms insurgent groups in the 
Philippines have. The table also highlights the external sources insurgent groups have 
had, past and present. This is by far more diversified than internal sources of small arms. 
Chapter 5 103
Table 5.1 Summary of MNLF, MILF and NPA External and Internal Sources
The Moro National Liberation Front
Sources of Finance and Resources Sources of Small Arms
External  Libya
 Malaysia
 Syria
 Iran
 Diasporas from middle east workers
 Libya
 Pakistan
 Malaysia
 Vietnam
Internal  Drug Trafficking
 Production of Marijuana
 Production of Marijuana fields
 Production of Crystal 
Methamphetamine
 Villager Support
 Battlefield Acquisition
 Purchases off Government 
Soldiers – Black Market Sales
 Indigenous Production
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Sources of Finance and Resources Sources of Small Arms
External  Malaysia
 Pakistan
 Libya
 Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda
 Jemaah Islamiya
 China
 Malaysia
 Iraq
 North Korea
 Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda
Internal  Kidnap for Ransom
 Petty Crimes
 Tax on Logging Companies
 Manpower Services
 Islamic Charities
 Network of Front Companies
 Battlefield Acquisition
 Leakage of Government 
Stockpiles
 Indigenous Production – Firearms 
Factory 
The New Peoples Army
Sources of Finance and Resources Sources of Small Arms
External  China
 Stock Markets
 Palestine Liberation Organisation
 North Korea
 China
 Nicaragua
 Cuba
 Libya
Internal  Revolutionary Taxes 
 Control over village resources
 Tax on Logging Companies
 Battlefield Acquisition – Raids 
and Ambushes
 Leakage of Government 
Stockpiles
 Purchases off Government 
Soldiers – Black Market Sales
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Many of the countries that are present in the tables like Iraq, China and Libya are now in 
no position to supply these insurgent groups with small arms. This has meant all three 
insurgent groups have had to be reliant mainly on internal sources for their small arms. 
The MILF have the most sophisticated indigenous production facility, with a firearms 
factory rumoured to be based somewhere in central Mindanao. Sources of finances and 
resources are also greatly diversified between the different insurgent groups. The two 
ethnic insurgent groups fighting in Mindanao are by far better funded externally than the 
communist NPA. This pattern is unlikely to change, with fewer countries financing 
communist insurgent movements in general. For insurgent groups that are based around 
territorial and ethnic disputes, there is still likely to be countries who are willing to 
support their cause. This is highlighted by the MNLF and the MILF insurgent groups 
who have numerous external supporters. More recently, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
who been linked to the MILF with providing both finances and resources. However, the 
MNLF and the MILF despite their external support, are still mainly reliant on internal 
sources for their income, such as drug trafficking and kidnap for ransom. The NPA have 
shown that it is not necessary to have an external benefactor to provide a source of
income, as long as you can be self sufficient in providing finances and resources 
internally. All three insurgent groups are highly reliant on the use of contraband goods, 
which can be used or traded for small arms.
There is no doubt that small arms transfers to insurgent groups in the Philippines have
greatly increased the intensity and duration of internal conflict and civil war in the 
country. With the constant availability of small arms to non-state actors, the chance of 
civil war breaking out in the Philippines has increased dramatically. However, the lack of 
heavy weapons to insurgent groups, has meant fighting is usually not intense enough to 
produce the casualties suffered in inter-state war. Instead fighting between non-state 
actors and government forces occurs on a frequent basis, with battles that are of a short 
duration. The supply of small arms and ammunition to insurgent groups during internal 
conflict occurring in the Philippines will usually dictate the longevity and intensity of 
fighting against government forces, in geographical areas favouring insurgent forces. 
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The use of small arms by the ethnic insurgent forces in Mindanao highlights how 
weapons continue to increase the duration of a conflict. This is supported in general by 
Fearon (2004) who finds that ethnic wars appear to last somewhat longer with about a 
70% increase in expected duration (ibid:18). However, the case of the NPA can highlight 
that even if an insurgent group is not based on ethnic divisions, as long as finances and 
small arms are available, an insurgent force can continue to carry out armed conflict. The 
NPA have shown that despite its lack of external support, by acquiring finance and 
weapons through internal methods, this can be sufficient enough to carry out armed 
conflict. In the Philippines this has come at the expense of civilians who have faced 
declining standards of living and increased casualties due to the misuse and proliferation
of small arms, which has furthered the duration of conflict in the country.   
There is also evidence to suggest that access and accumulation of small arms and 
ammunition by insurgent groups in the Philippines will result in prolonged periods of 
fighting. Overall this has further extended the total duration of conflict in the Philippines
and made the conflict more intractable to negotiations or mediation. There have also been 
accusations by the Philippine military that insurgent groups in the country use cease-fires 
and settlements to build up and re-arm their stockpiles with armaments. Not only does 
easy access to weapons in the Philippines make insurgent groups more willing to form an 
insurgency, but also gives other insurgent groups, who have already been formed, the 
chance to resume active armed conflict. This was highlighted by the MNLF who led an 
attack against a Philippine military base in 2001, the first time they had been involved in 
active armed conflict in a number of years. Their ability to acquire and have access to 
small arms was the key factor in the attack. Overall the insurgent groups in the 
Philippines show that it is highly unlikely or possible to continue fighting in an internal 
conflict or civil war, without some form of arm supply. These findings are in direct 
contrast to Gilks (1987) opinion that arms control in the Philippines can only play a 
minor role in enhancing stability (ibid:92). The lack of arms control in the Philippines 
and the rampant gun culture that exists throughout many facets of Philippine society is 
one of the major factors in the increasing instability the country faces. 
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 The Influence of Small Arms on Intra-State Conflict within Burma, Indonesia 
and the Philippines
Small arms while lacking the firepower of more conventional heavy weaponry like tanks 
and aircrafts have played a significant role in increasing the duration and intensity of 
intra-state conflicts. In the hands of non-state actors, like insurgent groups, small arms 
constitute the primary weapon of choice in Southeast Asia. The ability of insurgent 
groups to obtain both external and internal financial and military aid in Southeast Asia 
has been crucial in allowing these groups to continue in waging armed conflict. The three 
case studies of Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines highlight perfectly the detrimental 
effects small arms have on internal conflict in Southeast Asia. While this study only 
analysed in depth these three countries, the influence of small arms in the rest of 
Southeast Asia is profound. Many other countries within Southeast Asia have already felt 
the effects of small arms proliferation inside their borders, for example Cambodia, while 
other countries like Thailand are beginning to experience the difficulties associated with 
small arms transfers to insurgent groups.
The continuing violence in the south of Thailand has shown the importance of preventing 
insurgent groups from obtaining various sources of small arms supply. As tension 
between the Muslim separatists and the Thailand government continue to rise the use of 
small arms will continue to be a significant factor in sustaining any conflict between the 
two sides. Furthermore, countries like Malaysia, Vietnam and Laos have all felt the 
impacts of small arms use by insurgent groups. In many cases this has caused a profound 
and humanitarian impact on these countries. Even after conflicts have ended in countries 
like Cambodia, small arms have been recycled and pipelines have been established that 
has seen thousands of small arms end up in the hands of other insurgents groups still 
involved in active armed conflict, throughout the rest of Southeast Asia. A significant 
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factor in these small arms transfers have been as a result of the lax laws and regulations 
that have been put in place by these countries and other Southeast Asian nations, which 
has given rise to the opportunity for, small arms to be diverted into the illicit circuits 
(Kramer, 2001:24).    
A broad hypothesis would be to state that small arms make internal conflict in Southeast 
Asia more durable. However, there are a number of factors that have caused the 
durability of internal conflict in Southeast Asia and small arms themselves do not create 
conflict. It is the non-state armed groups who are in possession of small arms that cause 
the conflict. The use of small arms by non-state actors has caused thousands of civilian 
causalities in Southeast Asia and more often than not, has caused internal conflicts to 
escalate, making the conflict more durable and resistance to any outside intervention, 
such as mediation attempts. Another broad hypothesis when analysing the effect and 
influence small arms have on internal conflict would be to state, that small arms have 
increased the intensity of internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. However, once again this is 
not entirely correct. While the use of small arms by non-state actors in Southeast Asia has
increased the amount of casualties in countries affected by internal conflict, a majority of 
these casualties have been accumulated over time, as in a number of decades. Instead, it 
is more likely that small arms use in Southeast Asia will mean that battles between 
insurgent groups and governments forces are likely to be more intense and frequent in 
areas that are prone to insurgent rebellion. This leads to the outcome of government 
forces trying to defeat insurgent groups in territories where the insurgents are based and 
as a result of this, gives insurgents more opportunities to launch raids and ambushes on 
government forces in order to gain possession of the small arms carried by the soldiers. In 
the case studies analysed in this thesis, most casualties were inflicted on civilians in the 
states where insurgent groups were based from, for example the states of Mindanao, 
Aceh, Karen and Shan. 
All three countries analysed in this thesis have been highly affected by small arm use, 
which have made all of their internal conflicts prone to duration and frequency of 
fighting. Furthermore, the insurgents groups operating in these countries have been able 
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to continually find some form of arms supply which has allowed the insurgents to carry 
out armed conflict against government forces. It has been this ability to access a source of 
weaponry that has allowed many groups to rearm themselves after a period of inactivity. 
This was highlighted by the case of GAM who were able to resume active armed conflict 
after nearly being wiped out by government forces a number of years earlier.
Furthermore, the MNLF have been linked to a recent insurgent uprising in the island of 
Jolo, despite not being involved in active armed conflict since 2001. However, it was the 
ability of the MNLF to still have access to small arms that allowed them to carry out 
armed conflict against the AFP. The resulting access of small arms by insurgent groups
can to a large extent be put down to their ability to acquire funding and resources which 
can then be used to purchase small arms. Without any form of funding or income, 
insurgent groups would have to rely solely on internal methods to obtain arms such as 
battlefield acquisition, which is an irregular source of supply. Obtaining weapons from 
the black market or arms dealers’ costs money, however, this method of obtaining arms
has been crucial in sustaining many of the insurgent groups in Burma, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
The overall context of this thesis has been to highlight a number of factors that affect the 
dynamics of small arms transfers to Southeast Asian insurgencies, using insurgent groups 
involved in current or recent armed conflict as the case studies. More specifically these 
factors were analysed using three key questions that would identify the characteristics 
associated with small arms transfers to insurgent groups: (1) What are the external and 
internal, financial and military sources of insurgent groups?; (2) What are the most 
important sources for obtaining small arms?; (3) How does the supply, use and 
accumulation of small arms affect internal conflict? These questions have provided the 
main research view points for this thesis and are reflected upon below.
       
Question 1: The Importance of Insurgents to Acquire Funding for their Rebellion
What most small arms studies fail to highlight is the importance of insurgent groups in 
Southeast Asia to acquire resources and funding which can then be used to sustain their 
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irregular army and more importantly buy small arms. This is shown simply in the 
diagram below. The ability of insurgent groups in Southeast Asia to acquire some form of 
finance has led to the purchase of small arms, which in turn has contributed to the onset
and duration of civil war, which is reflected in a continuous cycle of conflict. This is 
especially the case in the three case studies analysed in this thesis. The resulting flow on 
effect occurs, because as an internal conflict or civil war continues it can become more 
advantageous for an insurgent group to keep the conflict going. Numerous reasons exist 
for this such as the ability of insurgents to acquire funding from opportunities that arise 
from extracting and selling resources (Ross, 2003:13). For the conflict to carry on 
insurgent groups need small arms to continue to engage government troops in combat. 
This means that to obtain arms that are not from battlefield acquisition, insurgent groups 
need a source of funding. Hence this is reflected in the continuous conflict cycle below.
Figure 6.1 The Continuous Conflict Cycle
The ability of insurgents to have easy access to global markets, “for the sale of plundered 
commodities and for the purchase of armaments” may be one of the factors why the 
Insurgent Groups 
in Active Armed 
Conflict 
Small Arms 
Transfers
Internal Conflict
The Sourcing of 
Finances and 
Resources
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chances of peace “were much lower in the 1980s and 1990s than they had been 
previously” (Collier et al, 2004:268). The ability of these insurgent groups to purchase
commodities and armaments from the black market is a direct result of the finances 
insurgents are able to obtain. While some foreign states continue to support insurgent or 
separatist movements, be it a low lever since the end of the Cold War, they still can
provide a source of income for a number of insurgent groups. Other sources of important 
funding as discussed in the case studies have included tax on the local population and 
business, criminal proceeds and kidnapping. Diaspora’s and revenues from trading in 
contraband goods and commodities like timber and drugs, such as marijuana and 
methamphetamines are especially vital in providing a source of income for insurgent 
groups.
The obtaining of internal finance for an insurgent group becomes even more important 
after the initial formation of the group. In the instance of all the insurgent groups in the 
case studies most of the groups were able to initially sustain themselves with money 
provided by overseas countries or other external supporters. However, if this funding 
dries up significantly or exists at a low level such as the insurgent groups operating in
Burma and Indonesia, many of the groups may be forced into looting and exploiting 
natural resources in order to obtain some form of finance in order to pay for the operating 
costs of being involved in armed conflict with government forces. Resources such as 
timber, oil, minerals and metals become a greater priority in financing an insurgent group 
and allowing the internal conflict to continue, after initial support from an external 
supporter may have dried up. These resources can be used to purchase arms and 
ammunition and other commodities to ensure the survival of an insurgent group, after 
their initial formation.
The following tables categorise the forms of external and internal income and resources
the six insurgent groups analysed in this thesis were previously, and are still currently
able to obtain. The external table is broken down into three different sources of finance 
and resources, ranging from likely external sources to unlikely sources of external 
finances. The internal table of finance and resources follows the same methods, but has 
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been broken down into two different sources, thus being regular and irregular sources of 
finance and resources. The external financial income differs for most of the insurgent 
groups as many overseas countries are unwilling to back insurgencies for fear of the 
repercussions. It is also unlikely that aid previously given to insurgencies by external 
governments will not be the same now as it had been prior to the end of the Cold War. 
There is also geographical and strategic factors that are needed to be taken into account. 
For many insurgent groups in this study there is a threat that external aid from countries 
will continue to dry up. Instead, it is likely that many Islamic ideological based insurgent 
groups will rely on regional organisations to obtain funding, like Jemaah Islamiya. Many 
of the same methods used to acquire internal finance and resources by insurgents in 
countries like Indonesia, are the same as those insurgencies operating in both the 
Philippines and Burma, despite the geographical distance.
Table 6.1 Overall Summary of External Finance and Resources
Likely Possibly Unlikely
External  Diasporas
 Al Qaeda
 Jermaah 
Islamiya
 Thailand
 Libya
 Malaysia
 China
 Pakistan
 Syria
 Iran
As can be seen by the above table, Diasporas and Islamic organisations are perhaps the 
most likely source of income for the insurgent groups in the case studies. These 
Diasporas generally come from Muslim workers and followers who support the goals and 
are sympathetic to the causes of these insurgent groups. Diasporas are a more favourable 
form of aid to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia as the logistics that are involved 
through providing military goods can be far more complicated than just providing money.
Diasporas can come from Muslim sympathisers in Southern Thailand, to overseas 
workers as far away as the Middle East. More recently, Al Qaeda in association with 
Osama bin Laden have been identified as a likely supporter of Muslim secessionist 
insurgent groups in the Philippines and Indonesia. This external support is likely to be 
funnelled through the regional organisation Jermaah Islamiya.  Possible external 
supporters include; Thailand, Libya and Malaysia. It is unclear to what extent Thailand is 
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now involved in supporting Burma insurgencies, but support currently is likely to now be 
minimal. Libya are also probably currently involved in minimal or low level support for 
Southeast Asia insurgencies. Malaysia has frequently been accused by governments like 
Indonesia of supporting insurgencies, something consistently denied by the Malaysian 
government. Unlikely but still possible external suppliers of finance and resources to 
insurgent groups include; China, Pakistan, Syria and Iran. China was known to support 
the NPA during the 1960s and 1970s, but any support from their government is now
presumed to be non-existent. Pakistan, Syria and Iran, have appeared in news reports 
about their possible involvement in insurgencies throughout Southeast Asia in the past, 
but little is know about their current involvement in any insurgent movements. External 
methods to obtain finance and resources can then be contrasted to the internal methods 
used by insurgents to obtain financial security. The following table highlights these
internal finances and the resources the six insurgent groups analysed in this thesis have 
relied on.
Table 6.2 Overall Summary of Internal Finances and Resources
Regular Irregular
Internal  Trade Gates – tax
 Illegal Logging
 Tax on Local Villagers 
 Tax on Business & Companies
 The Trade & Cultivation of 
Marijuana
 Villager Support & Donations
 Islamic Charities
 Revolutionary Taxes (NPA)
 Drug Trafficking
 Crime 
 Kidnapping
 Prostitution
 Production of Crystal 
Methamphetamines 
 Piracy
The most important source of internal income for these insurgent groups tends to come 
from different form of taxation. For the KNU, one of their more important sources of 
income comes from charging tax on goods passing through trade gates on the Thailand 
and Burma borders. In general, tax on the local villagers was one of the major sources of 
income for the insurgent groups. This coupled with villager support and donations are 
also of vital importance, as it provides money as well as food and resources to the 
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insurgent groups. Revolutionary taxes the term described by the NPA for their taxation 
methods were of vital importance in securing some form of income for their group. Tax 
on business and companies also tends to be an important source of internal income for 
most of the insurgent groups. This is especially the case for most logging companies 
carrying out operations in insurgent controlled areas. They were especially targeted as a 
vital source of income. Furthermore, illegal logging was also a method employed by a 
number of the insurgent groups in this study; however taxation on the logging companies 
seemed to be the more preferable option. Other important sources of internal income 
tended to come from both the trade and cultivation of marijuana and donations from 
Islamic charities.
Less regular sources of internal income for the insurgents groups in the study came from 
drug trafficking, crime, kidnapping, prostitution, production of crystal 
methamphetamines and piracy. Drug trafficking was reported from time to time, but it 
seems that most of the insurgent groups prefer to produce drugs like marijuana before 
selling the crop on. Crime, kidnapping and prostitution are all possible sources of income 
mentioned for insurgent groups. The MNLF were also reported as being involved in the 
production of crystal methamphetamines. As far as piracy is concerned only GAM were 
reported to be involved in this method in order to obtain sought after contraband goods.
Kidnapping is becoming a more prevalent trend with large ransom payments demanded. 
However, the main perpetrator of these activities has come from terrorist organisations 
like the Abu Sayyaf. Why there are numerous other sources of finances and resources 
available to these insurgent groups, these tend to be the most reported sources of methods 
used to obtain income. As has been shown, insurgent groups in Southeast Asia are likely 
to be extremely imaginative and innovative when searching for new forms or internal 
income. If more regular forms of income are lacking for insurgent groups like taxation 
from villagers and business, insurgent groups will look at other ways and means in which 
to secure some form of money or resources. After these finances have been secured, 
insurgent groups may then use the money to buy small arms, in order to carry out armed 
conflict.
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Question 2: The Main Sources for Insurgent Groups in Obtaining Small Arms
The majority of small arms acquired by the insurgent groups in this study have come 
from internal sources. These have included; battlefield acquisition, leakage in 
government stockpiles and indigenous procurement. Small arms acquired through 
battlefield acquisition consist mainly of raids and ambushes on government forces. Raids 
are usually conducted on government weapons depots and military outposts, while 
ambushes usually occur on small groups of government troops. Leakage in government 
stockpiles is another common internal source of weapons for insurgent groups. This 
method of acquiring weapons includes; purchases from soldiers, defectors or corrupt 
officials and theft from government arsenals. Another internal source of small arms 
comes from indigenous production. In comparison to the other two main methods of 
acquiring weapons internally, this method is reasonably insignificant. In this study, apart 
from the MILF most of the other insurgent groups were not know or believed to have any 
operational facilities or abilities in which they could produce their own weaponry. At best 
a few groups like the NPA were believed to have the ability to make primitive pistols and 
shotguns.
In comparison, external methods of acquiring small arms for insurgent groups are much 
more erratic. This form of small arms supply includes purchases from black markets 
(generally from countries in the Southeast Asia region) and small arms transfers from
other countries governments in the form of ‘grey area’ transfers. Other external methods 
of supply can come from commercial motivated sales or private arms dealers. This form 
of supply is dominated by purely financial and profit motivated gains for the seller. As far 
as black market supply is concerned, most arms purchases can be arranged through this 
method as long as the insurgent group can front up with the money. The Thailand black 
market tends to be the one of the most advantageous for acquiring small arms in 
Southeast Asia. Grey area or covert transfers largely depends on the internal political 
context of the country exporting the weapons at the time. During the Post Cold War era 
numerous countries exported small arms to insurgent groups to further their own 
ambitions and goals.
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 The main countries that were frequently mentioned as exporting small arms to insurgent 
groups in this study included; Libya, Malaysia, Thailand, China, and North Korea. Other 
countries that were mentioned rarely or on the odd occasion included; Cambodia, Cuba, 
Pakistan, Vietnam and Iraq. The extent to how many small arms are currently exported 
by countries like Libya and North Korea to insurgencies in Southeast Asia is still 
relatively unknown. However, as previously mentioned it is likely that the previous
military aid given by Libya and Thailand to insurgents in the Philippines and Burma 
respectively is now minimal. It is also likely that military aid once provided by China to 
various Southeast Asia insurgencies is now non-existent, or occurs at a very low level, as 
part of grey area transfers. On the other hand, Malaysia is still frequently accused by 
neighbouring countries and other countries in the region of Southeast Asia of providing 
weaponry and logistical support to insurgent movements in the area, especially in the 
case of Islamic ideological based insurgencies. This has been frequently denied by the 
Malaysian government, on numerous occasions. Another source of external arms supply
that is becoming more essential is from regional organisations like Jemaah Islamiya, who 
are funded from sources such as Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. These internal and 
external sources of small arms can be summed up in the table below
Table 6.3 Overall Summary of External and Internal Sources of Small Arms
Likely Possibly
External  Black Market Sales –
Thailand & Cambodia
 Malaysia
 Jeemah Islamiya
 Thailand
 Libya
 North Korea
 Iraq
 Cambodia
 Cuba
 China
Internal  Battlefield Acquisition
 Leakage in Government 
Stockpiles
 Indigenous Procurement
Previous literature on the subject of small arms transfers to insurgents groups has 
highlighted a number of main sources where insurgents are able to acquire armaments 
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from in Southeast Asia. Capie (2002) states that there are three main channels through 
which small arms  pass through on the way to the illicit circuit, which include leakage, 
commercially motivated sales and grey area transfers. Klare (1998) highlights a number 
of sources that insurgent groups can obtain small arms from including; covert transfers 
black market sales, theft of government stocks and exchanges between criminal 
organisations. Kramer (2004) believes that there are two main sources for insurgents in 
obtaining small arms, thus being the black market and leakage in government stockpiles. 
Sislin and Pearson (2001) divided arms transfers into three main categories; importation, 
domestic procurement and indigenous production. Furthermore, they have also identified 
an arms supplier as being either; contiguous, regional or extraregional.   
This thesis has expanded on these characteristics of small arms transfers to insurgent 
groups by analysing the supply of small arms from two different sources, external and 
internal. As far as external sources are concerned three main supply methods have been 
identified in this thesis. Firstly, overseas black markets are a significant source of small 
arm supply for numerous insurgents groups in Southeast Asia. As long as an insurgent 
group has the money, most arms purchases can be arranged through the black market. 
Two of the more popular black markets include both Thailand and Cambodia. Thailand is 
used as one of the main transit areas for any small arm transfers and is a logical place to 
purchase small arms from. Cambodia after previous civil wars is still home to a 
significant number of excess small arms, which has allowed arms dealers to establish 
pipelines. Secondly, grey area or covert transfers are another substantial source of small 
arms. The literature would tend to suggest that Malaysia is the main regional supplier of 
small arms to various insurgent groups. Extraregional sources include countries like
North Korea and Libya.  Thirdly, and what is becoming more considerable, is the 
logistical support provided to insurgents in Southeast Asia by regional organisations like 
Jeemah Islamiya, who not only provide finances but also weapons. These organisations 
have direct links to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.  
When it comes to the internal sources of supply for small arms, this thesis has again 
identified three main methods of acquisition. First, there is battlefield acquisition, as in 
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weapons obtained through direct confrontation with government forces, or weapons 
acquired through raids and ambushes on government forces and depots. This method of 
obtaining weapons can also be part of the second main internal source for obtaining small 
arms, leakage. Leakage can arise from corrupt government soldiers or officials selling 
weapons, but it can also be used as a term to describe the loss of weapons in supply 
depots due to raids by insurgent groups. Finally, the remaining main method of obtaining 
small arms through internal methods is through, indigenous procurement of production. 
This method is the least likely of the three to be the most fruitful when an insurgent
groups is trying to source or establish a supply of arms. The only insurgent group in this 
study believed to have some sort of firearms factory with the capacity to produce small 
arms was the MILF. For many insurgent groups the technical abilities or resources 
required to produce small arms is virtually impossible or impractical. Hence, very few 
insurgent groups are even capable of producing their own arms.
Question Three: The Effects of Small Arms Use on Internal Conflicts
This thesis has focused on the effects of small arms use on internal conflicts in general, 
but has analysed in depth and more specifically two variables of internal conflict, 
duration and intensity. While perhaps it would have been more preferable to discuss other 
variables of internal conflict, due to time constraints, it was not practical. However, both 
duration and intensity are important variables to analyse when discussing the effects of 
small arms use by insurgent groups in internal conflict. Both the duration and intensity of 
internal conflict can be correlated with small arms transfers to insurgent groups. This 
leads to the issue of whether small arms transfers to insurgent groups leads to greater 
violence through the usage of small arms, which then contributes to the increased
duration and intensity of internal conflicts. 
Sislin and Pearson (2001) argue that three factors increase the duration of conflict when 
small arms are involved, these include; increased quantity of arms available, increased 
number of suppliers and the deployment of heavy weapons (ibid:91). As far as Southeast 
Asia is concerned to a large extent, this can also considered to be the case. Most of the 
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insurgent groups in this thesis have lacked the ability to obtain small arms in bulk, have 
struggled to find numerous suppliers and have been deficient in the capacity or ability to 
operate heavy weapons. For most of the insurgent groups a lack of a foreign supplier has 
severely hampered any major military offensives they may have been planning. In the 
case of Burma, the lack of any foreign supplier for both insurgent groups has basically 
meant that they are solely reliant on internal methods to obtain arms, something which is 
not practical. This argument ties in with Sislin and Pearson’s (2001) view that, duration 
of an internal conflict is dependent on the number of external suppliers. However, many 
of the insurgent groups have shown in this study that it is still possible to continue in an 
internal conflict situation with limited arms supplies and suppliers. While an external
foreign supplier can be crucial in sustaining an insurgent group in conflict, internal 
sources of supply it can be argued are just as important. This was highlighted by GAM 
leader Hasan ti Tiro who placed too much emphasis on obtaining external support, which 
meant he neglected to achieve the support he needed internally to be able fight the 
Indonesian forces. This eventually led to GAM’s military defeat soon after their initial
formation.
Sislin and Pearson (2001) have also argued that the more external suppliers a non-state 
group receives the more commitment they will have to continue backing their client, 
which will also increase the duration of conflict in the long term. In the case of Southeast 
Asia this largely does not seem to be the case. For many of the insurgent groups in this 
study, their initial formation was backed by at least one external supplier. However, many 
of these suppliers who previously supplied arms to these insurgents groups during their 
formation, are no longer willing or in the position to supply small arms currently. The 
supply of small arms to insurgents has also increased the duration of conflict in Southeast 
Asia, as it has resulted in a form of military stalemate between the parties in the conflict. 
This is a factor that is understood by some insurgent groups, as highlighted by a GAM 
member who thought that the military stalemate was a benefit to his group, as they aimed 
to exhaust the Indonesian government financially. Neither side has been able to defeat the 
other through military means, which has resulted in numerous peace talks. This brings up 
the argument as claimed by all three governments in the case studies, that the insurgents 
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groups use these peace talks to regroup and rearm themselves, which has increased the 
duration of conflict in these countries. However, while there is evidence to suggest that 
this may possibly be true in some cases, it is hard to say whether it is government 
paranoia or fact. The concept of small arms use and the effects it has on the duration of
internal conflicts can also be tied into the effects small arms have on the intensity of 
internal conflicts. 
Generally it can be hypothesised that small arms plus the addition of heavier weapons 
(tanks, fighter aircraft, artillery etc.) that are involved in internal conflict the more intense 
the fighting will be, resulting in greater casualties. However, this may not always be the 
case as can be seen in third world countries where an ethnic grievance is involved. In 
some of these cases small arms are still the principal cause of causalities, for example 
Rwanda and Sudan. Sislin and Pearson (2001) argue that supplies of heavy weapons are 
more likely to lead to intense fighting than light weapons (ibid:93). Furthermore, Sislin 
and Pearson (2001) argue that the greater the number of arms suppliers, the more intense 
the fighting (ibid:93).  In Southeast Asia the lack of heavy weapons for most of the 
insurgent groups has prevented many of the internal conflicts turning into full scaled civil
wars. Generally heavy weapons have tended to be more an exception than a rule within 
the internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. However casualties have still been severe 
throughout many areas of the countries in the case studies. According to the Uppsala 
dataset on armed conflict (Gledistch et al:2002) all of the conflicts in this study are 
generally either involved in intermediate armed conflict (at least 25 battle related deaths 
per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths), or war (at least 1,000 battle 
related deaths per year). This has been mainly due to the ability of insurgent groups to 
carry out sustained fighting due to their ability to access some form of arms supply, 
whether external or internal. In the case of the Philippines guerrilla tactics and the use of 
small arms, not access to heavy weapons were perceived to be exacting higher casualties 
as well as increasing the duration of the conflict (Oxfam International:2001).
The intensity of many internal conflicts is also dependent not only on the supply of small 
arms, but also on the supply of ammunition. The SSA in Burma were more concerned 
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about ammunition preservation than finding a foreign supplier for small arms. This is 
something frequently overlooked by much of the current literature. Intense fighting 
within internal conflicts in Southeast Asia does also seem to be linked to having at least 
one foreign supplier. With a foreign supplier it allows the insurgent group the ability to 
have some form of continuous supply, instead of having to worry about obtaining arms 
through internal supply’s, which can be erratic. This study has also found that due to the 
lack of supply in small arms most of the insurgent groups face, battles between insurgent 
and government forces occur on a frequent basis, but are of a relatively low intensity. 
Numerous reasons for this exist, such as the ability for the insurgent force to field enough 
troops and the lack of appropriate ammunition the group may have. Another perhaps 
more notable reason is that in many of the cases where insurgent groups are involved in 
conflict, it is for the explicit purpose of obtaining arms through the use of raids and 
ambushes. These ‘hit and run’ raids occur frequently by many of the insurgent groups in 
this study. For example, the NPA have formed ‘sparrow units’ with the explicit purpose 
of obtaining weapons from government forces. These kinds of tactics have seen an 
increase in the frequency of attacks on government forces, but occur within a relatively 
short time frame of fighting. In general the amount of small arms supplied to insurgent 
groups in Southeast Asia, will usually dictate both the duration and intensity of fighting 
within internal conflicts. The greater the access to supply an insurgent group has, the 
more likely it will be involved in continuous fighting. 
6.2 Conclusion and Possible Policy Recommendations for Curbing the Use of Small 
Arms by Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia
As previously mentioned at the start of this chapter, the problem of small arms transfers 
to insurgents in Southeast Asia is becoming an ever-increasing problem. If this problem 
is not addressed by governments in Southeast Asia conflicts that are simmering in 
countries like Thailand, could become further intensified by the ability of insurgents to 
access a supply of small arms. Even if an insurgent group does not have a large 
infrastructure or support base, it may still be able to cause a significant amount of 
causalities, due to their ability to purchase or obtain a constant arms supply. The ability 
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of insurgent groups to access some form of arms supply can be connected to the lax laws 
and regulations that have been put in place by many of the governments in the region. 
These laws have allowed insurgents to obtain arms through corrupt government officials, 
resulting in the problem of leakage in government arsenals. In numerous cases poor stock 
counting systems in place have not picked up the missing weapons. This not only gives 
the opportunity for corrupt soldiers or officials to continue with their activities, but it also 
increases the black market trade in small arms.
One aspect that has been identified in this thesis is the ability of insurgents groups to 
obtain both internal and external finance. This correlated with the operational support 
from many villagers in areas sympathetic to the insurgents cause, has made it extremely 
tough for governments to defeat insurgent forces. As has been seen in Burma, if a 
government is able to target the finances of an insurgent group, it limits the effectiveness 
of that insurgent group to operate. It is astonishing that numerous governments 
throughout Southeast Asia have failed to target or acknowledge the ability of insurgents 
to obtain regular income and resources through external and internal sources. This
method of targeting or limiting the amount of income an insurgent group receives does 
not solve the grievance problem of the insurgent group in the long-term. However, in the 
short term it may limit the ability of the insurgent group to obtain small arms. This is 
especially the case for insurgent groups who obtain small arms through external 
suppliers. Nonetheless, there is very little most governments can do, to stop insurgents 
acquiring small arms through internal methods. Raids and ambushes will usually take 
place on small groups of soldiers or on arsenal depots that have minimal security. 
As this thesis has shown there are numerous supply channels and sources in which non-
state actors like insurgent groups can obtain small arms. While it is one thing to identify 
the supply factors that contribute to small arms transfers, it is another issue altogether to 
address the factors that drive the demand for small arms. These demand factors lead to 
the misuse of small arms and the subsequent causalities that arise from their misuse. 
Thus, when analysing the dynamics of small arms transfers to insurgents in Southeast 
Asia, governments need to take into account both the 'supply' and 'demand' factors. By 
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addressing not only the supply factors but also the demand factors for small arms, 
governments in Southeast Asia will be able to identify the alternatives or economic 
choices available to insurgent groups. This again will involve analysing where insurgents 
receive their sources of funding from. Furthermore, it will open the door for future 
conflict management attempts as governments will be able to offer economic alternatives 
to insurgent groups still involved in active armed conflict.
A key feature in the research of small arm transfers that needs to improve in order for 
effective policies to be created is the need to develop more comprehensive forms of 
quantitative data on small arms. As discussed in Chapter Two there have been numerous 
improvements in research methodologies and data bases on small arms.  However, there 
is still plenty of room for improvement. Creating a quantitative database on small arms 
would help future researchers analysing the problems associated with small arms 
transfers not only in Southeast Asia, but throughout other regions in the world. 
Nevertheless, the amount of research and studies using increasing sophisticated 
qualitative data and participative methodologies has increased dramatically over the last 
few years. It is the future job of researchers and academics to design studies like this
thesis, that will help inform policy-makers in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world on 
how to best address the problems associated with small arms transfers to non-state actors. 
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